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Why are some city governments more innovative than others? In this thesis, 
I provide a theoretical framework that combines conventional explanations, namely 
leadership and society, with an arguably less-conventional one based on theories of 
transaction cost.  The ‘leadership, society, transactions’ (LST) framework examines 
the extent to which transformational leadership, progressive society, and efficient 
transaction costs could help explain the governance of ‘innovative’ and ‘typical’ 
cities of the Philippines and Indonesia.  
 Conventional explanations of innovation in city governance largely hinge on 
two main camps: leadership (charisma, commitment, and diversity of experience) 
and society (norms and values, organization of civil society, and history). The notion 
of transaction costs was initially developed to explain different governance 
structures (Williamson 1996, 1979, Coase 1937). They include the costs of obtaining 
information, of engaging in negotiations, and of monitoring and enforcing a contract 
(Dahlman 1979). While transaction costs have been used to explore a wide range of 
questions, it has rarely been used to explain public innovations.  
This thesis expands the application of transaction cost analysis on city 
governance innovation. Drawing from data of public innovation award winners and 
additional background checks, I identified four ‘innovative’ and four ‘typical’ mid-
sized city governments in Indonesia and the Philippines. Next, I conducted fieldwork 
to explore the extent to which transformational leadership, progressive society, and 
efficient transaction costs were present in these cities over a period of 10-20 years.  
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I find that the four ‘innovative’ city governments showed notable presence 
of all three explanatory factors while ‘typical’ city governments tend to lack one, 
two, or all three factors. Two cities deserve a special note: Dagupan (the Philippines) 
showed that a combination of transformational leaders and progressive society 
were not sufficient to explain innovativeness when the city’s leaders constantly 
faced high transaction costs of governing. Meanwhile, Samarinda (Indonesia) 
showed that having efficient transaction costs were similarly insufficient to enable 
innovativeness without transformational leadership and progressive society.  
These findings raise questions about the dominance of the leadership 
(agency) and societal institutions (structure) arguments in explaining innovation. 
Instead, I argue that a mezzo-level structure linking leaders with their social and 
political setting is present in the form of transaction costs, and that they, too, may 
play a role in explaining public innovation. These provide implications for policy 
makers, especially the national government, in their attempt to enable more public 
service innovations at the local level. The findings also highlight opportunities for 
further research in the application of institutional analysis on public management 
and urban governance, especially in mid-sized cities. 
The research faced some limitations in the lack of objective and quantifiable 
data on public innovation, leadership, and social norms at the local level. Despite 
efforts to ensure validity, issues of endogeneity persist and biases may have 
influenced the selection of cases, the answering of interview questions, and the 
analysis of data. The transaction cost framework to explain local public innovation is 
in an early stage and would benefit from further empirical work. Growing interest in 




List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Eight City Governments Studied in the thesis ............................................................ 11 
Table 2: Defining Explanatory Factors: Leadership and Society ............................................... 60 
Table 3: Defining Explanatory Factors: Transaction Costs ....................................................... 64 
Table 4: The Philippines’ ‘innovative’ cities.............................................................................. 75 
Table 5: Short list of ‘typical’ cities to compare with Marikina ................................................ 76 
Table 6: Short list of ‘typical’ cities to compare with Naga City ............................................... 76 
Table 7: Indonesia’s ‘innovative’ cities ..................................................................................... 79 
Table 8: Shortlist of ‘typical’ cities to compare with Balikpapan ............................................. 81 
Table 9: Shortlist of ‘typical’ cities to compare with Pekalongan ............................................ 81 
Table 10: Formal interviews conducted (by city and stakeholder) .......................................... 85 
Table 11: Coding Categories and Sub-categories ..................................................................... 89 
Table 12: Sample Truth Table: Configurations of Outcome and Explanatory Factors ............. 91 
Table 13: Sample Set Analysis: Expected and Unexpected Observations ................................ 92 
Table 14: Galing Pook Awards for Naga City .......................................................................... 108 
Table 15: Case Summary:  Leadership, Society, and Transaction Costs in Naga .................... 123 
Table 16: Case Summary:  Leadership, Society, and Transaction Costs in Dagupan .............. 139 
Table 17: Galing Pook Awards for Marikina City .................................................................... 142 
Table 18: Case Summary:  Leadership, Society, and Transaction Costs in Marikina .............. 157 
Table 19: Case Summary:  Leadership, Society, and Transaction Costs in Malabon .............. 173 
Table 20: Case Summary:  Leadership, Society, and Transaction Costs in Balikpapan .......... 196 
Table 21: Case Summary:  Leadership, Society, and Transaction Costs in Samarinda ........... 212 
Table 22: Awards highlighting Pekalongan City’s innovations ............................................... 215 
Table 23: Case Summary:  Leadership, Society, and Transaction Costs in Pekalongan.......... 227 
Table 24: Case Summary:  Leadership, Society, and Transaction Costs in Tanjungpinang .... 243 
Table 25: Leadership in ‘Innovative’ and ‘Typical’ Cases ........................................................ 246 
Table 26: Observations linking Leadership with Innovativeness ............................................ 246 
Table 27: Society in ‘Innovative’ and ‘Typical’ Cases .............................................................. 252 
vii 
 
Table 28: Observations linking Society with Innovativeness .................................................. 252 
Table 29: Information Costs in ‘Innovative’ and ‘Typical’ Cases ............................................ 259 
Table 30: Negotiation Costs in ‘Innovative’ and ‘Typical’ Cases ............................................. 263 
Table 31: Enforcement Costs in ‘Innovative’ and ‘Typical’ Cases ........................................... 269 
Table 32: Transaction Costs in ‘Innovative’ and ‘Typical’ Cases ............................................. 272 
Table 33: Observations linking Transaction Cost with Innovativeness .................................. 273 
Table 34: Comparing transaction cost factors between Innovative and Typical cases .......... 274 
Table 35: Truth Table with Configurations of Cases ............................................................... 279 
Table 36: Truth Table with Types of Change .......................................................................... 282 
Table 37: Leadership in Philippine and Indonesian Cases ...................................................... 286 
Table 38: Society in Philippine and Indonesian Cases ............................................................ 287 
Table 39: Transaction Costs in Philippine and Indonesian Cases ........................................... 287 





List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: The ‘Leadership, Society, Transactions’ Framework ................................................. 10 
Figure 2: Structure of the Thesis .............................................................................................. 17 
Figure 3: Structure of the Literature Review ............................................................................ 21 
Figure 4: Map of the literature: Leadership factors related to innovativeness ....................... 31 
Figure 5: Map of the literature: Society factors related to innovativeness ............................. 37 
Figure 6: Map of the literature: Transaction cost factors related to innovativeness ............... 48 
Figure 7: Analytical Framework: Outcome and Explanatory Factors ....................................... 58 
Figure 8: Research Reference from Governing the Commons ................................................. 70 
Figure 9: Data Analysis Procedure ............................................................................................ 88 
Figure 10: Sample Set Analysis: Cases in relation to Explanatory Factors ............................... 92 
Figure 11: Number of Philippine cities by population, 2014 .................................................. 104 
Figure 12: Indicative Location of Philippine Cases ................................................................. 106 
Figure 13: Number of Indonesian cities by population, 2013 ................................................ 179 
Figure 14: Indicative Locations of Indonesian Cases .............................................................. 180 
Figure 15: Cases in relation to sets of Leadership Sub-factors ............................................... 247 
Figure 16: Cases in relation to sets of Society Sub-factors ..................................................... 253 
Figure 17: Cases in relation to sets of Transaction Cost Sub-factors ..................................... 273 
Figure 18: Comparing Explanatory Factors between Innovative and Typical Cases .............. 277 
Figure 19: Comparing Explanatory Factors between Philippine and Indonesian Cases ......... 291 





List of Abbreviations & Terminology 
 
AAA Highest level of contractor's license, given by the Philippine Contractors 
Accreditation Board 
ACF Advocacy Coalition Framework - a public policy framework by Sabatier 
(1988) 
AIMM Urban Poor Alliance of Malabon City, the Philippines 
APEKSI Asosiasi Pemerintah Kota Seluruh Indonesia - Indonesian Association of City 
Governments 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Barangay The smallest local government unit in the Philippines 
BF Bayani F. Fernando (Mayor of Marikina City, the Philippines, 1992-2001) 
CMP Community Mortgage Program (of the Philippine government) 
CPR Common pool resources 
CSO Civil society organizations 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
DAU Dana Alokasi Umum (general purpose grant) - Indonesia 
DILG Department of Interior and Local Governments (of the Philippines) 
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat - the national legislative agency of Indonesia 
DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah - regional legislative agencies in Indonesia 
FOSS Free and Open Source Software 
GP Galing Pook ('Great Places' in Filipino). Refers to: (1) award for 'innovation 
and excellence in local governance', (2) foundation administering the award. 
GRDP Gross Regional Domestic Product 
ICT Information and communications technology 
ID Indonesia 
IGA Innovative Government Award - Indonesia 
IMP Inovasi Manajemen Perkotaan ('Urban Management Innovation'). A national 
award for innovative urban management in Indonesia. 
IRA Internal Revenue Allotment – the Philippines 
JATAM Jaringan Advokasi Tambang (Advocacy Network for Mining Issues). An 
Indonesian NGO 
Kecamatan Sub-district (Indonesian) - sub-city government unit 
Kelurahan Village (Indonesian) - smallest local government unit of Indonesia. Used 
primarily in the urban context. 
x 
 
LCP League of Cities of the Philippines 
LGU Local Government Unit 
LST Leadership-Society-Transactions (a theoretical framework offered in this 
thesis) 
MCF Marides Carlos Fernando (Mayor of Marikina City, the Philippines, 2001-
2010) 
MNDC Metro Naga Development Council 
MMDA Metro Manila Development Authority 
MOH Ministry of Home Affairs (of Indonesia) 
MS Multiple Streams - a public policy framework by Kingdon (1984) 
NCPC Naga City People's Council 
NCR National Capital Region of the Philippines. Also known as 'Metro Manila'. 
NGO Non-government organization 
NPM New Public Management - a paradigm of public administration 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PH The Philippines 
PIP Productivity Improvement Program (of Naga City, the Philippines) 
PNPM Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (National Community 
Empowerment Program of the Indonesian government) 
PO People's organization 
QCA Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
R&D Research and Development 
RW Rukun Warga - Community-level organization in Indonesia 
Sinovik Kompetisi Inovasi Pelayanan Publik (Public Service Innovation Competition) - 
Indonesia 
TC Transaction cost 
UCLG United Cities and Local Governments 
UN-HABITAT United Nations Programme on Human Settlements 
UP University of the Philippines 
1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
This thesis attempts to explain why some city governments have been more 
innovative1 than others. It does so by offering a new theoretical framework that 
combines more conventional explanations, namely leadership and society, with an 
arguably less conventional one drawn from the theories of transaction cost.  The 
‘leadership, society, transactions’ framework examines the extent to which 
transformational leadership, progressive society, and efficient transaction costs 
were present in the governing of ‘innovative’ and ‘typical’ cities over extended 
periods of time. The research focuses on medium or mid-sized cities in the 
Philippines and Indonesia to acknowledge notable gaps in the literature. 
Public Innovation 
The first decade of the 21st century saw a rise in the number of prestigious 
global awards for city government innovations. The Lee Kuan Yew World City Prize 
(since 2008), the Innovative City of the Year Award (since 2013), the Guangzhou 
International Award for Urban Innovation (since 2014), and Bloomberg 
Philanthropies’ Mayors Challenge competition (since 2014) were just a few of the 
recently established initiatives to acknowledge bold ideas well-implemented by city 
governments.2  
                                                          
1 ‘Innovative’ and ‘innovativeness’ refer to the introduction of a large number of (public) 
innovations over time 
2 These awards were generally conducted by or in collaboration with notable research or 
government institutions, such as Singapore’s Urban Redevelopment Authority (Lee Kuan 
Yew World City Prize), the Urban Land Institute (Innovative City of the Year Award), United 
Cities and Local Governments and Metropolis (Guangzhou Award), as well as LSE Cities, 
Nesta, and EuroCities (Mayors Challenge). 
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At the national and regional level, these awards have started at least since 
the 1980s. The U.S. was among the first to recognize local public innovations 
through the Innovations in American Government Award, which started in 1986 at 
the Harvard Kennedy School. Meanwhile, in Europe, we find the European Public 
Sector Award (since 2008) and in Africa, the All Africa Public Sector Innovation 
Awards (since 2005). In Asia such initiatives include the Chinese Local Governance 
Innovation Award (hosted by the Central Party School and Peking University since 
2001) and Indonesia’s Urban Management Innovation Award (hosted by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs since 2008). In the Philippines, the Galing Pook Award for 
innovation and excellence in local governance began earlier in 1993 by the 
Department of Interior and Local Governments, in line with the start of the country’s 
massive decentralization effort. Various public organizations to support innovation 
have also been established, such as MindLab in Denmark, La 27e Région in France, 
Galing Pook Foundation in the Philippines, and Laboratorio para la Ciudad in Mexico 
City. Some cities have also revised their management approach to enable more 
creativity in the conduction of public affairs (Berman and Kim 2010). 
Along with increased public attention, academic studies of public innovation 
have expanded considerably. In the 1970s and 1980s, such studies mainly used cases 
to critique the predominantly risk-averse culture of the public sector (i.e., Windrum 
and Koch 2008 provides a review of past studies). Since the 2000’s, however, there 
have been more quantitative research on the topic. Some of these took the sampling 
frame from past innovation award winners (Grady 1992, Borins 2000b, 2001, 2014); 
others from surveys of local government officials, such as those conducted in the UK 
(Walker 2006, Audit Commission 2007), Australia (Arundel and Huber 2013, 
Considine and Lewis 2007), the Nordic countries (Bloch and Bugge 2013, Bloch 
2011), the Philippines (Capuno 2011), and Thailand (Lorsuwannarat 2013). 
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Public innovation arguably provides an opportunity to better understand the 
processes of public policy-making. The phases of public innovation is similar to those 
found in a public policy ‘cycle’, such as agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-
making, implementation, and evaluation (Jann and Wegrich 2007, Howlett, Ramesh, 
and Perl 2009). For example, Eggers and Singh (2009) provides a ‘policy innovation 
cycle’ with four phases: generation and discovery, selection, implementation, and 
diffusion. Similarly, Albury (2005) proposed a ‘framework of public sector 
innovation’ which is similarly a ‘cycle’ which include generating possibilities, 
incubating and prototyping promising ideas, replication and scaling up, and analysis 
and learning.  
Despite more research on public innovation, there remains a dearth of 
theoretical propositions on factors that drive city governments to be innovative. 
Much of the attention still remains on the descriptive side, such as clarifying 
definitions, establishing boundaries, developing typologies, and identifying the 
objectives, outcomes, and key issues of public innovation (for example, see Osborne 
and Brown 2013, Stewart‐Weeks and Kastelle 2015, De Vries, Bekkers, and Tummers 
2015). Answers to the ‘why’ of public innovation tend to be provided as lists of 
factors that are conducive to innovation. Among others, such list include: (1) 
leadership and culture, (2) pulls and pushes, (3) creativity and recombination, (4) 
prototypes and pilots, (5) scaling and diffusion, and (6) sophisticated risk 
management (Mulgan 2007). Another list presents four institutional factors that 
encourage and discourage local public innovation: (1) national politics, (2) networks 
and partnerships, (3) incentives, and (4) citizen or user demand (Newman, Raine, 
and Skelcher 2001).  
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A more comprehensive theoretical framework is offered in the form of a 
‘public sector innovation ecosystem’ which includes four overlapping and ‘mutually  
dependent’ factors, namely consciousness, capacity, courage, and co-creation 
(Bason 2010). On the same note, a strong argument has been made on the 
importance of power, networks, norms, and procedures in determining the 
likelihood of innovation in government (Considine, Lewis, and Alexander 2009). 
However, such explanatory offerings are still rare.  
Further exploration of the literature on similar concepts to ‘innovation’, such 
as ‘development’, ‘progress’, and ‘change’, found heavy emphases on the role of 
individuals (agents) and society (structure). The leadership argument tends to be 
popular in explaining change and innovation as it confirms the intuition of some 
people in developing countries who see themselves as ‘paternalistic’ (KEMENPANRB 
2013, Kasuya 2009). Meanwhile, the society argument tends to be popular in 
explaining stasis or lack of innovations as it adheres to many people’s understanding 
on the institutional difficulties of introducing change. However, so far, no theoretical 
framework that links leadership, society, and public innovation has been offered. 
Opportunities for Research Contribution 
There are at least three opportunities to contribute to the development of 
the literature on public innovation: (1) applying insights from institutional analysis, 
(2) expanding the topic to mid-sized cities, and (3) expanding the topic to the 
context of Indonesia and the Philippines.  
First, the literature on public innovation could benefit from insights from 
related academic fields such as institutional analysis (Ménard and Shirley 2008, 
Ostrom 2005). The notion of ‘innovation’ shifts the emphasis of public management 
away from mere efficiency, and places a larger premium on achieving effectiveness, 
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disrupting routines (Bessant 2005), taking risks (Bhatta 2003), building trusts (Potts 
2009), and co-creating through networks and partnerships (Alves 2013, Bason 2010). 
Some of these themes are related to the notions of ‘transaction costs’ (Williamson 
2010), which have been explored more extensively in the field of institutional 
analysis.  
Transaction costs have been utilized to approach a wide range of questions. 
In relation to innovation, there has been much discussion on the relationship 
between the form and size of an organization and its likelihood to adopt innovations 
(Damanpour 1987, 1992, Wolter and Veloso 2008). Transaction costs have also been 
linked to the processes of learning across different organizations or ‘open 
innovation’ (Nooteboom 2007, Remneland‐Wikhamn and Knights 2012, Kortelainen, 
Kutvonen, and Torkkeli 2012). More specifically on cities, the transaction cost 
approach has been used to explain high occurrence of private innovation in certain 
cities, where it is argued that the presence of trust, networks, and other forms of 
social capital contribute to lesser transaction costs, greater positive externalities, 
and create a more conducive environment for open innovation (Piore and Sabel 
1984, Storper 1993, Saxenian 1996). Similar applications of transaction cost analysis 
on public management issues, however, have been rarely found. 
Second, there is an opportunity to expand the literature on urban studies. 
With increasing awareness of urbanization and the important role of cities (Glaeser 
2011, Dobbs et al. 2011), the spotlight is shifting to city governments and city 
leaders (Barber 2013). In the developed and developing world alike, city 
governments are expected to deliver not just performance, but also innovations to 
solve new types of problems and/or old problems of unprecedented scale. Topics 
related to cities and urban regions, such as urban politics (Judge, Stoker, and 
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Wolman 1995, Cox 1995), urban competitiveness (Begg 1999, Ni and Qiongjie 2014), 
the creative and cultural industries (Florida 2002, Landry 2008), social equity 
(Fainstein 2010, Harvey 1988), and the role of civil society (Douglass and Friedmann 
1998) in the city are now at the forefront of policy makers’ and scholars’ attention. 
Issues related to ‘managing fast growing cities’ have been well documented (for 
example, see Devas and Rakodi 1993). Substantial research has also been conducted 
on prominent urban areas, such as ‘global’ or ‘world’ cities (Newman and Thornley 
2005, Sassen 2001, Massey 2007) and various metropolitan regions of the world 
(Jones 2002, Jones and Douglass 2008, Laquian 2005, Forbes 1996).  
However, there have been limited studies on second-tier and medium-sized 
cities. Consequently, we know much less on the specific issues faced by mid-sized 
cities, including the ways in which they deal with their problems with the limited 
capacity that they have. With a few exceptions (Fulton 2002, Hildreth 2007, Klinken 
and Berenschot 2014), existing research on mid-sized cities tend to be more 
economic-focused (Bolton and Hildreth 2013, Markusen, Lee, and DiGiovanna 1999, 
Puissant and Lacour 2011). More research on secondary and medium-sized cities 
would be welcomed considering their fast growth (United Nations 2014), their sheer 
number compared to large and metropolitan cities (Giffinger et al. 2007), and their 
role in enabling further urbanization without adding too much pressure on primary 
and major cities. 
Third, there is also an opportunity to expand the literature on 
decentralization and local public management. The management of cities is closely 
related to the level of authority that city governments have. As more developing 
countries adopted devolution since the 1970s and 1980s, there has been increasing 
interest in local government capacity, the ways in which they are managed, and how 
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they relate with other actors in the context of local governance (for example, Ahmad 
and Brosio 2009, Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006, Martinez-Vazquez and Vaillancourt 
2011, Grindle 2007). In Asia, a substantial amount of study has been conducted on 
how Chinese cities have been governed in a largely autonomous way, despite the 
country’s single party system (Ma and Wu 2005, Wong, Tang, and van Horen 2006, 
World Bank 1993, Akhmat and Bochun 2010). 
However, there has been less exploration of local public management issues 
in Indonesian and Philippine cities. Among Asian countries, the Philippines and 
Indonesia have been at the forefront of applying wide-scale decentralization in the 
form of devolution. The extent and pace of both country’s decentralization – much 
linked to their quick transition  from authoritarian to democratic regimes – has been 
remarkable compared to that which took place in other countries (Balisacan and Hill 
2007, World Bank 2005). Along with decentralization, Indonesia and the Philippines 
similarly have been facing issues to ensure that local governments deliver quality 
public services. Awards for local government performance and innovations have 
been a widely used tool for this purpose, arguably more so in the Philippines and 
Indonesia compared to other Asian countries. However, not much research has been 
done based on data drawn from these awards. 
Research Questions 
The preceding background identified three research topics that converged in 
this thesis, namely public innovation, mid-sized cities, and the Philippines and 
Indonesia. The primary research question explored in this thesis is: “Why are some 
city governments more innovative than others?”  
Using cases from the Philippines and Indonesia, I breakdown this question 
into four sub-questions: 
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1. To what extent was transformational leadership present in innovative 
and typical city governments? 
2. To what extent were innovative and typical city governments embedded 
in a progressive society? 
3. To what extent did leaders of innovative and typical city governments 
face efficient transaction costs of governing? 
4. How did leadership, society, and transaction costs factors manifest 
themselves in innovative and typical city governments over time? 
1. Hypotheses and Findings 
Existing Explanations 
Conventional explanations of innovativeness largely hinge on two main 
camps: leadership and society. The leadership argument highlights the importance 
individual characteristics of leaders that support organizational development, such 
as charisma, commitment, and diversity of experience. This argument seems to 
explain the case of some local governments that were innovative under the 
leadership of one mayor, while not so innovative under the leadership of the 
subsequent mayor. However, it does not explain why some cities remain 
consistently innovative over the years, mayor after mayor.  
The society argument highlights the importance of deep-rooted institutions 
that are present in the city’s society, such as norms and values, local associations 
and organizations, as well as the city’s recent and distant history. This argument 
seems to explain cases of some city governments which are innovative and have a 
progressive society. However, it does not explain the phenomenon of some cities 
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with unfavorable structural variables that have over time transformed themselves 
for the better, despite the odds.  
Notions of individual actors (i.e., leaders, public entrepreneurs, policy 
brokers) and institutions (i.e., beliefs, networks, path dependency) have been 
similarly explored in the policy studies literature to explain why policies may or may 
not change. Policy change frameworks provide meso-level explanations that explore 
interactions between the ‘agent’ and the ‘structure’. However, most of these 
frameworks do not offer a theory about which circumstances contribute to making 
policy change more likely.  
Proposed Explanation 
This research offers a third viewpoint to explain public innovativeness which 
is based on transaction cost theories. The notion of transaction costs was initially 
developed to explain the existence of different governance structures (Williamson 
1996, 1979, Coase 1937), but it has also been applied to explain innovation in the 
private sector, innovation in the city, and delivery of public services and public 
goods. This thesis argues that transaction cost perspectives could give insight to 
explain public innovativeness in ways that it has not been explained before.  
Transaction costs can be understood as ‘the costs of running the economic 
system’ (Arrow 1969). It includes: (1) information costs, which are related to the 
costs of ‘learning’ about the ‘market’, (2) negotiation costs, or the costs of reaching 
an agreement with different parties, and (3) enforcement costs, which are the costs 
of making sure the agreement is carried out (Dahlman 1979). The New Institutional 
Economics literature argues that economic activities take different forms (ranging 
from buying goods and services in the open market to producing them in-house) 
based on the goal of ‘economizing’ on transaction costs (Williamson 2010).  
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The notion of transaction costs is developed based on the private sector 
context, where it is assumed that economic activities will take place somehow 
because economic actors need to generate profit. However, extending this 
argument to the public sector (where conducting innovations is not a requirement, 
but a risky activity), it could be argued that if transaction costs to conduct 
innovations were too high, such innovation may not take place to begin with.  
This research combines the existing explanations of leadership and society 
with the proposed explanation of transaction costs into a unified ‘Leadership-
Society-Transaction Cost’ framework. The framework explores the ‘presence’ or 
‘absence’ of the three explanatory factors in a city, and expects that city government 
innovativeness may be related to the presence of transformational leadership, 
progressive society, and efficient transaction costs over time. 
























The research explores four ‘innovative’ and four ‘typical’ (non-innovative) 
governments of mid-sized cities in the Philippines and Indonesia (see Table 1). The 
‘innovative’ cases were selected by identifying cities which have won a relatively 
large number of innovation awards. The ‘typical’ cities were selected from a 
sampling frame of non-winners, with a number of background checks to ensure that 
they have not introduced notable innovations despite not winning awards, and 
other measures to ensure apple-to-apple comparison with ‘innovative’ cases.  
Fieldwork and desk study of the eight cases generated primary data in the 
form of interviews and observations, and secondary data in the form of formal city 
statistics, policy documents, and media articles spanning a period of 10-20 years. 
The data was then coded into themes, packaged as analytic narratives, and further 
analyzed using the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method.  The analysis 
aims to identify the extent to which each of the three explanatory factors was 
‘present’ or ‘absent’ in the innovative and typical cases. 
Table 1: Eight City Governments Studied in the thesis 
 Philippine Cities Indonesian Cities 
‘Innovative’ Cases 1. Marikina City,  
National Capital Region  
2. Naga City,  
Camarines Sur 
1. Balikpapan City,  
East Kalimantan 
2. Pekalongan City,  
Central Java  
‘Typical’ Cases 1. Malabon City,  
National Capital Region  
2. Dagupan City,  
Pangasinan 
1. Samarinda City,  
East Kalimantan  
2. Tanjungpinang City,  





The four ‘innovative’ city governments studied in this thesis showed notable 
presence of transformational leadership, progressive society, and efficient 
transaction costs over time. Meanwhile, ‘typical’ city governments tend to be lacking 
in one, two, or all three explanatory factors. This seems to suggest that the three 
explanatory factors may have some association with innovativeness. Out of the four 
‘typical’ cases, two lacked all three explanatory factors, while the other two defied 
both conventional (leadership and society) explanations as well as the proposed 
transaction cost-based explanation.  
First, Dagupan City in the Philippines showed relatively consistent presence 
of transformational leadership and progressive society, but was not identified as an 
‘innovative’ city. Upon further review, it was found that Dagupan’s leaders faced 
largely unfavorable transaction costs of governing the city. This seems to point out 
that leadership and society factors, alone or together, could not fully account for 
innovativeness.  
Second, Samarinda City in Indonesia showed the presence of efficient 
transaction costs, but was similarly not identified as an ‘innovative’ city. Upon 
reviewing the three explanatory factors, it was found that the city lacked having 
consistent presence of transformational leadership and progressive society over 
time. Samarinda showed that having efficient transaction costs, alone, were not 
sufficient to make it an ‘innovative’ city.  
Through a more detailed analysis that takes history into consideration 
(reviewing how leadership, society, and transaction costs manifest over time in each 
city), another ‘special case’ was identified. Marikina City in the Philippines showed 
that innovativeness could be achieved by a strong leader with favorable transaction 
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costs, even if the characteristics of a progressive society were not present. Over 
time, a consistent presence of transformational leaders institutionalized the 
reforms, and facilitated the transformation of civil society to be better organized 
and more meritocratic. However, the odds of relying on such leaders are small. 
The research findings problematize conventional claims on the primacy of 
leadership (agency) alone and deep-rooted societal institutions (structure) alone. 
Instead, it argues that a meso-level structure that links leaders with their social 
setting is present in the form of transaction costs. Transaction costs arguably play an 
important role in a framework that explains local public innovativeness; however, 
they are similarly insufficient. The three explanatory factors need to be examined 
together as one framework.  
2. Scope and Limitations 
The scope of this research needs to be delineated, and some terms need to 
be clarified. First, the phenomenon being studied, namely ‘public innovativeness’ 
should not be taken as inherently virtuous. Innovation may not necessarily lead to 
improvement (Hartley 2005). For example, by innovating an organization may 
experience (temporary) decline of performance due to a ‘learning process’. 
Moreover, politically the results may not be beneficial for all segments of the 
society. Many of the award-winning city government innovations have not gone 
through an ex-post impact evaluation. However, by adopting a specifically public-
sector view of innovation as ‘new ideas that work at creating public value’ (Mulgan 
2007), this thesis intends to associate public innovations with improvements in 
outcomes and processes that benefit the greater society.  
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Similarly, the key explanatory factor proposed in this research (transaction 
costs) is not an inherently virtuous concept. Political and administrative transaction 
costs measure the ease in which decisions could be made and activities could be 
conducted. This thesis argues that the presence of low transaction costs could help 
city leaders conduct innovations. However, whether this is used for good purpose or 
based on good intention is not discussed. Arguably, authoritarian systems and 
indifferent societies provide leaders with very ‘favorable’ transaction costs in 
running the government. In the context of direct democracy, however, awareness of 
transaction costs is beneficial to help ensure that bold, impactful initiatives do not 
become nullified by political and administrative hassles. 
Second, although transaction costs originally came from the domain of 
economics, the transaction costs explored in this thesis are mostly political and 
administrative costs. The analyses, therefore, do not include monetization or 
econometric modeling of such costs, as these were not deemed to be expressly 
necessary to answer the research questions. Rather than measuring the extent of 
such costs in continuous or ordinal construct, a dichotomous or binary construct was 
used. This answers the question of whether a city government faced low 
information, negotiation, and enforcement costs in largely ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ terms. This 
was arguably appropriate for the Qualitative Comparative Analysis methods used in 
the analysis (more about this in chapter 3). 
Third, the topic of the thesis is ultimately about public ‘innovativeness’, not 
‘innovations’. Here, ‘innovativeness’ refers to the extent to which city governments 
have been acknowledged for conducting innovations over multiple years. The 
research therefore does not describe each innovation in detail, and does not 
distinguish the different types of innovation that the city has conducted. Some 
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award-winning programs are described in the case reports (chapters 4 and 5) solely 
as illustration of the types of innovative programs that were conducted. 
Consequently, program-specific details such as how the innovation was 
implemented and who were involved were not explored.  
Fourth, the research embraces a wide spectrum of what is considered as 
‘innovation’ and does not discuss the extent to which the innovations were truly 
‘new to the world’. Indonesia and the Philippines both fall under the World Bank 
classification of ‘lower-middle-income’ economies with GDP per capita between 
$1,046 and $4,125 in 2015,3 where public and private spending on research and 
development tend to be much smaller than in developed countries. Thus some of 
the city governments’ award-winning programs may not be ‘breakthrough’ 
innovations based on the latest technologies or intensive research and 
development, and may have been adopted or ‘learned’ from an existing example.  
Fifth, the notion of ‘medium’ to denote city size is relative.4 In this research, 
‘mid-sized’ refers to cities with population between 100,000 and 1 million. In the 
context of China, for example, a city of four million may be considered as ‘mid-size’. 
But the Philippines have only four metropolitan areas with more than 1 million 
people: Metro Manila (about 11.8 million), Metro Cebu (2.5 million), Metro Davao 
(2.2 million), and Metro Cagayan de Oro (1.2 million). Out of the country’s 144 cities, 
the majority (90 cities) have between 100,000 and 500,000 population in 2010. 
Indonesia may have some larger metropolitan areas, such as Greater Jakarta (about 
28 million), Greater Bandung (7.8 million), and Greater Surabaya (6.5 million). But 
                                                          
3 http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups 
4 Countries classify city size in various ways, mostly based on population. For example, mid-
sized cities are defined by a population range of 250,000 to 500,000 (U.K.), 100,000 to 
300,000 (U.S.), and 200,000 to 700,000 (Vietnam). In Indonesia, second-tier cities may 
include ‘large’ (but not ‘metropolitan’) cities with a population between 500,000 and 1 
million, and ‘medium’ cities with 100,000 to 500,000 inhabitants.  
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among the country’s 93 autonomous cities, only 12 had more than 1 million people 
in 2010. The majority (58 cities) had between 100,000 and 500,000 residents.  
Sixth, a ‘city’ in this research refers to a political and administrative entity, 
rather than a functional urban agglomeration. It is a populated geographic area 
delineated by law, governed by a city government organization, and fulfils some 
criteria adopted by the national government that identify it as a ‘city’.5  Since this 
research focuses on the topic of public management, and does not particularly 
address issues related to regional economics and governance, whether or not the 
‘city’ in question is part of another city’s greater metropolitan area is not considered 
as a key defining character. 
Seventh, both the Philippines and Indonesia are relatively ‘new’ multi-party 
democracies that have implemented extensive decentralization. This makes them 
subject to conditions which may be different from those faced by well-established 
democracies, limited democracies, or non-democracies. For example, in Indonesia 
and the Philippines city mayors are directly elected, as are members of the city 
council. Also, most city governments in Indonesia, as well as ‘highly-urbanized’ and 
‘independent component’ cities in the Philippines are politically autonomous 
entities. This means that in the conduction of local affairs, their liability to the 
provincial and national governments is limited. The transaction costs that they face, 
therefore, are different compared to those faced by non-autonomous cities, as well 
as cities in single-party states and other limited types of democracies. 
                                                          
5 Such criteria typically include higher density, large presence of service or manufacturing 
industries, and availability of social and administrative facilities, among others 
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3. Structure of the Thesis   
The thesis is organized in seven chapters, reflective of the sequence in which 
the research was actually conducted (see Figure 2). Chapter 1 has provided a 
starting point into the research by presenting its motivations, the questions that it 
aims to answer, its scope and limitations, and expected contributions.  









Chapter 2 (Literature Review) explores the state of knowledge on public 
innovation and the factors that may explain it. It reviews innovation in general, 
examines why public innovation is slightly different but ultimately similar to 
innovation in the private sector, and explores how economists and policy scholars 
have attempted to explain innovation and closely-related concepts such as 
‘development’, ‘progress’, and ‘change’. Much of the explanation hinges on two 
factors: leadership, actors, or ‘agents’ on the one hand, and society, deep-rooted 
institutions, or ‘structure’ on the other hand. This thesis also draws from the 
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literature on transaction costs to propose a third factor that is expected to shed light 
on public innovation, namely how leaders interact with their surrounding 
environment.  
Chapter 3 (Methodology) explains the process in which answers to the 
research questions were sought. It starts by proposing an analytical framework that 
underpins the research (the LST framework), and defines how the key outcome 
phenomenon (public innovativeness) and explanatory factors (leadership, society, 
and transaction costs) are operationalized in this research. Next, the chapter 
describes the data sources and data analysis procedures, which include the 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis and Analytic Narrative. Lastly, issues of research 
quality, such as reliability and validity, are addressed.  
Chapters 4 and 5 (the Philippine and Indonesian case reports, respectively) 
describe the findings from eight cities. The chapters start with a brief overview of 
local governance mechanism in each country, followed by an analytic narrative of 
each case to describe the city’s social, economic, and geographic context. Conditions 
related to the city’s leadership and society, as well as transaction costs faced by city 
leaders over the past 10-20 years are explored in more depth based on the data 
collected. Each case ends with an assessment of whether or not the city has had 
favorable leadership, society, and transaction costs.  
Chapter 6 (Comparisons and Analysis) reviews the findings as presented in 
Chapters 4 and 5. There are three ways in which the findings are compared and 
contrasted. First, comparisons were made between ‘innovative’ and ‘typical’ city 
governments, leading to explanations of what may have contributed to certain cities 
being innovative. Second, comparisons were made across different time periods in 
each city. This allows a historical analysis of the sequence in which transformational 
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leadership, progressive society, and efficient transaction costs manifest themselves 
in each city over a 10-20 year time period. Third, comparisons were made between 
the Philippine and Indonesian cases to understand possible variations in local 
innovativeness among the two countries. This is also done to acknowledge or check 
whether such variation may have contributed to some bias that affected how the 
innovative and typical cases were distinguished.  
Chapter 7 (Conclusions) provides a summary of the findings, and continues 
to offer policy implications for government agencies and donor agencies. It closes 
the thesis by reviewing the contributions that it hopes to make to the literature, as 








Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 
This chapter presents a review of the literature on innovation (see Figure 3). 
First, it covers the different ways in which innovation has been defined and 
measured, and highlights some unique aspects about public innovation that 
distinguishes it from private innovation. Second, it describes the ways in which 
innovation and policy change have been predominantly explained, namely through 
the role of individuals (leaders, entrepreneurs, etc.) and institutions (society, 
structure, etc.). Finally the chapter proposes an alternative approach to explain 
innovation, which is based on the transaction cost analysis. The theories explored in 
this chapter form the basis upon which this research is conducted (as will be 
explained in the following chapter on methodology). 
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a. Defining Innovation  
Innovation is defined as the implementation of something new. Different 
from invention, which is about coming up with new ideas, innovation is about 
putting those ideas to work. The Oslo Manual, which is the OECD-standard ‘guideline 
for collecting and interpreting innovation data’ in the business sector, defines 
innovation as: 
“…the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or 
service) or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational 
method in business practices, workplace organization or external relations.” 
(OECD/Eurostat 2005, para. 146) 
This simple definition can be viewed from at least four angles, highlighting 
the inclusiveness of the term. First, based on what is new, innovation can be seen as 
product innovation or process innovation (Swann 2009). In the context of public 
sector innovation, a product innovation typically involves the provision of a new 
form of public service. Process innovation, on the other hand, includes new ways in 
which a product is made or a service is provided. Taylorism, Fordism, Lean and 
Flexible production systems are some of the process innovations in the 
manufacturing sector. In the public sector, reforms under the New Public 
Management banner are largely process innovations. 
Second, by examining the extent of novelty, an innovation can be 
considered as radical or incremental (Bessant 2005, Moore 2005, Albury 2011, 
Borins 2000a). Radical innovation6 has wide-ranging effects and often results in an 
                                                          
6 ‘Radical’ innovation is also known as ‘breakthrough’, ‘discontinuous’, ‘disruptive’, 
‘systemic’, or ‘holistic’ innovation 
23 
 
existing product or process being rendered obsolete and abandoned. Radical 
innovation is argued to stem of a process of ‘bisociation’, or the recombination of 
indirectly-related knowledge (Koestler 1964). On the other hand, incremental 
innovation7 offers minor improvements that are continuous and accumulative. Most 
(90 to 94 percent) of innovation is arguably incremental (Tidd, Bessant, and Pavitt 
2005). This type of innovation is closely related to the notion of continuous and 
accumulated learning, and tends to be facilitated by stronger specialization and 
clearer divisions of labor, as in larger companies (Swann 2009).  
Third, based on the initial source of idea, innovation can be original or 
learned (Lee and Rodríguez-Pose 2013). An original innovation is one that has not 
been implemented by any other organization or in any other context. It entails much 
creative aspect and can be considered as ‘new to the world’. A learned innovation, 
on the other hand, is a deliberate attempt to implement something based on the 
experience of another. Fitting an existing program or project in a new context 
requires some form of ‘reinvention’ or ‘adaptation’ (Hartley 2005, 27), and thus it 
can be identified as innovation that is ‘new to the enterprise’ (Tidd, Bessant, and 
Pavitt 2005). In the public policy literature, learned innovation is heavily related to 
the concepts of policy learning (Rose 1991, Bennett and Howlett 1992), policy 
transfer (Evans 2004, 2009), policy diffusion (Gray and Walker 1973), and policy 
convergence (Bennett 1991), and policy isomorphism. In the urban studies field, it is 
close to the notion of ‘urban inter-referencing’ (Phelps et al. 2014). 
Fourth, based on its motivation, innovation can be considered as compulsory 
or voluntary (Lorsuwannarat 2013, Windrum and Koch 2008). A compulsory or ‘top-
down’ innovation happens when an organization which has higher level of authority 
                                                          
7 ‘Incremental’ innovation is also known as ‘stable’, ‘steady-state’, or ‘partial’ innovation 
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instructs others to implement a new program, usually based on a standard model. A 
voluntary or ‘bottom-up’ innovation is when such innovation is conducted without 
compulsion from a higher level authority. Much of the studies on local public 
innovation in the US in the 1970s were related to the diffusion of compulsory 
innovation, or how states and city governments implemented new federal 
government programs (Gray and Walker 1973, Walker 1969). This is closely related 
to the field of implementation in the policy studies literature (Bardach 1977, 
Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980).  
b. Measuring Innovation 
Measuring innovation is not a simple matter (Unger 2005, OECD 2007). In 
the private sector, industry surveys, patent registration, and research and 
development (R&D) spending have been utilized to measure or proxy for innovation. 
However, each of these methods has drawbacks.  
The Community Innovation Survey has been conducted by EU member 
states on a biannual basis to understand innovation activities in Europe’s private 
enterprises (OECD/Eurostat). However, a wide array of things could be considered as 
‘innovation’, and therefore with the increasing expectation for companies to 
innovate, surveys tend to overestimate the number of actual innovations conducted 
(Libbey 1994, Borins 2000b, Bloch and Bugge 2013, Unger 2005). 
The World Intellectual Property Organization provides data on patents 
(WIPO 2004), while companies measure their ‘research and experimental 
development’ activities based on the Frascati Manual (OECD 2002). However, these 
indicators have also been criticized. Some have argued that patents are more 
reflective of invention rather than innovation. Meanwhile, R&D data are often 
difficult to disaggregate and not very helpful to identify innovations (which are more 
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associated with ‘development’ rather than ‘research’). Furthermore, innovation also 
includes other activities not accounted for in R&D data, such as prototyping, tooling, 
and marketing (Unger 2005, Swann 2009).  
In the public sector, innovation has been studied since as early as the 1960s 
(Mohr 1969, Walker 1969, Gray and Walker 1973). Earlier research mainly used case 
methods and criticized the risk-averse culture in the public sector (Arundel and 
Huber 2013). Since the early 2000s, however, there has been more large-n research 
on the topic. Some of these took the sampling frame of past innovation award 
winners, such as those in the U.S. (Grady 1992, Borins 2001) and in the 
Commonwealth countries (Borins 2001). Extensive data of award winners and 
applicants in the U.S. over more than 20 years have allowed cross-section and time 
series analyses of various aspects of public innovation, including funding size and 
sources, accountability mechanisms, beneficiaries, internal and external challenges, 
and outcomes (Borins 2014).  
Other scholars have used data from relatively recent innovation surveys in 
the UK (Walker 2006, Audit Commission 2007), Australia (Arundel and Huber 2013), 
the Nordic countries (Bloch and Bugge 2013, Bloch 2011), and others. Such studies 
have found local governments to be highly innovative. For example, 91% of the 350 
Australian local governments reportedly conducted an innovation in the past two 
years, with 40% of those claimed to be ‘first in Australia’ (Arundel and Huber 2013). 
Meanwhile, the incidence of innovation in 2008-2009 in Nordic local governments 
was also very high, ranging from 66.9% in Sweden to 84.5% in Denmark (Bloch and 
Bugge 2013). These studies provided us with some characteristics of public 
innovation, such as source of idea, implementation strategy, and barriers to success. 
In Asia, quantitative studies of public innovation have also been conducted through 
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local government surveys, such as in the Philippines (Capuno 2011) and Thailand 
(Lorsuwannarat 2013). 
However, there have been criticisms towards the use of data from both 
innovation awards and innovation surveys. Both were claimed to have self-selection 
bias: local governments that do not have successful innovations tend to refrain from 
submitting an application for the award (Libbey 1994, Borins 2000b) or from 
responding to the survey (Bloch and Bugge 2013, Unger 2005). Thus awards and 
surveys tend to give a more optimistic view on public innovation than it really is. 
c. Unique Traits of Public Innovation 
Innovation in the public sector is defined similarly as in the private sector. 
The ultimate goal of public innovation is arguably to achieve ‘public value’ rather 
than private profit, but two main characters - newness and implementation – 
remain key. A more thorough definition is as follows: 
‘Public sector innovation is about new ideas that work at creating public 
value. The ideas have to be at least in part new (rather than improvements); 
they have to be taken up (rather than just being good ideas); and they have 
to be useful’. Mulgan (2007, 6) 
Traditionally associated with the domain of the private sector, innovation is 
increasingly being expected from public agencies. There are a number of arguments 
as to why the public sector is expected to innovate. The ‘Innovation in American 
Government Awards,’ was started in the 1980s by the Harvard Kennedy School and 
the Ford Foundation to shed positive light on the public sector amidst growing NPM-
style criticism of government inefficiency and stagnation (Moore 2005). In the 
contemporary context, public innovation remains important to improve the public 
sector’s image and legitimacy (Bloch et al. 2009, Vigoda‐Gadot et al. 2008) and to 
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identify and provide services that are in-line with changing citizen’s needs and 
expectations (Bason 2010, Commonwealth of Australia 2009, Albury 2011). From an 
economic point of view, public innovation is touted to generate cost savings in the 
context of financial crises and austerity. It has also been argued to result in more 
innovations in the private sector, and ultimately in better economic performance 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2009, Bloch et al. 2009). 
Public innovation, however, is fraught with contradictions. On the one hand, 
some scholars argued that the public sector could never be as innovative as the 
private sector (for example, Potts 2009, Cole 1988, Stewart‐Weeks and Kastelle 
2015). On the other hand, other scholars claimed that the public sector is actually 
more innovative than many people think (for example, Mulgan 2007, Bloch 2011). 
Meanwhile, those in the middle ground argue that there is no contradiction 
between public and private innovation. For example, Ostrom (1965) synthesized 
earlier and argued that public and private entrepreneurship are mutually dependent 
and co-evolve together.  
Much of the debate on public innovation is associated with the notion of 
risk. Both the private and public sectors face risk, but there is a difference in the way 
the two view risk. For the private sector, risk is acknowledged as part of the day-to-
day reality of doing business. And thus, as Bhatta (2003) explained, the private 
sector has factored in the cost of risk in their business plan. Failure(s) may be 
tolerated as long as risks were properly calculated, and the benefits of success 
(which may come after several failures), could offset the costs. The amount that the 
private sector invests in these ‘experiments’ varies. In the context of advanced 
industrial countries, 3-4% of a firm’s turnover is generally used for Research and 
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Development (R&D) activities, while for firms in R&D-heavy sectors such as 
biotechnology, the figure is more likely to be 20-30% (Mulgan 2007).  
For the public sector, the notion of risk is viewed in a more careful manner. 
As the government deals with critical public issues which sometimes involve matters 
of life and death, risk is typically unwelcomed. The government is often seen as a 
“stabilizing force” that is needed to balance a fast-changing world (Mulgan 2007, 
15), and that being innovative in private sector-like ways “may compromise the 
state’s social responsibilities” (Pinto 1998). Allowing government officials to 
experiment with new programs requires high level of public trust. Thus the easiest 
way to deal with risks in the public sector is often to avoid them altogether.  
Because governments are generally run on risk-aversion principles, attempts 
at innovation tend to be discouraged. The reason: consequences of failed 
innovations are detrimental to the public servant’s career, while the benefits of 
success are easily captured by elites (Bhatta 2003, Moore 2005). Furthermore, 
government failure is more prone to scrutiny by the public, the media, and 
legislative institutions, compared to private sector failure (Allison 2007).  
Individuals within the public sector tend to fear the risk of conducting 
innovations. Ten years after the optimistic publication of Creating Public Value 
(Moore 1995), Moore (2005, 43-44) revised his earlier assumption that public 
managers have some authority to innovate. Instead, he clarified that:   
“Most government managers… had very narrow tolerances in which to 
innovate… and they thought they needed some kind of authorization to 
gamble with taxpayer dollars, client welfare, and the public interest on new, 
untested ideas”. Moore (2005, 43-44) 
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The practice of public management under NPM principles, which places 
much emphasis of efficiency, is claimed to be associated with risk-aversion (Potts 
2009). Efficiency and innovation are ‘mutually inconsistent’: The former involves 
preference for proven winners and intolerance for experimentation while 
innovation, on the other hand, requires risk-taking, experimentation, and a 
tolerance of failure which implies the presence of public trust (Potts 2009). These 
issues have been widely explored in the field of New Institutional Economics, 
especially transaction cost analysis. However, the dominant explanations of 
innovation have tended to sidestep transaction costs and focused primarily on 
leadership and society aspects. 
2. Dominant Explanations: Leadership and Society 
An exploration of the literature on private and public innovation, as well as 
on closely-related concepts such as development, progress, and policy change, 
identified two major groups of explanation. The first group is related to individual 
aspects, more specifically leadership and entrepreneurialism. The second group is 
related to structural aspects, more specifically the institutions or ‘culture’ present in 
an organization or society.  
a. Leadership, Actors, Agents 
Innovation has been heavily linked to an individual’s leadership character. 
Let’s call this the ‘agency’ argument. In the private sector domain, the leadership 
styles of Steve Jobs and Bill Gates have been explored to explain the success of 
Apple and Microsoft. Similarly in the public sector, narratives about Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Margaret Thatcher, and Deng Xiaoping are extensive in explaining how a 
country transformed itself or turned around from a crisis.  
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Arguments for the importance of leadership can be found in the literature 
related to public and business administration, as well as political studies. In the field 
of political science, Paige (1977), Blondel (1987), among others, provided some of 
the earlier groundwork to expand the literature on leadership at the national level, 
while Barber (1964), Wildavsky (1964) did so at the local level. Since then, the notion 
of “political leadership” has been widely expanded (Rhodes and Hart 2014, 
Kellerman 1986, Helms 2012, Berg and Rao 2005). 
A public leader’s role in triggering innovation is often seen from a ‘public 
entrepreneurship’ point of view. Here, public leaders are seen as entrepreneurs 
(Doig and Hargrove 1990) who attempt to create ‘public value’ (Moore 1995) and 
are characterized by their alertness to opportunities, ability to make judgmental 
decisions, and drive for innovation (Klein et al. 2010). The importance of leadership 
in transforming or reforming the government has been written at the level of the 
U.S. federal government (Klitgaard 2005) as well as sub-national governments 
worldwide (Campbell and Fuhr 2004). 
Prominently explored in the literature, a leader mobilizes followers to 
conduct things that collectively contribute to a common goal. Two types of 
leadership have been highlighted: ‘transactional’ and ‘transformational’ (Burns 
1978). Transactional leadership focuses on administrative issues, such as 
maintaining established procedures and keeping staffs’ performance in check, often 
through short-term, ‘tit-for-tat’ exchanges. Transformational leadership, in contrast, 
emphasizes a leader’s ability to motivate and challenge staff to take initiative and 
achieve the organization’s goals (Bass 1990). Being ‘passionate’ (Albury 2011) and 
‘enthusiastic’ (Marsden et al. 2011) were often highlighted among the characters of 
such leaders.  
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The notion of transformational leadership has been widely explored (Gasper 
1992, Bass and Riggio 2006). It has also been applied to the public sector (Koehler 
and Pankowski 1997), especially in relation to public service motivation (Paarlberg 
and Lavigna 2010). Similar notions to transformational leadership can be found in 
arguments such as ‘adaptive leadership’ (Heifetz 1994), ‘strength-based leadership’ 
(Rath and Conchie 2008), and to a certain extent, ‘soft power’ (Nye 2008).  
The wide range of literature presents at least three common personal 
characteristics that make someone a ‘transformational’ leader. These include 
charisma, or ability to motivate and mobilize others to achieve a common goal, 
commitment, or the will to do something even if it means tying one’s own hands or 
being unpopular, and diversity of experience in sectors other than the local 
government which could provide one with inspiration to try new things. The notion 
of ‘change leadership’ explains how a leader facilitates the processes needed to 
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the organizational mindset, and development of team creativity (Kuczmarski 1996, 
Adair 2007).  
Charisma 
Although transformational leadership is primarily a practice, some authors 
(i.e., Bass 1990) have identified charisma as one of the traits that supports the 
practice of transformational leadership. Max Weber in 1922 wrote that the 
legitimacy of a leader originates from three sources: traditional authority, legal-
rational authority, and charismatic authority (Weber and Gerth 1958). Traditional 
authority is justified through birth right (as in monarchies and traditional societies), 
while legal-rational authority is justified through legal appointment, election, 
administrative capacity, and other rational arguments. Charismatic authority, 
however, refers to a personal trait that inspires, builds motivation, and provides 
guidance for followers to reach a common goal, regardless of a person’s birth rights 
or formal position in the organization.  
However, transformational leadership has also been critiqued for its ‘dark 
sides’ (Conger and Kanungo 1998, Tourish 2013). These include use of charisma to 
manipulate and deceive, eventually leading to authoritarianism. Responding to 
these challenges, Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) argued that ‘to be truly 
transformational, leadership must be grounded in moral foundations’.  
Commitment 
A leader’s commitment is based on his or her personal will to create positive 
change, with the consequences that come with making such commitment credible. 
This may mean working harder and having more determination (Collins 2001, 
Molinaro 2013), taking risks that might lead to creating enemies or being unpopular 
(Heifetz and Linsky 2002), and prioritizing collective success above personal gains 
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(Sinek 2014). Beyond dealing with administrative aspects of management, a leader 
promotes and protects organizational values in a more advanced role of 
‘institutional leadership’ (Selznik 1984), where commitment is demanded not just 
personally, but also towards collective values and programs.  
Commitment is also closely related to moral legitimacy (Barnard 1982, 
Steinbauer et al. 2014) and ethics (Brown and Treviño 2006, Ciulla 1998). These stem 
from having characters such as credibility (Gabris, Golembiewski, and Ihrke 2001), 
trustworthiness (Carnevale 1995), and accountability (Dive 2008). The above 
characters make a leader ‘exemplary’ to others (Cooper and Wright 1992) and 
justifies his or her instructions with moral grounds. Without moral foundation, 
charisma may be effectively used for deviant purposes.  
Diversity of Experience 
A common personality trait of transformational leaders and those who lead 
‘change’ and innovation is creativity. Creativity, in turn, is associated with openness 
to experience, or willingness and curiosity to try different things (Zopiatis and 
Constanti 2012, Judge and Bono 2000, Lee 2013).  
In the American public sector, Treverton (2005, 106) laments the silos that 
separate public and private leadership and the fact that in the public sector, there is 
‘almost no lateral entry from other sectors except at the very top.’ Taking cue from 
the military model, where staffs undergo frequent job rotations that enrich their 
experience, the National Commission on the Public Service (2005) suggested that 
federal employees be given subsidized opportunities to have some working 
experience outside of the government. This is hoped to provide a diversity of 
perspectives and openness to new ideas. 
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Others have argued that public innovation is more likely to occur in 
‘common zones’ were political leaders meet other leaders from the bureaucracy, the 
business sector, and the community (Hambleton and Howard 2013). The extent to 
which leaders are facilitative in providing or encouraging ‘spaces’ for different minds 
and viewpoints to meet are also important in encouraging innovation (Mulgan 
2007). 
Policy Change and Actors 
The public policy literature has shown interest on the role of actors in 
inducing policy change and innovation. Such interest, however, tends to be placed 
on individuals with entrepreneurial characteristics rather than formal leaders per se. 
Kingdon (1984) in his Multiple Streams (MS) framework brought some attention to 
the notion of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ and identified these as people who push for 
policy change by coupling problems, policies, and politics – often in short ‘windows 
of opportunity’. The concept of policy entrepreneurs has been further explored in 
various contexts (Palmer 2015, Roberts and King 1991).  
The MS framework explained some characteristics of policy entrepreneurs: 
They are driven primarily by personal gains, have enough knowledge to present and 
argue for their ‘pet’ policy solutions, enough power to influence the formal decision 
makers, and enough insight to know when possible ‘policy windows’ might open up.  
These entrepreneurs could be from within the government (i.e., elected leaders, civil 
servants, legislative members) or outside the government (i.e., interest groups, 
NGOs, academics, and the media).  
Subsequently, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) provided a more 
thorough explanation of policy change and introduced the notion of ‘policy brokers’ 
(Sabatier 1988, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). The latter mediate agreements 
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between different coalitions within a policy subsystem. Like the policy entrepreneur, 
the policy broker may also come from within or outside of the government. 
However, unlike the policy entrepreneur, who is largely seen as self-serving, policy 
brokers are argued to be motivated by a policy belief.  
The achievements of policy brokers are not generally attributed to chance, 
but to effort. Rather than take advantage of chaotic focusing events, they attempt to 
mediate conflict and find a middle ground between competing coalitions. Their 
primary motive is to advance their policy beliefs. The concept of the policy broker, 
too, has been further explored in different subsystem contexts (Kingiri 2014, Diaz‐
Kope, Lombard, and Miller‐Stevens 2013, Sabatier and Weible 2007).  
b. Society, Institutions, Structure 
Another potent explanation for innovation, or the progress of a nation or 
society, is the deep-rooted institutions that exist therein. Let’s call this the 
‘structure’ argument. Institutions are the formal or informal, self-inflicted or 
externally-enforced constraints that bind a person’s actions, be it individually or 
collectively (North 1991). As ‘rules of the game’, institutions take a wide range of 
forms, including written laws and regulations, norms prescribing acceptable or 
unacceptable behavior, personal and collective values about what are desirable or 
undesirable, and deeply-held beliefs about what is right or wrong. Instead of 
referring to these as the ‘deep-rooted institutions of a society’, the term ‘society’ is 
used as shorthand. This shifts attention from ‘leadership’ to the role of 
‘followership’ in determining an organization or a society’s success (Kellerman 
2008). 
Institutions exist at multiple levels, where rules at the more micro level are 
“embedded” within rules at the more macro level (Granovetter 1985). Kiser and 
36 
 
Ostrom (1982) identified three levels of institutions: operational, collective-choice, 
and constitutional-choice. At the operational level, institutions take the form of 
practical decisions about programs, projects, and activities. At the collective-choice 
level, institutions take the form of policies, laws, and regulations that govern which 
programs and projects will be implemented or prioritized. At the constitutional-
choice level, institutions take the form of laws about law-making, which prescribes 
the processes and circumstances under which a law or policy could be changed. 
Williamson (2000) identified a fourth level of institutions which are even more 
macro than the constitutional-choice; these include informal institutions such as 
traditions, norms, religions, and ideologies which are very difficult to change (they 
last for centuries, and shape the path of subsequent development once adopted).  
Increasing interest in New Institutional Economics has prompted 
international development organizations to encourage the development of ‘good 
institutions’ conducive for development and growth (World Bank 2002), such as the 
International Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Programmes. These, however, 
have been criticized for their lack of attention towards the local-specific, informal 
institutions, such as the presence of ethnic fractions and lack of democratic 
institutions. This highlighted earlier arguments about the difficulty of changing 
formal institutions without considering how norms and values are changed (Chang 
2007, Rodrik 2008, Shirley 2008). 
The range of literature on society presents three common institutional 
characteristics that make a society more likely to change and adapt to new 
conditions (let’s call this a ‘progressive society’). These include (1) meritocratic 
norms and values which consider honest hard work (as opposed to rent-seeking) as 
desirable behavior which will be paid off, (2) organized civil society groups within 
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various segments of the society to better achieve collective goals, and (3) favorable 
history, or the extent to which such norms and organizations have been present in 
the city’s recent and distant paths. These are closely related to the notions of 
‘sociological institutionalism’ and ‘historical institutionalism’ (Hall and Taylor 1996).  










Meritocratic Norms and Values 
Institutional economists have argued that economic growth is associated 
with the ability to change and adopt innovations, which in turn is associated with 
norms and values that encourage trust and trustworthiness (Keefer and Knack 
2005), and protect property rights and enforce contracts (Acemoglu and Johnson 
2005). Other values such as meritocracy (Mahbubani 2008) and Weber’s Protestant 
work ethic (Ferguson 2011, Weber, Parsons, and Giddens 2005) were also used to 
explain why Western societies developed and innovated much faster than others. 
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Changes in values and beliefs, especially perception of the consequences of one’s 
actions, were considered key to explaining changes in the economy (North 2005).  
A number of scholars have argued that values which are commonly thought 
to be ‘given’ from a Western point of view, such as rationality, efficiency, and 
democracy, could not be taken for granted (Dollar and Svensson 2000). Non-
Western values exist throughout the world (Wiarda 1983), such as collectivism in 
Southern Africa (Müller, Mekgwe, and Mhloyi 2013), religiosity in Southeast Asia 
(Clammer 1996), as well as Confucianism and the belief in strong states in East Asia, 
caste in the Indian subcontinent, and the notion of ‘East versus West’ in Islamic 
societies (Wiarda and Boilard 1999). 
However, norms and values can change over time. The fast rise of some 
Asian countries has been attributed to their ability to adopt values like meritocracy 
(Mahbubani 2008, Ferguson 2011). Nonetheless, the processes by which norms and 
values change – thus the process by which societies and economies fundamentally 
transform itself – remain ill-understood (North 1981). 
In the innovation literature, there are plenty of references to the role of an 
‘organizational culture’ in promoting or hindering innovation (Luke, Verreynne, and 
Kearins 2010, Osborne and Brown 2005). For example, overly extensive use of 
hierarchy and heuristics (‘rules of thumb’) in an organization prevents innovation, 
which thrive instead on non-hierarchical structure, openness, and fact-based 
communication (Feser 2012). Furthermore, organizational routines that encourage 
curiosity, experimentation, and risk-taking, and - to a certain extent - tolerates 
failure and the bending of rules (Albury 2005, 2011, Bessant 2005, Potts 2009, 
Moore 2005) is claimed to be more conducive for innovation. 
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Organized Civil Society  
The ways in which members of the society are organized and associated are 
argued to be important in sustaining or changing institutions. Associations increase 
trust among members, which ultimately facilitate them in achieving collective goals 
and introducing change and innovations (Keefer and Knack 2005). Tocqueville (1831) 
attributed the success of democracy in America to a number of factors, especially 
the habit of creating associations to achieve collective goals. This was enabled by the 
widespread belief in liberty of association for various purposes, including civil 
(commerce, religious, leisure, etc.) and political ones. Freedom of association works 
hand-in-hand with freedom of the press, where Tocqueville observed that 
‘newspapers make associations, and associations make newspapers’.  
Public associations remain important until today, with scholars associating 
government effectiveness in a democracy with the presence of strong civic 
engagement. In their study of variations in Italy’s regional governments, Putnam 
(1993) found that regions where civil associations flourish tend to have higher trust 
among individuals and show better performance in public services, even after 
keeping rules constant. Civil associations (networks) coupled with trust and 
trustworthiness (norm) form the basis of social capital (Keefer and Knack 2005, 
Maloney and Rossteutscher 2007, van Houwelingen 2012). 
However, there are a number of ways in which associations could hamper 
development. Inclusive or ‘bridging’ social capital, where trust has a ‘wide radius’ 
and extends beyond narrow characteristics of members, is beneficial for progress, 
change, and innovation. However, exclusive or ‘bonding’ social capital, which binds 
membership largely on exclusive characteristics like ethnicity and religion, is not 
(Fukuyama 1995). In many societies, associations are often formed in exclusive 
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manner for perverse purposes. For example, in Metro Manila, well-connected elitist 
social groups prevent meaningful role of civil society in development (Shatkin 2000), 
and an alliance of corrupt bureaucrats, party leaders, business interests, thugs, and 
criminals enforce a system of “bossism” in many places in Southeast Asia (Sidel 
1999, 2004).  
Favorable History 
The notion that informal institutions persist over long periods has been 
established. For example, the West’s rapid economic development was seen as 
result of centuries-long accumulation of changes in their deep-rooted institutions, 
including values and beliefs about property rights, meritocracy, and institutions that 
support contractual exchanges (North 1981, Greif 2006). Similarly, variations in the 
development level of Asian, African, and South American countries were explained 
through the different mechanisms in which colonialism took place hundreds of years 
ago (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004, 
Lange 2009). In Southeast Asia, as well as in other developing countries, many elite 
or royal family networks originating from the pre-colonial era have persisted until 
today, sustained by the colonialists through local administrative and rent-seeking 
roles (Day 2003, Nordholt 2004).  
Increasing attention to the importance of history in explaining progress and 
development is reflected in calls to infuse more time-series and historical reasoning 
(Chang 2011). The notion of ‘path-dependency’ argues that changes are often 
incremental and follow a slow, evolutionary path dependent on institutions that 
have been previously planted in place. However, at certain times, a major stochastic 
change could occur and plant a different kind of institution, allowing a radically 
different path to present itself (North 1990). This implies that change and innovation 
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is more likely to be dependent on the extent to which meritocratic norms and values 
and organized civil society have been present throughout a society’s history. 
Policy Change and Institutions 
In the public policy literature, changes in ideas and beliefs have been 
discussed as one of the explanations for policy change (Yee 1996). Ideas and beliefs 
change through processes of learning (Bennett and Howlett 1992, Birkland 1997), 
such as ‘political learning’ (Heclo 1974), ‘policy learning’ (Sabatier 1988), ‘social 
learning’ (Hall 1993) and ‘lesson drawing’ (Rose 1991). These typically take place 
during the policy evaluations stage, but not exclusively so. Discourse, or the way 
information and knowledge are communicated, plays an important role in these 
learning processes (Schmidt 2011, Schmidt 2008).  
The process of altering one’s ideas may happen incrementally, in different 
‘orders of change’. Such orders range from minor changes in budgets, to more 
substantial changes in policy instruments, to radical changes in policy goals and 
paradigms (Hall 1993). Major policy change typically occurs over relatively long 
periods of time; some have argued that it takes at least 10 years for the lessons of 
policy learning to accumulate and inflict change in one’s policy beliefs (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993).  
The policy literature identifies associations as networks, or the actors and 
the relationships that exist between them (Knoke 1993, Dowding 1995). Networks 
take diverse forms. Some are established based on certain issues and sectors, as in 
the notions of ‘issue network’ and ‘policy network’ (Heclo 1978, McCool 1998). The 
purpose and character of these networks can range from learning, as in the notions 
of ‘policy community’ and ‘epistemic community’ (Haas 1992, Dunlop 2013, Miller 
and Demir 2007) to advocacy, as in ‘advocacy coalitions’ (Sabatier 1988), to 
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monopoly of policy making processes, as in ‘iron triangles’ (Cater 1964). Policy 
change is argued to be related to the dynamics taking place in policy networks 
(Compston 2009). For example, Villadsen (2011) attributed policy isomorphism 
among Danish municipalities to the social network structure of local political 
executives.  
The policy literature also acknowledges path dependency of policy beliefs, 
which may change through stochastic or evolutionary ways (Howlett and Rayner 
2006). For example, conservative policy change is a major feature of the Punctuated 
Equilibrium theory (Baumgartner and Jones 1991), but the theory also acknowledges 
that sometimes policies change substantially. These two types of changes are 
identified as ‘self-reinforcing sequence’ and ‘reactive sequence’ (Mahoney 2000).  
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom 2007, 
Kiser and Ostrom 1982) dissects the workings of institutions to explain how policies 
are decided and adopted. The IAD framework uses an input – process – output – 
feedback cycle. First, the inputs entail three contextual factors that influence policy-
making, namely attributes of the good or service in question, the rules that are used 
by the community, and the values and norms that apply therein. Second, the process 
relates to how actors strategically interact with each other within an ‘action 
situation’. This is a ‘social space where individuals interact, exchange goods and 
services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight’ (Ostrom 2011). Third, the 
outputs are collective decisions from the action situation which are implemented, 
enforced, and evaluated against a set of criteria determined by the community’s 
norms and values. Such outputs result in longer-term outcomes that over time 




The leadership literature identified various characteristics of a leader, 
namely charisma, commitment, and diversity of experience, which were argued to 
enable more innovations. But it does not offer a framework to explain how a leader 
with such characteristics may do so. Also, the leadership argument for innovation or 
change seems to explain the case of some local governments which were innovative 
under the leadership of one mayor, while not so innovative under the leadership of 
the subsequent mayor. However, it does not explain why some cities remain 
consistently innovative over many years, after being led by different successive 
mayors. 
The society literature offers several deep-rooted institutional aspects of the 
society that are more conducive to innovation, namely meritocratic norms, 
progressive local organizations, and favorable history. However, a theory or 
framework that links these aspects with innovation is lacking. The society argument 
seems to explain the presence of some innovative city governments which have a 
progressive society with meritocratic values, high trust, and vibrant associations. 
However, it does not explain the phenomenon of some cities with  unfavorable 
structural variables that have transformed for the better, despite the odds.  
In the public policy literature, policy change frameworks offer meso-level 
explanations about the actors involved in policy dynamics (i.e. ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’, ‘policy brokers’) and the institutional environment where the actor 
is contextualized (i.e., ‘policy venues’, ‘action situations’). However, they do not 
offer a theory about which circumstances make policy change more likely. The 
processes related to key events that lead to policy change, such as coupling of the 
three streams (Kingdon 1984), or the brokerage of opposing advocacy coalitions 
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(Sabatier and Weible 2007), or when a negative ‘policy image’ turns positive 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1991), are left largely unexplained. In the MS framework, 
Kingdon (1984) attributed the coupling of streams to serendipity. 
[Policy entrepreneurs] wait in and around government with their solutions at 
hand, waiting for problems to float by to which they can attach their 
solutions, waiting for a development in the political stream they can use to 
their advantage. (Kingdon 1984, 165-6) 
The IAD framework is an exception as it utilizes game-theoretic reasoning to 
provide a framework that explains how actors in an ‘action situation’ may come to 
agree on certain policy decisions. However, game theory focuses on whether 
cooperation between two or more players will take place, not whether policy 
change (or adoption of new policies) will happen (Ostrom 1994, Holzinger 2003). 
Furthermore, game theory could be complex and depends on a number of factors, 
such as how many times the game is conducted, whether the games are sequential 
or simultaneous, whether access to full information is available, etc. 
An opportunity to explain public innovations in a more parsimonious way 
exists in another framework which shares the same theoretical foundation as 
Ostrom’s IAD. The transaction cost theory was devised to explain why firms exist 
(Coase 1937) and why different governance structures emerge (Williamson 1996, 
1979). But it has also been further developed and utilized in various ways, including 
to explain why certain cities have been more innovative than others in the private 
sector context (Piore and Sabel 1984, Storper 1993, Saxenian 1996). We now turn to 
transaction cost as a proposed explanation for public innovation. 
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3.  Proposed Explanation: Transaction Costs 
Since it takes more than one person to innovate, innovation is fraught with 
transactions. The initiator of an innovation needs to convince a group of people to 
approve a new idea and mobilize another group of people to implement it. In a 
sense, she needs to conduct agreements or “transactions”. Due to these 
considerations, theories of transaction cost form an appropriate foundation for 
public innovation studies. Transaction cost analysis can be considered as part of the 
‘rational institutionalism’ paradigm (Hall and Taylor 1996) 
The notion of transaction costs (TC) was developed by multiple scholars, 
predominantly Oliver Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985, 1996), but also Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972), Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Buchanan (1975), Grossman 
(1986), Dixit (1996) and others based on earlier developments in the fields of 
economics (i.e., by John R. Commons, Ronald Coase, Friedrich Hayek), organization 
theory (i.e., by Chester Barnard, Herbert Simon), and law (i.e. by Karl Llewellyn).  
TC can be described as ‘the costs of running the economic system’ (Arrow 
1969) that arise when individuals exchange ownership rights and enforce it’ 
(Eggertsson 1990). TCs do not include the cost of making a product or providing a 
service in-house; these are called ‘production costs’. Before the notion of TC was 
raised, buying and selling a product or service in the open market was considered 
costless and frictionless. The presence of TC was initially highlighted by Coase (1937) 
and proven later by Coase (1960) and Arrow (1969), among others, through the 
presence of negative externalities (which would have been completely internalized if 
TCs do not exist).  
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Economic activities take different forms based on the goal of minimizing TC 
(Williamson 2010). Where TCs are low, economic actors tend to use the market 
system, meaning they would buy products and services (conducting exchanges with 
other parties) as opposed to making them. On the other hand, where TCs are high, 
economic actors would tend to use the ‘firm’ (a vertical organization) to make 
products and services as opposed to buying them on the market. This is the concept 
of ‘economizing’ on transaction costs (Williamson 1991) which shall be applied in 
this research to the process of public innovation. 
Transaction cost analysis has been used primarily in the private sector to 
help firms decide whether or not to outsource jobs, as well as how much and where 
to outsource. The analysis has been used in the public sector context (for example, 
Brown and Potoski 2003, Huet and Saussier 2003, Kwon, Lee, and Feiock 2010, 
Obermann 2007), but it has not been applied to the topic of public innovation. 
Transaction costs could be valued in monetary terms (calculated from man-
hours spent, cost of buying insurance, etc.), but in the public sector they come into 
consciousness primarily in the form of administrative hassles and political risks. Due 
to the various characters of transaction and types of transaction costs, conducting 
public innovations could be a ‘hassle’ or highly ‘risky’ to conduct.  
a. Characteristics of Transaction 
There are three characters of transaction which can make it costly: asset 
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency (Williamson 1979). First, asset specificity 
refers to the degree in which transaction-specific investments are needed. A 
transaction typically leads a firm to invest in certain equipment, labor, land, etc. The 
more specific the investment, the more “locked-in” is that investment to the 
transaction, which means the more costly it is for the firm to engage in that 
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contract. In the context of public innovations, the more an innovative activity 
requires specific investments that could not be used for other activities, the more 
costly is the transaction to enable such innovation. 
Second, uncertainty stems from the presence of information asymmetry and 
the condition of bounded rationality (cognitive limitations of humans). It is the 
primary reason why contracts are inherently incomplete; because it would be 
impossible to write a clause ex-ante to cover all possible calamities or mishaps that 
could take place ex-post (Williamson 1981). Due to this element of uncertainty, 
transactions are by definition risky. This risk could be reduced with the presence of 
reliable and efficient arbitration systems. The more uncertainty is created by the 
transaction, the more costly is said transaction. In public innovations, the more 
uncertain a new project is expected to succeed, the more costly is the transaction 
needed to mobilize political and administrative support for such project. 
Third, frequency refers to the number of times such transaction recurs. The 
more often it will be repeated, the higher the transaction costs. Therefore, products 
or services which need to be procured on an ongoing basis tend to be procured in-
house. This increases the production cost of the firm, but reduces the transaction 
cost that it would have to pay if they were to buy the product from a third party 
repeatedly. In the public sector, new projects which require multiple investments (or 
multiple rounds of funding cycles or approval) before it could achieve success tend 
to be more difficult to support. 
While the characters of transaction help to gauge the ‘costliness’ of 
attempting to conduct particular types of innovations, they do not explain 
‘innovativeness’. To better understand this, we turn to explore the different types of 
transaction costs.  
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b. Types of Transaction Cost 
Transaction costs include: (1) search and information costs, (2) bargaining or 
negotiation costs, and (3) policing and enforcement costs (Dahlman 1979). Both 
information costs and negotiating costs take place before the contract (ex-ante), 
while policing or monitoring, and enforcement or implementation costs take place 
after the contract (ex-post). This thesis proposes that the more efficient these 
transactions are for a city leader, the more likely that innovations would be adopted. 








Information costs in the classic, private sector context refer to the costs of 
finding out what to buy, who to buy from, how to buy it, and at what price. These 
stem from the presence of information asymmetries (where not everyone has the 
same access to information), as well as bounded rationality (where some 
information is simply too complex or too much for humans to process and 
understand).  
In the context of public innovation, information costs refer to the effort 
needed by the public entrepreneur to find out about policies, programs, and 
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projects which have been successfully implemented in other places, the process by 
which they were conducted, and the extent to which they are relevant for her city. It 
is related to the notions of policy learning (Rose 1991), policy transfer (Evans 2004) 
policy diffusion (Gray and Walker 1973), and inter-city referencing (Phelps et al. 
2014). Successful cities were argued to have ‘a pattern of deliberate and systematic 
acquisition of knowledge’ that benefits from good practices happening throughout 
the world (Campbell 2012). Some of the ways in which such information, knowledge, 
or ‘lessons’ can be accessed by the public innovator: through access to information 
and communication technology (ICT), referrals from personal and professional 
networks, and visits or travels. 
ICT and media outlets provide a wide array of information and allow future 
public innovators to find references or solutions to their problems (Bekkers, 
Duivenboden, and Thaens 2006, Hale and Project 2011). News and feature articles 
from mainstream media may profile a successful program from a particular city. 
Similarly, ‘best practice’ compilations assembled by national government 
organizations, donor agencies, or academic institutions may also provide inspiration 
and trigger interest to learn further. The spread of successful innovations also often 
depends on the publicizing of successful pilots (Mulgan 2007). 
ICT, however, could overload policy makers with information. Therefore 
there is value in having trusted and knowledgeable networks that can curate such 
information (Marsden et al. 2011, Considine, Lewis, and Alexander 2009, Considine 
and Lewis 2007). This network may be vertical, horizontal, or local. A vertical 
network involves officials from various hierarchies: cities, provinces, the central 
government. A horizontal network involves peers from other cities, such as city 
government associations at the national and international level (Campbell 2012). For 
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innovative ideas to flourish, city officials were suggested to expand their network 
beyond their immediate locality and interact with officials from other cities and 
regions (Newman, Raine, and Skelcher 2001). A local network involves local actors 
who are based in a particular city or region, such as the city government, businesses, 
and civil society groups (Compston 2009, Simmie 1997, Benz and Fürst 2002). 
Learning, however, is most likely to be impactful when done by directly 
interacting with the ‘teacher’. Travels to other cities to observe good programs in 
action provide inspiration and reduce uncertainties (Rose 1993). They also facilitate 
the transfer of tacit knowledge that is not generally found in reports or ‘best 
practice’ compilations (Dolowitz 2009). These travels usually take place in 
professional settings, such as during formal missions or conferences (Bulmer and 
Padgett 2005), but could similarly be effective when conducted on personal trips 
(Marsden et al. 2011). Studies have pointed out that policy transfer is more likely 
among places which are geographically near because there is more opportunity for 
direct visits (Kern, Koll, and Schophaus 2007)  
Negotiation costs 
Negotiation costs are the costs of coming to an agreement for the different 
parties involved in the contract. These include the time and resources spent on 
negotiating, convincing, and agreeing to the content and conditions of the contract. 
Issues related to trust, commitment, credibility and reputation – as have been 
explored in the discussion on institutions, play an important role. Part of risk 
management is ensuring that public expectations are managed, i.e. by informing and 
involving stakeholders (Mulgan 2007).  
In the context of public innovation, negotiation costs involve efforts needed 
to convince people to approve and/or support the use of public resources to 
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implement an innovative idea. These are closely bound to the notion of ‘governance’ 
(Kjær 2004) and how the city’s leaders relate to their legislative counterparts, their 
political rivals, and other stakeholders of the city, including business interests and 
community groups (Hambleton 2011). Relationship between the city’s leaders and 
their administrative superiors (province or state government) are also important and 
may present ‘bounds’ or ‘limits’ to a city’s authority (Peterson 1981, Frug and Barron 
2008). However, this phenomenon is arguably less prominent in the context of 
devolution, where Indonesia’s cities as well as the Philippines’ ‘highly urbanized’ and 
‘independent component’ cities are practically autonomous local political entities.  
In a democratic context, city leaders and heads of departments (the 
executive) need to convince their counterparts at the city council (the legislative) to 
approve the city’s yearly programs and budget. In this regard, city councilors could 
be considered as ‘veto players’ (Tsebelis 2002). Formal politics at the city level 
possibly contributes to public innovativeness, where the mayor may have larger 
support to conduct innovations if she shares a common political affiliation with the 
majority of city councilors. Thus the political composition of the city council may 
determine the level of legislative support for the mayor.  
However, politics does not only take place in the formal, legislative setting. 
In American and British cities, Stone (1993), Molotch (1976), and DiGaetano and 
Klemanski (1993) have argued that urban development is often driven by a pro-
growth network of business interests, land-owners, and local politicians (‘urban 
regime’ or ‘governing coalitions’). They may not have a formal role in the council’s 
voting process, but they have informal influence on the mayor, senior officials, and 
councilors. In the Philippines, such regime may manifest in the form of ‘bossism’, 
which includes a close-knit alliance of corrupt bureaucrats, politicians, illegal 
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businesses, and thugs (Sidel 1999, Lacaba 1995). Relationship with various city 
stakeholders is also important because user feedback is critical for ensuring the 
success of the innovation (Albury 2011). The notion of ‘co-creation’, where 
‘producers’ (i.e., the city government) and ‘consumers’ (citizens) sit together to 
identify products and processes which are mutually beneficial, is argued to stimulate 
more innovation (Alves 2013, Bason 2010, Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004). But for 
that, the capacity of society groups needs to be strengthened (Morse 2012). 
City leaders sometimes may also face extreme rivalry from other local 
politicians who may affect the governing process. Competition is arguably conducive 
to innovation (for example, Lawless and Anderson 1996), but not if disruptive. This is 
often the case when the city’s growth is largely rooted in politics rather than 
economics (White 2009, Hardin and Bahuchet 2011). In some cases, political rivalry 
could extend beyond the election time into periods where governing and 
development should take priority. The mayor may also face problems in governing if 
the rival or the rival’s followers are present in the governing structure, such as in the 
city council or as the vice mayor.8  
Enforcement costs 
After the approval for the innovation has been secured, the public innovator 
needs to monitor the performance of her staff to make sure that the innovation is 
conducted well. Enforcement is closely related to the literature on policy 
implementation (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980, Pressman and Wildavsky 1984, 
Bardach 1977), and has been analyzed through the lens of the ‘principal-agent’ 
problem (Ross 1973, Jensen and Meckling 1976), where the city leader acts as 
                                                          
8 In the Philippines, mayors and vice mayors are elected separately, so it is quite likely that 
the two may come from different, or even opposing, political coalitions. 
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‘principal’ and the staff as ‘agents’. Since the incentives of the agent may not always 
align with those of the principal, there is a need for the principal to monitor and 
enforce the work of the agent.  
Public sector performance has been a major topic of discussion, especially 
since the rise of NPM principles in public administration (Wholey 1999, Williams 
2009, Hatton and Schroeder 2007). The capability and commitment of civil servants, 
as well as quality of local institutions determine the performance of public agencies. 
Staffs’ capacity is related to education level and work ethic or commitment. 
Bureaucratic capability refers to the quality of city-level governing institutions, such 
as regulations that help determine how the bureaucracy works. High performance of 
a bureaucracy is often related to the presence of meritocratic recruitment, which 
tend to signify individual quality of civil servants, more so than the presence of 
rewards such as competitive salary, promotions, and career stability (Rauch and 
Evans 2000). In China, stronger bureaucratic capacity was associated with more 
cooperative relationship between the state and society (Huang and Yang 2002). 
Regardless of the existing capacity, city governments need to conduct 
capacity building for their staff on a regular basis (Grindle 1997). Civil servants need 
to deliver an innovative program successfully, and be equipped to deal with 
constantly changing situations. Capacity building could take place through formal 
trainings, but also through on-the-job trainings and modeling of good habits by 
leaders (West and Berman 2011) Various challenges of conducting local government 
capacity building have been documented (Ta'i 2000), but with consistency and 
commitment, coupled with the right incentives, it could result positively (Courtney, 
Deguit, and White 2002, Berman and Kim 2010).  
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Aside from ensuring and building staff capacity, the city government has 
been suggested to adopt performance requirements, including incentive systems 
which are appropriate for the public sector (Merchant and Van der Stede 2012, 
Burgess and Ratto 2003). Incentives and disincentives may take various forms. The 
more tangible ones include performance bonuses and pay-cuts, as well as 
promotions and possibly demotions. Less tangible ones include praises and 
reprimands by the superior. Incentives and rewards for innovative staffs have also 
been argued to improve performance (Gertler and Vermeersch 2012) and encourage 
more innovations (Newman, Raine, and Skelcher 2001).  
c. Assessment 
TC theories help us understand that firms and markets are not a given, but 
results of efforts to minimize transaction costs by adjusting the boundaries of the 
firm (Coase 1937, Williamson 1996). Where transaction costs are low, economic 
actors tend to use the market system (‘buy’); where transaction costs are high, they 
use a vertically integrated organization (‘make’). Sometimes we also see hybrid 
forms of organization, such as publicly-owned corporations or Public-Private 
Partnerships to respond to hybrid forms of transaction costs. 
TC theories are mostly developed based on the private sector context, 
where it is assumed that economic activities will take place in any case, because 
economic actors need to generate profit. The main consideration is not whether to 
conduct the activity, but which form of organization (governance mechanism) is 
more appropriate to minimize transaction costs (Williamson and Masten 1999).  
However, TCs are also present in public organizations, and the way TCs work 
in the public sector may be slightly different from the way they work in the private 
sector. In the public sector context, however, innovation is not a requirement, and 
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therefore may not always be conducted. High TC of a possible public innovation may 
deter public organizations from conducting said innovation altogether. An analysis of 
the transaction costs of governing the city (as explored in this thesis) may shed light 
on the likelihood of a city government to introduce innovations. 
Some of the concepts included as part of TCs are not completely new to the 
field of public administration. For example, ‘negotiation costs’ in conducting public 
innovations (such as relationship with the city council and citizens groups) could 
have otherwise been referred to as ‘good governance’, while notions related to 
‘enforcement costs’ (such as bureaucratic capability, capacity building, and use of 
incentives) are also known as ‘public service capacity.’ However, I believe seeing 
them as ‘transaction costs’ is in line with one of the intentions of this thesis: to bring 
a new perspective to the issue. More specifically, the transaction cost framework is 
adept in dissecting the topics of risk, negotiations, and principal-agent issues that 








Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
 
A scientific research design is composed of research question, theory, data, 
and use of data (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). The research questions have been 
laid out in Chapter 1 (Introduction), while the theories were explored in Chapter 2 
(Literature review). Data will be presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 (the case 
reports) and analyzed in Chapter 6 (Comparisons and Analysis).  
This chapter presents the methodology of this thesis, including analytical 
framework, research design, and issues related to research quality. The analytical 
framework is presented to operationalize the theories into more concrete 
definitions of the outcome (phenomenon being explained) and the explanatory 
factors explored in this research. The research design attempts to justify the data by 
explaining the process of selecting the cases to achieve research objectives while 
minimizing bias, and the procedures in which data were analyzed. Finally, the 
section on quality highlights various methodological limitations of this research and 
explains efforts that have been taken to improve reliability and validity. 
1. Analytical Framework 
This thesis adopts a ‘retrospective research design’ that attempts to explain 
a given outcome phenomenon (public innovativeness) which has already been 
established at the start of the study. The phenomenon is then explained by 
exploring a proposed theory (that lower transaction costs contribute to more 
innovations) in light of existing explanations (that leadership and societal 
characteristics may also play a role in determining innovativeness). The analytical 
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framework outlining the explanatory factors used in the LST Framework is provided 
in Figure 7.  












a. Outcome: Public Innovativeness 
The phenomenon or ‘outcome’ being explained in this research is public 
innovativeness. Here ‘innovativeness’ refers to the extent to which innovations or 
innovative programs have been introduced by a city government, but does not 
discuss each innovation in detail. Therefore, this research is about public 
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Public innovativeness could be measured in multiple ways. As discussed in 
the literature review, use of survey data and innovation award data are similarly 
problematic. Surveys tend to be prone to self-selection and exaggeration in the 
reporting of ‘innovations’. Meanwhile, awards are less inclusive and more prone to 
saturating ‘innovation’ with other constructs such as successful implementation and 
to how the program was ‘presented’ (often related to the charisma of the leader). 
To deal with such measurement limitations, in this research public 
innovativeness is proposed to be measured by a dichotomous or binary construct 
(i.e. innovative, not innovative/typical) rather than a continuous construct (i.e. 
number of awards received, number of innovations reported) or an ordinal construct 
(i.e. highly innovative, rather innovative, less innovative). The binary construct 
concurs with the goal of this thesis: to understand why some city governments were 
more innovative than others. As such, the need was not to identify a range of cities 
based on different levels of innovativeness, but simply to identify cities which were 
‘innovative’ and ‘typical’.  
A list of innovation award winners could help to identify ‘innovative’ city 
governments, despite the biases that come with the awarding process. Cities which 
have won multiple awards could be argued to be among the set of ‘innovative 
cities’, even if there were other cities which were more innovative. To ensure 
variation in innovativeness, there is a need to identify ‘typical’ city governments to 
be compared and contrasted with the ‘innovative’ cases. The research could 
therefore also be regarded as a ‘case-control’ study. Case selection process is 
explained in Section 2.A. (Research Design, Case Selection). 
The unit of analysis in this research is the city government in whole, with 
focus on the mayor and her surrounding environment. Because the innovative cities 
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have won awards in multiple sectors, it is argued that there is something particular 
about the city government in whole that makes is worthy of being the unit of 
analysis. Had this research been about public innovativeness in certain sectors only 
(economic development, healthcare, education, etc.), it would make sense to 
choose a certain policy subsystem or relevant city departments as the unit of 
analysis.  
b. Explanatory Factors: Leadership and Society 
The literature review has identified two dominant explanations of 
innovation: leadership and society. A summary of factors related to leadership and 
society that will be explored in this research is summarized in Table 2. 
Leadership 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, three characters of leadership are particularly 
relevant to explain innovation or organizational change. City governments which 
have had leaders who were charismatic, committed, with diverse career experience 
were argued to be more likely to conduct public innovations.  
Table 2: Defining Explanatory Factors: Leadership and Society 
No. Explanatory Factors Definition 
1 LEADERSHIP  
1a Charisma Ability to motivate and mobilize people; to make 
staff follow instructions 
1b Commitment Personal will to achieve positive change, supported 
by credible moral legitimacy 
1c Diversity of Experience The state of having exposure to and/or experience 
in careers beyond the local government 
2 SOCIETY  
2a Meritocratic Norms Presence of norms that support meritocracy and 




No. Explanatory Factors Definition 
2b Organized Civil Society Condition where citizens are organized and 
networked as civil society groups, and can articulate 
their collective demands  
2c Favourable History The extent to which meritocratic norms and 
organized civil society has been present in the city’s 
recent & distant history 
 
Charisma refers to a leader’s ability to motivate and mobilize the people 
around her to achieve certain goal. This includes the leader’s capacity to make 
people listen to what she says, make staff follow instructions appropriately, and 
inspire people to adopt new habits. Such are the characters of ‘charismatic 
authority’ argued by Weber in 1922 that would make someone acknowledged as 
‘leader’ rather than ‘boss.’ Whether a leader is charismatic and effective can be 
identified through interviews, surveys, media articles and news recordings, as well 
as from the leader’s track record of achievements.  
Commitment refers to a leader’s personal and political will to achieve 
change despite various consequences. These include the tendency to work harder, 
take risks, and be unpopular politically. Commitment also refers to the leader’s 
consistency in showing moral legitimacy, accountability, and credibility, as well as 
continuous support towards a program or idea. The institutional analysis literature 
has highlighted the importance of ‘credible commitment’ in achieving cooperation 
that would ultimately lead to successful innovations. These characters can be 
identified through interviews and surveys, as well as news articles which portray the 
mayor, both in positive and negative lights. 
Diversity of experience is considered beneficial to build a leader’s creativity 
and capacity to identify elements which could be recombined in different ways. 
Having lived in different places, participated in different organizations, and having 
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jobs or careers beyond the local public sector contribute to characters which would 
arguably enable leaders to be more open to change and new ideas. They can be 
identified by reviewing the curriculum vitae of the mayors, as well as from 
interviews with key respondents. 
Society 
The literature review also identified another explanation of innovativeness 
(or ability to change and develop over extended periods of time) in the deep-rooted 
institutions of the society. Societies which have had meritocratic norms and values, 
organized civil society, and have had them over extended periods in history were 
argued to be more likely to encourage or allow innovations to take place. 
Norms and values that protect the people’s rights, enforce contracts, and 
encourage meritocracy, trust and trustworthiness, have been said to be associated 
with sustained progress and economic growth. These shall be referred to as 
‘meritocratic norms’, as shorthand. In the management literature, having a non-
hierarchical organizational structure and values that encourage openness, curiosity, 
and risk-taking, while adopting fair, fact-based communication were also claimed to 
be more supportive of innovation. Such characters can be identified through 
interviews and surveys with leaders and members of the society.  
The organization of citizens into civil society groups has also been attributed 
to the likelihood of having a more equal relationship between society and ruler. 
Associations and networks improve trust and trustworthiness, and build social 
capital among the association’s members. Note that the social capital here refers to 
that which forms between citizens, not that which forms between the city leader 
and citizens groups (which is discussed under negotiation costs). This can be 
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identified through statistics on the number of local organizations and associations, 
as well as observations and casual conversations. 
Favorable history refers to the extent to which meritocratic norms and 
progressive local organizations are embedded in the city’s history, and lays a path 
that directs the city’s trajectory. The longer such traits have been present in the city, 
the more likely the society will continue to remain meritocratic and progressive, and 
possibly encourage innovations. Such characters can be identified through history 
books, archives of past policies and programs, as well as news articles. It can also be 
uncovered through conversations with key informants who are familiar with the 
history of the city. 
c. Explanatory Factors: Transaction Cost 
Aside from leadership and society, the argument raised in this thesis is that 
transaction costs matter in encouraging or discouraging public innovations. 
Transaction costs can be disaggregated as information costs, negotiation costs, and 
enforcement costs. A summary of the factors related to transaction costs that are 
explored in this research is presented in Table 3. 
Information costs  
Information costs refer to the effort needed by the public entrepreneur to 
find out about policies, programs, and projects which have been successfully 
implemented in other places. The premise is that lesser or more efficient 
information costs are faced by city leaders who (1) have wider access to ICT and the 
media, (2) actively participate in various networking opportunities, (3) have traveled 




 Table 3: Defining Explanatory Factors: Transaction Costs 
No. Explanatory Factors Definition 
3a INFORMATION COSTS  
3a1 Access to ICT and media The extent to which internet connection, media 
outlets, and relevant packaged information are 
easily accessible to city leaders 
3a2 Networking opportunities Opportunity for city leaders to network with the 
central government, mayors/leaders of other cities, 
and local interest groups 
3a3 Travels to other cities Opportunity for city leaders to directly visit other 
cities, to be familiar with innovative programs 
taking place elsewhere 
3b NEGOTIATION COSTS  
3b1 Relationship with city 
council  
The extent to which executive leaders could build 
healthy political relationship with legislative 
members (‘veto players’) 
3b2 Relationship with citizens 
groups 
The extent to which city leaders engage & interact 
positively with various local interest groups  
3b3 Healthy political rivalry The extent to which the current, formal city leaders 
could exercise their authority to conduct activities 
without disruption from political rivals 
3c ENFORCEMENT COSTS  
3c1 Capable bureaucracy  The personal qualifications of civil servants and the 
administrative quality of city government 
organizations 
3c2 Capacity building  The extent to which the city government could 
conduct capacity building for their staff 
 
3c3 Incentives & disincentives Ability of city government to implement an 
effective system that rewards performance and/or 
punishes non-performance 
 
Access to ICT and the media refers to the extent to which internet 
connection, media outlets, and relevant packaged information (such as ‘best 
practice’ compilations, case studies) are available and accessible to city leaders and 
government staff. These could be gauged by the presence of affordable and reliable 
ICT infrastructure, be it in the city in general, or in the city government offices. The 
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number, size, and variety of local media companies also contribute to this aspect in 
ensuring a wider array of information sources.  
Participation in networks refers to the opportunity for city leaders to liaise 
with various parties whose knowledge resources could be tapped. These could be 
assessed by the extent to which the city leaders (the mayor or heads of 
departments) actively participate in vertical networks with the central government, 
horizontal networks with other cities (nationally or internationally), and local 
networks with other city stakeholders. Such networks could be formal or informal.  
Travels to other cities refer to the opportunity for city leaders, as well as the 
extent to which city leaders have traveled to visit other cities which may act as 
reference for innovative programs. Such travel is meant to signify familiarity with 
good programs that have been conducted elsewhere, and could take place in 
formally or informally, in official or personal settings. Travels which were done 
personally and before the leader started to hold office is related to the leader’s 
personal background. However, official travels during the time as mayor or head of 
department is related to the opportunity that a leader is presented with.  
Negotiation costs  
Negotiation costs refer to the effort needed by city leaders to convince their 
political counterparts to approve use of public funds for an innovative program. The 
premise is that more efficient negotiation costs are faced by city leaders who (1) 
have good political relationship with the city council, (2) have positive relationship 
with citizens and local interest groups, and (3) face healthy political rivalry.  
Relationship with the city council (legislative branch) refers to the extent to 
which the city’s executive could build healthy political relationship with ‘veto 
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players’. Such healthy relationship could be achieved through formal or informal 
political agreements or through a benign understanding where discussions in the 
city council take place for the greatest interest of the citizens. Such relationship can 
be gauged from the frequency in which new proposals from the executive were 
accepted by the legislative, the process in which they were accepted (if apply), and 
the content of discussion or debate that took place. 
Relationship with citizens groups refers to the extent to which city leaders 
engage and interact positively with various civil society organizations and business 
associations in ways that build mutual trust. These can be observed, for example, 
from the frequency of meetings or interactions between city leaders and these 
various groups, whether such meetings take place regularly or only incidentally, 
where such meetings take place, and how they are conducted. It can also be 
observed from the quality of relationship between the mayor and citizens and level 
of public trust that the mayor holds.  
Healthy political rivalry refers to the extent to which the current, formal city 
leaders could exercise their authority to conduct public projects or activities without 
facing disruptive challenges from their political rivals. This can be assessed from the 
manifestation of political rivalry: whether they caused disruption in the 
implementation of public activities or delivery of public services. 
Enforcement costs  
Enforcement costs refer to the effort needed by the public entrepreneur to 
implement an innovative program successfully. The premise is that lesser or more 
efficient enforcement costs are faced by city leaders who (1) have access to capable 
bureaucracy and civil servants, (2) have resources to conduct capacity building, and 
(3) can apply an effective incentive system to reward performance. 
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Capable bureaucracy refers partly to the personal qualifications of civil 
servants, including their education level, experience, trainings that they have had, 
discipline, creativity, and work motivation. It also refers to the administrative quality 
of city government organizations and institutions, including the extent to which local 
regulations enable the city government as a whole to deliver public services in 
effective and efficient manner, or to be creative and responsive towards new 
opportunities. The capability of a bureaucracy, either individually or as a system, can 
also be gauged by asking the perception of city leaders, and cross-check that with 
the perception of academicians and the business sector. This thesis, however, does 
not seek to measure the institutional aspects of bureaucratic capability, such as 
those related to rules and procedures of the city government.  
Capacity building refers to the extent to which the city government conducts 
activities to build the capacity of their staff. These can be gauged from the frequency 
in which trainings were conducted, or staffs were sent for continuing education. 
They can also be reviewed from how the trainings were conducted, the topics which 
were covered, and the effectiveness or impact. These relate to the presence of 
resources to provide trainings or to send staff for continuing education.  
Incentives systems refer to the presence of an effective formal mechanism 
that rewards civil servants for good performance (through both monetary and 
career-related appreciations) and dis-incentivize them for lack of performance. This 
can be evaluated from the extent to which such system is implemented consistently 
and is considered fair by civil servants, and its effectiveness in enticing government 
staff to improve their performance. 
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2. Research Design  
The research was conducted based on the principles of ‘scientific inference’ 
(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) using a combined method of analytic narratives 
(Bates 1998), multiple case study (Yin 2009) and Qualitative Comparative Analysis or 
QCA (Ragin 1987). The retrospective and ‘case-control comparison’ conducted in this 
research is influenced by the example provided by Ostrom (1990) in ‘Governing the 
Commons’. Underlying the methodology is a post-positivist epistemology, which is in 
line with the notion of ‘bounded-rationality’ embraced by New Institutional 
Economics (Ménard and Shirley 2008).  
Due to limitations on the availability of measurable data on the outcome 
(public innovativeness) and explanatory factors (leadership, society, and transaction 
costs), the small-n, qualitative approach is utilized. The case study method is argued 
to be appropriate in answering ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions in small-n research, 
especially when the phenomenon being explained and the explanatory factors are 
intricately linked to each other and to their settings (Yin 2009). This method allows 
deeper exploration of a unit of analysis (a city government) in close relationship with 
its context (the city’s stakeholders and institutional setting). Such explorations are 
then described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  
Since the goal of the research is to identify possible factors as to why some 
city governments were more innovative than others, the ‘innovative’ cities shall be 
compared and contrasted with ‘typical’ ones. This calls for a comparative approach 
where key insights are gained from the cross-case analysis rather than from 
individual case reports. The Qualitative Comparative Analysis or QCA method allows 
the researcher to conclude whether an explanatory factor is ‘present’ or ‘absent’ in 
an observation by translating thick descriptions from case reports into binary ‘Yes’ 
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and ‘No’ values. Patterns are then sought to see if any configuration of explanatory 
factors are associated with the outcome phenomenon (Ragin 1987). 
Such approach conforms to the comparative analysis adopted in Governing 
the Commons (Ostrom 1990). In her attempt to identify what distinguishes 
institutionally robust common pool resources (CPRs) from failed and fragile ones, 
Ostrom conducted a five-step research process: (1) review existing research 
pertaining to the management of CPRs around the world, (2) identify research on 
‘robust’ institutions in the form of long-enduring, self-governed CPRs, (3) summarize 
the ‘design principles’ which were similar among the long-enduring CPRs (similar to 
‘hypotheses’), (4) identify research on ‘failed’ and ‘fragile’ institutions in the form of 
CPRs which did not manage to deal, or are still dealing with their collective action 
problems, and (5) analyze of the extent to which the ‘design principles’ (derived 
from the ‘robust’ cases) apply or not apply to the ‘failed’ and ‘fragile’ cases (similar 
to ‘hypothesis testing’ in quantitative research). An overview of results of Ostrom’s 
study is presented in Figure 8. 
Ostrom did not necessarily conduct the original research on the 14 CPRs that 
she compared and contrasted; instead, she drew on ‘a rich literature written by 
other scholars,’ narrowed down the cases based on some criteria that fit her 
research objectives (i.e., small size, located in one country), and enacted reasoned 
judgment to summarize the ‘design principles’ which were present among the 
‘robust’ cases. She then analyzed the extent to which ‘failed’ and ‘fragile’ cases 




























































































This thesis, however, did not benefit from a similarly ‘rich’ literature on 
public innovation, leadership, society, and transaction costs in mid-sized cities of the 
Philippines and Indonesia. Therefore, fieldwork needed to be conducted in pre-
selected ‘innovative’ and ‘typical’ cases to gather primary and secondary data. Since 
cross-case comparison will be the basis upon which the research question is 
answered, selection of both the ‘innovative’ and ‘typical’ cases was done with care.  
a. Case Selection 
The Philippines and Indonesia are selected as settings for the cities (cases) in 
this research due to their relatively recent political transformations: adoption of 
direct democracy and extensive decentralization in very short period. This 
transformation started with the Philippines’ ‘People Power Revolution’ in 1986 and 
Indonesia’s ‘Reformasi’ in 1998. The World Bank (2005) have referred to both 
countries’ decentralization process as a ‘big bang’. Along with this phenomenon 
came a drastic change in the way governance takes place at the local level. Mayors 
are increasingly taking the stage, and local democracy is gradually institutionalized, 
albeit with various extents and speeds. Along with decentralization, Indonesia and 
the Philippines have been facing issues to ensure that local governments deliver 
quality public services. Awards for local government performance and innovations 
have been popularly used for this purpose, arguably more so in the Philippines and 
Indonesia compared to other Asian countries. The question is: which city 
governments in Indonesia and the Philippines should be selected for this research? 
Although perhaps not as ‘ideal’ as random selection that enables variation 
on the explanatory variable, a selection that enables variation on the dependent 
variable is acceptable as long as it is done with disregard to the explanatory 
variables (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Since this research is limited to a small 
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number of cases, the cases are selected intentionally to ensure variation in public 
innovativeness. This thesis utilized a combination of three case selection methods as 
identified by (Seawright and Gerring 2008): the ‘extreme’ cases represent cities with 
particularly high level of innovativeness, while the ‘typical’ cases represent the 
majority of cities. When one camp is compared and contrasted against the other, it 
adheres to a ‘most different’ method of case selection. 
Admittedly, intentional selection is prone to biases. The most problematic of 
such biases is using knowledge of the explanatory factors to help guide case 
selection, such that the cases confirm the researcher’s desired conclusion. This was 
something that the researcher has avoided. Given the dearth of data on conditions 
pertaining to leadership, society, and transaction costs in the middle-sized cities of 
Indonesia and the Philippines, such attempt would not be possible without 
conducting prior research.  
Another bias lies in the construct of ‘public innovativeness’. This research 
uses award winner data to identify cases that show presence of innovativeness. But 
such awards may be problematic. The fact that nominees are self-selected (not 
every city is assessed) lends to the bias that there could be some very innovative 
cities which have not applied for the award, and thus have not won any award. As 
described in Analytical Framework, this bias is dealt with by adopting a binary 
construct of ‘innovative’ and ‘non-innovative/typical’, and choosing cities which 
have won multiple awards as part of the ‘innovative’ set. Some of these biases will 
be discussed more in the Quality Considerations section.  
Despite these challenges, preliminary discussions with award committees in 
both countries conclude that efforts have been taken to select the winners as 
objectively as possible (i.e., no political consideration was identified). Care has also 
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been done on the part of the researcher to select cases from the pool of winners 
and the pool of ‘non-winners’. The following describes the process of selecting 
‘innovative’ and ‘typical’ city governments from both the Philippines and Indonesia. 
Philippine Cases 
The Philippine government has been conducting a prestigious, national-level 
award to ‘recognize innovation and excellence in local governance’. The Galing 
Pook9 (GP) Awards have been given since 1994 by the president to programs 
conducted by local government units or LGUs (provinces, cities, municipalities, or 
barangays). It started soon after the onset of decentralization as a joint-initiative of 
the Department of Interior and Local Government, with support from the Ford 
Foundation and other high profile national and local figures.  
For a program to be eligible, it has to satisfy three criteria: (1) it is conducted 
by the public sector (although it may have started as an NGO initiative), (2) it has 
been operational for at least one year, and (3) it has proven positive results. With 
these criteria, LGUs submit an application form, which consists of a brief description 
followed by explanation on how the program responds to five judging criteria: (a) 
positive results and impact, (b) promotion of people’s participation and 
empowerment, (c) innovativeness, and (d) efforts to ensure transferability and 
sustainability of the program. Although innovation is only one of the judging criteria, 
GP Foundation admittedly places a ‘premium on innovation’.  
The selection involves a rigorous process of trimming down the list, reviews 
by national and regional selection committees, on-site validation, and presentation. 
After an eligibility screening by the GP secretariat, the National Selection Committee 
identifies a list of promising programs to be further assessed by the Regional 
                                                          
9 Galing pook means great places. The award’s website is at http://www.galingpook.org/ 
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Selection Committees. After regional desk assessments, the latter return with a 
trimmed list of recommended programs. Based on this shorter list, several programs 
were further selected for on-site validation. Then the programs’ proponents (mayors 
and managers) were invited to Manila to present and defend their respective 
programs. Finally, 10 programs were selected as “outstanding” (winners) and 
another six to 10 as “trailblazing” (runner-ups).  
Every year, the GP Awards were given to 16-20 local programs, reaching a 
total of 328 awardees as of 2014.10 These 328 local programs were spread over 
multiple sectors, ranging from economics/livelihood to environmental protection to 
community involvement in public affairs. The awarded programs also came from 
various regions of the Philippines, and were conducted by barangays, cities, 
municipalities, and provinces alike. 
Selecting Innovative Cities 
An uneven distribution of award winners is found; some LGUs have won 
more awards than others. As many as 35 out of 81 provinces (43.2%), 58 out of 144 
cities (40.3%), and 96 out of 1,490 municipalities (6.4%) have won at least one GP 
award. But out of the 58 award-winning cities, 14 have won the award at least three 
times (see Table 4). We shall consider these as the Philippines’ ‘innovative’ cities. 
Table 4 provides the basis upon which selection for the Philippines’ 
‘innovative’ cities is conducted. Naga City in Camarines Sur and Marikina City in the 
NCR were selected as cases of ‘innovative’ city governments as they have won a 
large number of awards compared to other cities (ten and eight awards, 
respectively). They also concur with the study’s focus on mid-sized cities: In 2010, 
                                                          




Naga’s population was 174,931, and Marikina’s was 424,150. The third city on the 
list, Quezon City, with seven awards, would not have qualified as it had a very large 
population (2.7 million in 2010). Cebu City and San Carlos City in Negros Occidental 
each has received six awards, which puts them similarly in the ‘innovative’ category, 
and they are also mid-sized in terms of population. Thus Cebu and San Carlos could 
also have been selected as part of the ‘innovative’ set. However, there was no 
reason not to choose Naga and Marikina.  
Table 4: The Philippines’ ‘innovative’ cities  




Number of Galing 
Pook Awards 
(1994-2014) 
1 Naga Camarines Sur 174,931 10 
2 Marikina NCR 424,150 8 
3 Quezon City NCR 2,761,720 7 
4 Cebu City Cebu 866,171 6 
5 San Carlos Negros Occidental 129,981 6 
6 Puerto Princesa Palawan 222,673 5 
7 Mandaluyong NCR 328,699 4 
8 Muntinlupa NCR 459,941 4 
9 Iloilo City Iloilo 424,619 3 
10 Legazpi Albay 182,201 3 
11 Munoz Nueva Ecija 75,462 3 
12 San Fernando Pampanga 285,912 3 
13 Surigao Surigao del Norte 140,540 3 
14 Tagum Davao del Norte 242,801 3 
Source: Galing Pook Awards data, National Statistical Coordination Board 
 
Selecting Typical Cities 
To ensure diversity in the outcome phenomenon, the ‘innovative’ cases 
need to be compared with cities which were non-innovative. However, whereas 
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‘innovative cities’ were easier to identify through awards, ‘typical cities’ could not be 
identified as easily. Selection of typical cases was conducted through three stages: 
(1) narrowing down candidates from a long to a short list, (2) desk research to 
ensure non- or low-innovativeness, and (3) discussion with public administration 
experts who were familiar with local governments to confirm the cases.  
There are three criteria for narrowing down the candidate cities to a short 
list: (1) the city’s population is within a range of plus or minus 25% from the 
population of the city they are controlling, (2) it has the same ‘legal class’ as city they 
are controlling, and (3) the city has not won a GP award. These criteria provide us 
with a short list of ‘typical’ city candidates, wherein four are to be compared and 
contrasted with Marikina (Table 5) and two with Naga (Table 6). 
Table 5: Short list of ‘typical’ cities to compare with Marikina 




Legal Class Year of 
Charter 
1 Bacolod Negros Occidental 511,820 Highly urbanized 1938 
 Marikina 
(innovative) 
NCR 424,150 Highly urbanized 1996 
2 Malabon NCR 353,337 Highly urbanized 2001 
3 Lapu-Lapu Cebu 350,467 Highly urbanized 1961 
4 Angeles Pampanga 326,336 Highly urbanized 1964 
 
Table 6: Short list of ‘typical’ cities to compare with Naga City 








Camarines Sur 174,931 Independent 
component 
1948 
1 Dagupan Pangasinan 163,676 Independent 
component 
1947 






Next, further investigation of the typical case candidates were done through 
desk reviews to ensure that they have not been recognized as ‘innovative’ (i.e., by 
other awards, or the media). Such was conducted by keyword searches in the NUS 
library and Singapore National Library electronic catalogues and internet-based 
research (government websites, Philippine media articles, etc.). Afterwards, 
discussions were also conducted with two Philippine public administration scholars.  
Such probes found that Bacolod and Angeles have actually conducted a 
number of public innovations but have not received any Galing Pook awards. That 
leaves us with either Dagupan or Santiago to control Naga. Finally, Dagupan City, 
Pangasinan was chosen as Naga’s control because the two were similar in 
population size and years of being chartered. Furthermore, Naga and Dagupan were 
core cities of the Bicol and Ilocos regions, respectively, and are particularly notable 
nationwide for high poverty rate (Balisacan and Hill 2007).  
Meanwhile no prominent information on public innovations was found for 
Malabon and Lapu-lapu; either city would be appropriate to be compared and 
contrasted with Marikina. Finally, Malabon City, NCR was selected as Marikina’s 
control because, like Marikina, Malabon is part of the NCR but not a very significant 
part of the metropolitan in terms of population and economy.  
Indonesian Cases 
In Indonesia, three awards in particular have recognized public innovation at 
the subnational level since the start of decentralization. First, the Urban 
Management Innovation (Inovasi Manajemen Perkotaan or IMP) Award started in 
2008 to recognize innovative programs in the fields of urban management: land use 
planning, water and sanitation, slum upgrading, management of traditional markets, 
and management of informal street vendors. Second, the Innovative Government 
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(IG) Award was started in 2010 to acknowledge innovative programs in the field of 
public administration, public service, community empowerment, and regional 
competitiveness. Nominees are not based on applications, but preliminary 
identification by the central government. Both of the IMP and IGA awards are 
conducted by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Third, the Public Service Innovation 
Competition (Kompetisi Inovasi Pelayanan Publik or Sinovik) is a recent effort that 
started in 2014 to encourage public innovation by the Ministry of State Apparatus 
and Bureaucracy Reform. The competition is open to programs conducted by 
national and regional government organizations. The top-99, top-33, and top-nine 
programs are published, and awards are given by the minister. 
Since the intention of this study is to scrutinize cities which have been 
innovative over a relatively longer period, it was decided that the main source of 
identification for ‘innovative’ cases is the IMP Award. The latter focuses specifically 
on urban-related issues, and has been conducted the longest: since 2008 (note that 
this is fairly recent compared to the GP Awards of the Philippines, which started in 
1994).11  
For a program to be eligible for the IMP Award, five criteria need to be 
fulfilled: (1) it has been operational for at least two years, (2) it has a new and 
unique element that has not been applied in other Indonesian regions, (3) it includes 
participation from community members, (4) it is not funded by the national budget 
or foreign aid, and (5) it has sustained positive impact on the community. With these 
eligibility criteria, a city government submits an application, which is then reviewed 
according to six judging criteria: (a) newness and uniqueness, (b) impact on the 
                                                          
11 The following description of IMP Award eligibility criteria, judging criteria, and selection 




community, (c) community participation, (d) cross-stakeholder coordination, (e) 
cost-benefit comparison, (f) sustainability of the program.  
The selection involves a similarly rigorous process of trimming down a long 
list, a presentation in Jakarta, and on-site validation. First, an independent judging 
panel (which includes non-civil servant experts in urban management, public policy, 
environment, economics, and social welfare) and a technical team from the ministry 
identify a list of promising programs based on their applications. Second, those who 
make it to the short list are invited to give a presentation to the judging panel in 
Jakarta and answer related questions. Third, based on the presentation and Q&A, 
the judging panel decides on a list of ‘finalists’ that would undergo on-site validation. 
Fourth, the panel sits together and tallies the scores to identify winners.  
Selecting Innovative Cities 
As many as seven out of 93 Indonesian cities between 2008 and 2012 have 
won at least two IMP awards (see Table 7). We shall consider these as Indonesia’s 
‘innovative cities’.  
Table 7: Indonesia’s ‘innovative’ cities 




1 Balikpapan East Kalimantan 557,579 3 
2 Pekalongan City Central Java 281,434 3 
3 Cimahi West Java 541,177 2 
4 Payakumbuh West Sumatra 116,825 2 
5 Pontianak West Kalimantan 554,764 2 
6 Probolinggo East Java 217,062 2 
7 Surakarta (Solo) Central Java 499,337 2 




Table 7 provides the basis for selection of Indonesia’s ‘innovative’ cities. 
Pekalongan City in Central Java and Balikpapan City in East Kalimantan have won the 
IMP award in all three occasions that it was conducted, covering a period of five 
years. Both cities are the core of its respective metropolitan areas. They also fit the 
criteria of mid-sized cities. In 2010, Pekalongan’s population was 281,434 and 
Balikpapan’s was 557,579. The other five cities on the list could be claimed to be ‘as 
innovative’ or even ‘more innovative’ than Balikpapan and Pekalongan. However, 
there was no reason not to choose the two which have won more awards, as they all 
could be considered as part of the ‘innovative’ cities set. 
Selecting Typical Cities 
As in the Philippine example, selection of non- or low-innovative cities is not 
a straightforward task. Moreover, public innovation awards are a new phenomenon 
in post-decentralization Indonesia which started only in the second half of the 
2000s. The fact that a city has not won an IMP Award does not automatically render 
it as ‘non-innovative’. Therefore, identification of ‘typical’ cases was conducted in 
three stages, similar to the process of selecting typical Philippine cities: (1) 
narrowing down candidates from long to short list, (2) desk research to ensure non- 
or low-innovativeness, and (3) discussion with national public administration 
experts.  
Narrowing down the candidate cities to a short list is done using three 
criteria: (1) the city is in the same ‘population size category’ as the city they are 
controlling12, (2) like Pekalongan and Balikpapan, the city should also be a core city, 
                                                          
12 Indonesia recognizes a city size classification based on population, which include: 
“metropolitan city” (more than one million), “large city” (between 500,000 and one 




not part of another city’s metropolitan area, (3), for logistics reasons, considering 
the vast size of Indonesia, the city should not be located where it would be 
substantially costly or time consuming to reach13, and  (4) the city has not won any 
of the three public innovation awards described above, which include the IMP, IGA, 
and Sinovik awards. All Indonesian cities are autonomous, so there is no difference 
in legal class between one city and another. These criteria provide us with a short list 
of ‘typical’ city candidates, wherein four are to be compared and contrasted with 
Balikpapan (Table 8) and six with Pekalongan (Table 9). 
Table 8: Shortlist of ‘typical’ cities to compare with Balikpapan 
No. City Province Population 
(2010) 
City status 
1 Pekanbaru Riau 894,255 1946 
2 Samarinda East Kalimantan 826,394 1959 
3 Jambi Jambi 661,470 1946 
4 Tasikmalaya West Java 641,253 2001 
 Balikpapan  
(innovative) 
East Kalimantan 548,859 1959 
 
Table 9: Shortlist of ‘typical’ cities to compare with Pekalongan 
No. City Province Population 
(2010) 
City status 
1 Bengkulu Bengkulu    375,141  1957 
2 Cirebon West Java    319,353  1965 
 Pekalongan  
(innovative) 
Central Java   295,954  1950 
3 Tegal Central Java    254,450  1950 
4 Tanjungpinang Riau Islands    210,836  2001 
5 Pangkalpinang Bangka Belitung     200,434  1956 
6 Madiun East Java    200,403  1965 
                                                          
13 Cities in eastern Indonesia (Maluku and Papua regions), as well as smaller cities that would 
take more than five hours of road travel to reach were not preferred (admittedly, this 




After the list was compiled, a desk review (similar to the one conducted for 
the Philippine shortlists) and discussions with Indonesian public administration 
scholars were conducted to confirm whether these cities could have otherwise been 
considered ‘innovative’, despite not having won prominent awards.  
Through this exercise, it was found that two of Balikpapan’s control 
candidates (Pekanbaru and Jambi) could be argued to be innovative. This leaves two 
remaining candidates to control for Balikpapan, namely Samarinda and Tasikmalaya. 
Further considerations highlighted that Samarinda (rather than Tasikmalaya) is 
closer in character with Balikpapan. Samarinda is situated quite close to Balikpapan, 
(2 hours driving distance). Both cities are located in the same province (East 
Kalimantan, which is rich in oil and gas), and close to the major river delta in their 
respective areas. Both are endowed with large public finance derived from natural 
resources. Meanwhile, Tasikmalaya is located in the inland areas of West Java. Thus 
Samarinda City, East Kalimantan is selected as the ‘typical’ case to control for 
Balikpapan. 
The desk review also found that three of Pekalongan’s control candidates 
(Cirebon, Tegal, and Madiun) could be argued to be ‘innovative’. This leaves three 
remaining candidates to control for Pekalongan, namely Bengkulu, Tanjungpinang, 
and Pangkalpinang. The first plan was to conduct research in Bengkulu, which is 
similarly a mid-sized port town on a big island. However, after failed attempts at 
requesting interviews with city leaders,14 Tanjungpinang was approached and the 
city was willing to accept interview requests. Both Tanjungpinang and Pangkalpinang 
                                                          
14 In November 2014, research and interview requests were not entertained by the office of 
Bengkulu City mayor. Later it was found out that the mayor was being investigated for a 
corruption case.  
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are port towns, and either arguably would have been acceptable controls. In terms 
of practical reasons, however, Tanjungpinang is much closer to Singapore and would 
make it easier logistically to visit. Thus Tanjungpinang City, Riau Islands, completes 
the selection of ‘typical’ city to control for Pekalongan, Central Java. 
b. Data Collection  
The research sourced data from multiple sources in attempt to triangulate 
the information received. The data comes in various forms. Primary data was 
derived from semi-structured interviews, casual conversations, and direct 
observation of activities. Secondary data include national and local statistics, the city 
governments’ formal publications (past and present), national and local media 
articles (past and present), and local history books. Interviews make up an important 
component of the data, and will be explained in more detail.  
Primary Data: Interviews 
Interview subjects were identified based on intentional or purposive 
sampling in order to: (1) represent a variety of institutions or interests, (2) obtain 
specific information related to an innovative program, and (3) obtain specific 
information about issues facing the city. Initially, it was targeted that 8-12 interviews 
would be conducted in each city. The following is the ‘rule of thumb’ to identify 
respondents: 
1. At the national level, interviews were sought with:  
a. Award program administrators, and  
b. Prominent public administration scholars who have written about public 
innovation, decentralization, and local governance. 
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2. At the local level, interviews were sought with people representing the following 
groups:  
a. The city’s chief executives (mayors), past and present,  
b. City councilors, past and present,  
c. Business interests, and  
d. Civil society (including NGOs, people’s organizations, and academics).  
3. Other interview subjects were identified through desk review of the awards 
received by ‘innovative’ cities, or prominent programs conducted by ‘typical’ 
cities. This may suggest: 
a. Heads of city departments who were responsible for conducting the 
city’s innovative or prominent programs, 
b. Civil society groups which partnered with the city government in 
conducting such programs  
After preliminary identification of interview subjects, formal letters were 
sent to the current mayor to request for interviews and support for research (i.e., to 
help arrange interviews with identified respondents). If some of these respondents 
were perceived to have ‘problematic’ relationship with the mayor (i.e., the current 
mayor’s ‘rival’), they were approached for interviews independently (not through 
the mayor’s office). Samples of interview request (invitation) letter, participant 
information sheet, and consent form, are provided in Appendix 1: Sample of 
Interview Request.  
Once semi-structured interviews were underway, more respondents were 
identified through snowball method (recommendations from previous respondents, 
or hints from specific issues that they mentioned). Some of these additional 
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respondents were either approached through the person who suggested them, or 
independently by the researcher.  
The interviews were conducted directly by the researcher in Bahasa 
Indonesia for the Indonesia cases, and in English for the Philippine cases. I am a 
native Indonesian speaker and in the Philippines, English is widely spoken. In this 
manner, I am fairly confident that I have captured the main messages conveyed 
during the interviews. At some points during the interview, the respondent may use 
phrases in local languages (Javanese in Pekalongan, or Bikol in Naga). When this 
happens I would ask them for clarification, and again I would confirm these phrases 
after the interview with other native speakers. 
Table 10: Formal interviews conducted (by city and stakeholder) 
No. Cities 














1 Naga 3 4 1 1 2 11 
2 Marikina 2 4 2 1 2 11 
3 Dagupan 2 4 2 1 1 10 
4 Malabon 1 2 
  
2 5 
Count per stakeholder 
- Philippine Cities 8 14 5 3 7 37 
5 Pekalongan 2 5 1 2 6 16 
6 Balikpapan 2 3 1 2 2 10 
7 Samarinda 2 1 2 2 2 9 
8 Tanjungpinang 2 2 1 1 4 10 
Count per stakeholder 
- Indonesian Cities 8 11 5 7 14 45 
Total per Stakeholder 16 25 10 10 21 82 
 
Ultimately, a total of 82 interviews were conducted, averaging 10 interviews 
per city. In some cities like Malabon, securing formal interviews were difficult 
(except the mayor and a few others, other respondents were hesitant or unavailable 
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to be contacted) and only five interviews could be conducted. To compensate the 
gap in data, the strategy was to obtain and analyze more secondary data, and 
conduct more casual conversations and observations around the city. In contrast, 
interviews were welcomed and easily arranged in Pekalongan, and a total of 16 
interviews were conducted. Table 10 summarizes the number of interviews 
conducted at the local level, in eight cities. The list of interview questions is provided 
in Appendix 2: Interview Questions. The full list of interview subjects is provided in 
Appendix 3: Interview Respondents. 
Other Primary Data 
Aside from interviews, primary data were sought from casual conversations 
and direct observations. Casual conversations were conducted informally with 
random people met during fieldwork, such as taxi drivers, restaurant owners, hotel 
staff, etc. This is a triangulating mechanism to compare the responses obtained 
through formal interviews with perspectives of the layperson. It also helped to 
better understand how leadership, society, and public innovation issues were 
viewed from the average citizen’s point of view. Main points from these 
conversations were noted by the researcher afterwards and were reviewed when 
analyzing the cases.  
Aside from the casual conversations, direct observations were also 
conducted. The researcher attended some activities related to the city’s flagship 
programs to observe how the activities were conducted, and how participants 
communicated and related to each other. Transect walks were also conducted 
across the city, i.e., to observe physical artefacts of how the city was managed, and 




Secondary data was sought from the city’s information office or statistics 
agency, the city government website, the city public library, the local university 
library, local media outlets and websites, and local book stores. The most common 
form of secondary data collected includes:  
1. Formal city statistics (yearly publications), including social, economic, 
and physical data, as well as data on political composition of the city 
council over the years 
2. The city government’s formal reports, statements, and 
ordinances/regulations  
3. Other publications of the city government (brochures, profiles of 
flagship programs) 
4. Local media articles (major events, achievements, scandals, etc. that 
occurred) 
5. Books of local interest (local history, culture, prominent figures, etc.) 
To the extent possible, the secondary data is collected to cover present and 
past conditions. This is hoped to assist in the conduction of archival and historical 
analysis of how the city deals with leadership, society, and transaction cost issues 
over time. List of city or case-specific data, reports, books, and media articles are 
provided in Appendix 4: Case-specific References. 
c. Data Analysis  
Data analysis is conducted to examine the extent to which explanatory 
factors were ‘present’ or ‘absent’ in the eight cases. This was done using simple set 
analysis and Boolean algebra, followed by the QCA method (Ragin 1987). Ultimately, 
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for each city, there would be a list of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ values related to the explanatory 
factors. However, with the large amount of primary and secondary data that has 
been collected (i.e., more than 60 hours of interview recordings), analysis needed to 
be done systematically. Figure 9 provides an overview of the procedures conducted 
to analyze the data.  







Digitizing and Coding 
First, relevant data was digitized. For primary data, all interviews were 
transcribed and field notes were typed in the computer or scanned. Some of the 
secondary data, such as certain paragraphs, tables, etc. were also digitized (if not 
already in digital form).  
Second, the data was coded using qualitative data analysis software called 
QDA Miner Lite. Coding helped organize the data according to the themes of this 
research. Each relevant sentence, statement, paragraph, or table was coded into a 
number of categories and sub-categories, as in Table 11.   
 
1, 2 Digitize 
data & code 
into research 
themes 




4 Assign ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ 
values for each sub-
category, for each time 
period 
5 Consolidate ‘Yes’ and 
‘No’ values from sub-
categories into 
categories 
6 Consolidate ‘Yes’ and 
‘No’ values from 
multiple time periods 
into a single time period 
Conduct Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis 




Table 11: Coding Categories and Sub-categories 
No. Category Sub-category 
1 General information about the city (demographic, 
economic trends, etc.) 
 
2 Issues facing (or that was faced) by the city 
3 City government programs to deal with those issues 
4 Data and opinions about the city’s leadership a. Charisma 
b. Commitment 
c. Past experience 
5 Data and opinions about the city’s society a. Norms and values 
b. Organizations 
c. History 
6 Data and opinions about the transaction costs of 
conducting public innovations 
a. Information costs 
b. Negotiation costs 
c. Enforcement costs 
7 Historical period (time element): to identify the 
sequence of ‘processes’ or ‘path’ that was taken by 
a particular 
a. Period of Mayor A 
b. Period of Mayor B 
c. Etc.  
 
Preparing Case Reports 
Third, after the data had been organized into themes, it was easier to write 
the case reports which provide descriptions and narratives about each theme. These 
are presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The case reports provide narratives based 
on coded data about the cities’ background, innovative programs, and conditions 
related to society and leadership. They also provide more detailed narratives about 
how each city government dealt with various transaction costs in their effort to 
introduce and conduct public innovations.  
Assigning ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ Values 
The fourth step concludes the ‘presence’ or ‘absence’ of favorable 
leadership, society, and transaction cost in a particular city, at a particular period. 
These were done by assigning ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ values that would enable a set analysis. 
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For example, “Did City Government [A] have favorable working relationship with the 
city council during the period of Mayor [X]?” The answer could be ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.  
The ‘yes’ and ‘no’ values were assigned upon reviewing a database of 
statements (taken from interview transcripts, notes from casual conversations, 
media articles, books, project reports, etc.) which have been coded and categorized 
according to the explanatory factors (the ‘case database’). I have tried to ensure a 
variety of respondents and data sources. When dealing with ‘mixed comments’, I 
weigh the data and ultimately decide on ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Admittedly, the researcher’s 
judgments (which are prone to subjectivity) were used in reference to knowledge of 
the Philippine and Indonesian contexts. In creating this binary value, some nuances 
regarding the case were discarded. Such nuances, however, remain available to be 
inspected in the case reports. 
Consolidating Values into Categories 
The fifth step consolidates the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ values from the nine sub-
categories into three main categories of interest: leadership, society, and 
transaction costs. To maintain the ‘Yes’ / ‘No’ dichotomy, a simple consolidation is 
conducted by counting the majority of occurrences. For example, the leadership 
factor is composed of three sub-factors (charisma, commitment, and diversity of 
experiences). If City Government [B] has two ‘Yes’s’ and one ‘No’ for the three 
leadership sub-factors, it means it has a ‘Yes’ for leadership. This step, again, was 
taken to achieve dichotomous values that would enable crisp set analysis.  
Results of this step are used to identify various configurations of how the 
‘presence’ and ‘absence’ of explanatory factors relate to each other. Based on the 
QCA method (Ragin 1987), there are 16 possible configurations depending on 
whether the city government (1) was considered ‘innovative’ or ‘typical,’ (2) had 
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transformational leadership, (3) had progressive society, and (4) faced low 
transaction costs, at various time periods. Such configurations are presented in a 
‘truth table’ (See Table 12). This allows analysis into the factors that might enable 
the different cities to become innovative over time. 
















































Consolidating Values into One Time Period 
The sixth and final step consolidates the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ values across 
different time periods for each city, such that there would be only one consolidated 
time period. For example, “Did City Government [B] have transformational 
leadership throughout the past 10 years?” The possible answers are (1) ‘Yes’, (2) 
‘Now mostly Yes, but previously No’, (3) ‘Not Always’ or ‘Not Consistently’, and (4) 
‘No’. Again, to simplify into dichotomies, answers (1) and (2) are ultimately 
considered as ‘Yes’, while answers (3) and (4) are considered as ‘No’.  
92 
 
This allows the mapping of the eight cases (both the ‘innovative’ and 
‘typical’ cities) into ‘membership’ or ‘non-membership’ of three crisp sets (cities that 
have transformational leadership, cities that have progressive society, and cities 
which have low transaction costs). The expectation was that ‘innovative’ cities 
would be members of these sets (see Table 13).  











































As illustrated in Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference., a city could be 
(A) member of all three sets, or (B) member of any combination of two particular 
sets, or (C) member of any one particular set, or (D) not a member of any sets. The 
relationship among the sets remains obscure at this point, but it is expected that 




















A: Case is member of all three sets (expected to be ‘innovative’) 
B: Case is member of any two particular sets 
C: Case is member of any one particular set 
D: Case is not a member of any set (not expected to be ‘innovative’) 
 
3. Quality Considerations 
The quality of a research is related to issues of reliability and validity. The 
following explains how such issues are present in this thesis, and how they were 
addressed.  
a. Reliability  
Reliability refers to the consistency in which the research is conducted 
across researchers (‘inter-rater reliability’), across research subjects (‘representative 

















To ensure inter-rater reliability, the procedures of data collection and 
analysis have been documented in this chapter, with supporting documentation (i.e., 
interview questions, list of secondary data) as appendices. The information provided 
herein could be further refined as a ‘case study protocol’ that could be used by 
another researcher (Yin 2009). Admittedly, however, interview questions were 
open-ended and the interviews were done in semi-structured manner. Some 
responses required follow-up questions by the researcher, which often depend on 
the researcher’s creativity and familiarity with the topic. Consequently, some 
information may not have been uncovered if the researcher was not sensitive to 
responses which deserved to be further queried. 
To ensure representative reliability, the research has suggested a ‘standard 
list’ of interview subjects to be approached (based on the ‘rule of thumb’ explained 
in primary data sources). However, a subject could suggest other persons to be 
interviewed based on a ‘snowball’ method. Therefore, it may not be advisable to 
maintain the same list of interview subjects across all cases, especially since each 
case has a certain level of uniqueness. The least that could be maintained is that the 
‘core’ group of interview subjects remains the same across the cases, but 
‘additional’ subjects may be included depending on the need.  Furthermore, the list 
of interview questions could guide subjects to remain focused on the research topic, 
making sure that they respond to similar questions.  
To ensure stability across time, inputs were sought not only from those who 
were holding relevant positions at the moment (i.e., the current mayor, current 
heads of departments), but also those who held such positions in the past (i.e., the 
past mayor, past heads of departments). There are, however, challenges in obtaining 
relevant data from such subjects, as memories fade and the required respondents 
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may no longer be present or alive. In such conditions, interviews were conducted 
with other people who were closely involved with key persons in the past (i.e., as 
was done for the research in Marikina and Naga). To complement data from the 
interviews, secondary data from archives and historical sources were also sought to 
better understand the dynamics of innovativeness in the city government over time.  
Reliability could also be achieved by building a ‘case database’. This includes 
research notes, relevant secondary data, snippets of relevant information, and 
interview transcripts. This thesis has utilized a data analysis protocol where 
interviews and other relevant data were digitized, transcribed and coded according 
to various categories of explanatory factors, across time, and for each case. This 
enables the creation of a ‘case database’ where supporting quotes by interview 
respondents are easily searchable and could be presented as part of a ‘chain of 
evidence’ (Yin 2009). 
b. Validity  
Construct Validity  
Validity refers to the extent to which the research appropriately answers the 
question through a scientific method (Neuman 2011). Construct validity ensures that 
the meaning (and measurement) of certain concepts are adequately captured in 
how they are operationalized (Cronbach and Meehl 1955).  To help ensure that 
conceptual meanings are adequately captured, each of the explanatory factors is 
decomposed into sub-factors. For example, the notion of ‘transaction costs’ is 
divided into information costs, negotiation costs, and enforcement costs, where 
each are again divided into three more detailed sub-factors. The final value of each 
factor is obtained by re-aggregating the values of the sub-factors, similar to the 
method of ‘institutional decomposition’ (Saleth and Dinar 2004).  
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While the explanatory factors were proposed by the researcher, the 
definition and measurements of the outcome (public innovativeness) are dependent 
on ‘meaning’ given by other parties. The notion of ‘public innovativeness’ in this 
research depends on data of innovation award winners from Philippine and 
Indonesian national agencies. However, the awards included some formal criteria 
that are not directly or necessarily related to innovation, such as success (‘proven 
positive results’) and community participation. These arguably obscure the purist 
definition of ‘innovation’, and imply that the notion of innovation in this research 
should be used cautiously.  
Also, the awards are biased towards informal aspects which may have 
affected the judging process and are unrelated to innovativeness, namely: ability of 
the city to prepare compelling applications and the mayor’s charisma when 
presenting the program. These are related to some of the concepts of the 
explanatory factors. For example, ability to prepare applications is related to 
capability of civil servants, while mayor’s charisma is one of the sub-factors of 
leadership. Therefore, there are possibly some ‘contaminations’ which occurred 
between the outcome and the proposed explanatory factors. To ensure such biases 
are minimized, the awarding bodies have conducted on-site validations, i.e., to 
check that the program works to an extent similar to that presented in the 
application.  
Contamination of constructs between the explanatory factors is also an 
issue faced by this research. Here, transaction costs are understood to be the 
political and administrative hassles faced by a leader when introducing an 
innovation. To distinguish transaction costs from leadership (another explanatory 
factor), the latter is understood as the personal aspects of the leader, namely 
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charisma, commitment, and diversity of experience. While attempts have been 
made to distinguish the two explanatory factors, some aspects of transaction costs, 
such as involvement in networks, or quality of relationship with citizens groups, 
remain affected by the actions of the leader.  
On the other hand, the society explanation refers primarily to the deep-
rooted institutions that apply among citizens (here considered external to the 
leader), namely norms, organizations, and history. The transaction costs faced by a 
leader when introducing innovative programs may be affected by the predominant 
norms that apply in the society. For example, openness to new ideas and trust may 
help to reduce information costs, while an organized civil society may help the 
mayor with less negotiation hassles.  
These highlight the issue of endogeneity that exist between the explanatory 
factors, namely that leadership and society play a role in shaping the transaction 
costs. The subsequent analysis shall take note of these interactions between the 
explanatory variables. However, transaction costs remain a valid factor to be 
explored on its own as it gives a specific perspective (albeit perhaps still not a ‘clean’ 
one) of how leaders interact with citizens, civil servants, and political rivals. Several 
aspects of transaction costs (namely: access to ICT, political composition of city 
councilors, presence of detrimental political rivals, capability of civil servants) 
remain external to both leadership and society.  
Internal Validity 
Given the construct limitations as described above, this research attempts to 
improve internal validity through care in case selection, triangulation of explanations 
and data, as well as dealing with researcher and interviewees’ subjectivity.  
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The case selection procedure has been explained to show that the research 
applies adequate care in the selection of the cases, to enable comparison between 
‘innovative’ and ‘typical’ city governments. Intentional selection, however, is prone 
to bias. The biases related to ‘innovative’ cases are related to biases of the awards, 
which were discussed in construct validity issues. The biases related to selection of 
‘typical’ cases, however, were more associated with the researcher’s decisions, such 
as focusing on mid-sized cities, using population criteria in comparison to the 
‘innovative’ cases, choosing cities which were ‘independent’ of their provinces 
(which excludes ‘component cities’ in the Philippines), and choosing Indonesian 
cities which were not too costly or time consuming to visit (which excludes cities in 
the farthest Maluku and Papua regions). The biases caused by these selection-
related decisions, however, are expected to be less problematic as they were aimed 
to ensure more similarities among the innovative and typical cases. None of the 
selections were intentionally done with regards to knowledge of the explanatory 
factors.  
A conscious effort to improve internal validity is by offering alternative ways 
of explaining the phenomenon. Thus, each of the three explanatory factors could be 
considered as ‘rival explanations’ to the other. Whereas the transaction costs 
argument is a relatively new proposition, adopting it does not mean that the more 
dominant explanations, namely leadership and society, should be abandoned. 
Comparing how various factors ‘explain’ the phenomenon is hoped to enrich the 
overall goal of the thesis. 
Data triangulation is also conducted to achieve a similar aim of offering 
alternative perspectives. As explained in Data Sources, data as evidence is sought in 
multiple forms (interviews, observations, secondary data, formal reports, news 
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articles) and from multiple sources (city government, city council, civil society 
groups, etc.). These offer alternative ways to look at the phenomenon which could 
either highlight or downplay the information obtained from interviews.  
An important threat to internal validity is researcher and interviewees’ 
subjectivity. In analyzing the data, the researcher looks at patterns and themes, and 
concludes the presence of a particular explanatory variable in a case. Often, such 
presence could not be concluded in a ‘clear-cut’ manner, and the researcher has to 
use some level of subjectivity to decide ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. The danger lies in the fact that 
the researcher already knows which cities were ‘innovative’ and which were 
‘typical’. To the extent possible, the researcher adheres to the principle of 
objectivity in attempt to find scientific knowledge. Whether or not such objectivity is 
achieved, ultimately, is up to readers to decide by inspecting the descriptions 
presented as case reports in Chapters 4 and 5, as well as reviewing the case 
database which contains quotes, articles, statistics, and other information. 
The subjectivity of interviewees may also interfere with the research. Design 
contamination happens when respondents know that they were interviewed for 
being part of an ‘innovative’ city government. This may have tempted them to 
exaggerate the city’s innovations or their favorite explanations as to why 
innovations were conducted. To ensure that the researcher obtained a more 
balanced understanding of the situation, again, these responses were compared 
against alternative sources of information, such as program reports, media articles, 
and interviews with other stakeholders. 
External Validity 
In attempting to achieve external validity, the research generalizes cases 
both towards a theory (theoretical generalization) and towards other cases (Yin 
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2009). For theoretical generalization, each case can be analyzed in terms of how it 
fits the proposed LST framework. Cases that do would contribute as an empirical 
observation of the theory, but does not necessarily conclude its validity. The 
presence of any case which does not fit such theory would be contrary to the 
expectation, and thus renders the theory invalid.  
As the research utilizes a multiple-case method, ‘replication logic’ is also 
applied (Yin 2009). Some cases are envisioned as ‘literal replications’, where similar 
results were expected among the ‘innovative’ cities only, and among the ‘typical’ 
cities only. But some cases are ‘theoretical replications’, where contrasting results 
were anticipated, for example when comparing ‘innovative’ cities with ‘typical’ ones. 
Both findings, if confirmed, would strengthen the explanatory power of the 
research. 
Some of the inherent characteristics of small-n research create problems in 
achieving external validity beyond the cases examined in this research. Moreover, 
detailed observations, uniqueness of each case, as well as a certain level of 
subjectivity in drawing conclusions present difficulty in generalizing the findings to 
other cities in general. With such limitations in reliability and validity, the findings of 
this research therefore remains ‘quite speculative,’ and needs to be further verified 
theoretically and empirically.15 It does, however, contribute to an initial 
development of a transaction cost theory of public innovation, which is still in its 
early stage.  
 
                                                          
15 ‘Quite speculative’ was also the way Ostrom (1990) described her ‘design principles of 
long-enduring CPR situations’ 
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Chapter 4: Philippine Cases 
 
1. Background 
Reform and Decentralization 
The success of Philippines’ “people power revolution” in toppling Ferdinand 
Marcos’ authoritarian regime in 1986 brought forth a new era of democracy both at 
the national and local level. The country’s new 1987 Constitution put in place 
reforms that limit the power of the executive while mandated Congress to enact a 
“local government code” that would enable more autonomy for local government 
units (LGUs). This code was later enacted as Republic Act No. 7160, also known as 
the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991.  
Decentralization in the Philippines has been conducted since 1992 according 
to LGC 1991. It has taken the form of devolution, where LGUs are given much 
autonomy to decide their development priorities and implement development 
programs.  The transfer of much authority from the national government to LGUs is 
supported by transfer of personnel and fiscal resources. In 1992, at the onset of 
decentralization, about 60% of the Department of Agriculture, Department of 
Health, and Department of Social Welfare and Development’ staff were transferred 
from the national government to various local governments (Wallich, Manasan, and 
Sehili 2007). Similarly, about 56% of the Department of Social Welfare and 
Development’s budget and 40% of the Department of Health’s budget were 
devolved. After decentralization (1992-2003), the average yearly expenditure of 
Philippines’ LGUs was about 23% of the total public expenditure of the country. This 
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is an increase compared to 11% before decentralization (1985-1991). As of 2009, the 
proportion has risen even further to 25% (Martinez-Vazquez and Vaillancourt 2011).  
Despite having significantly more resources to spend, LGUs remain limited in 
their authority to generate revenue. Most of the substantial taxes (i.e., personal and 
corporate income tax, consumption tax) are collected by the national government as 
part of the Philippines’ internal revenue. LGUs are left with less substantial taxes, 
such as real property tax, property transfer tax, and amusement tax. LGUs are able 
to impose fees for services (i.e. yearly renewal of business permit), as well as charge 
for public utilities that they provide.  
Part (40%) of the internal revenue collected by the national government is 
redistributed to LGUs according to a simple formula based on the LGU’s land area 
and population. This is called the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). For the most 
part, LGUs have the autonomy to plan and decide what to do with their IRA. The IRA 
may have some role in reducing the drive to perform and generate revenue among 
some LGUs. It is large enough to enable LGUs to pay for staff salary and conduct very 
basic services, but not enough to conduct of substantial development programs or 
services. Therefore, LGUs which lack motivation or pressure from the citizens may 
just be able to survive providing a minimal level of service, while those who are 
more motivated are encouraged to generate more revenue to complement the IRA. 
Local Governance 
The devolution as assigned by LGC 1991 follows a hierarchy where provinces 
are identified as first-tier, municipalities and component cities are second-tier, and 
barangays are third-tier LGUs. Cities have three possible legal classes: ‘component’, 
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‘independent component’, or ‘highly urbanized’16. ‘Component’ cities, together with 
municipalities, occupy the second-tier hierarchy, under the province government. 
However, ‘highly urbanized’ and ‘independent component’ cities occupy the first-
tier hierarchy, on par with the province government. They do not report, nor share 
any of their tax revenues, with the province government. Instead, they report 
directly to the national government and have a coordinative relationship with the 
province. The Philippines also have a grouping and coordination system above the 
province level called the region. But regions (with the exception of the Autonomous 
Region of Muslim Mindanao) are not LGUs; they are created to help the national 
government coordinate various issued related to provinces and independent 
component cities.  
As of 2014, there are 17 regions, 81 provinces, 144 cities, 1,490 
municipalities, and 42,028 barangays17. Out of the 144 cities, 34 are ‘highly 
urbanized’ and five are ‘independent component’ cities. The Philippines do not 
adopt a classification of cities based on population, but following Indonesia’s city-
size classification, there are four cities with more than one million population (three 
of them are in the NCR), 13 “large” cities with population between 500,000 and 1 
million, 90 “medium” cities with population between 100,000 and 500,000, and 37 
“small” cities with population under 100,000 (see Figure 11). The average population 
of the Philippine cities is 256,411 and the median is 151,947. 
                                                          
16 Highly Urbanized Cities have a population of at least 200,000, and latest annual income of 
at least Fifty Million Pesos (1991 constant prices). Independent Component Cities are 
independent of the province as they have charters that prohibit voters from voting for 
provincial elective officials. Component Cities are those that do not meet both of the above 
requirements, and are thus considered a component of the province where they are 
geographically located.  
Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, Philippine Standard Geographic Code 
(http://www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/articles/con_cityclass.asp) 
 
17 National Statistical Coordination Board, Philippines Standard Geographic Code 
(http://www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/); accessed December 2014 
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Figure 11: Number of Philippine cities by population, 2014 
Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, 2014 
Provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays conduct local elections every 
three years. The mayor, vice mayor, and city councilors each hold a three-year term, 
and can hold three consecutive terms (nine years) at the maximum. Each local 
candidate is elected independently of the other. Therefore sometimes the mayor 
and the vice mayor could come from opposing political factions. Representatives 
(congressmen and congresswomen) are sometimes also considered as “local” public 
officials because they represent the interests of a certain locality.  
It is not uncommon to find political leadership at the local level dominated 
by strong families (“clans” or “dynasties”). Many of these were able to maintain 
their dominance through patronage politics, although there are also some clans 
which seem to be genuinely supported by the population. The 1987 Constitution 
discourages political dynasties by stating that: “The State shall guarantee equal 






























8 of which in Metro Manila 
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defined by law”18. However, until now no law has been passed to define a ‘dynasty’ 
and the phenomenon has persisted (Querubin 2012).  
Political parties at the local level were arguably weak (Kasuya 2009). Local 
politicians tend to affiliate themselves with certain personalities (rather than 
parties), and such personalities typically would change parties to match the party of 
their preferred presidential candidate, whom they think have a strong chance of 
winning the election. When the local leader changes political parties, his or her 
political affiliates (aspiring vice mayor, representative, and city councilor candidates) 
would tend to do the same.  
The city council (Sangguniang Panlungsod) passes ordinances and 
resolutions, approves the city’s budget, and makes sure the executive conducts their 
job according to LGC 1991. Most cities (132 out of 144) have between 10 and 12 
councilors, with only 12 larger cities having 16 councilors or above. The vice mayor 
sits as the presiding officer of the city council; he or she does not vote, except when 
there is a need to break a tie. 
Case Locations 
Based on the selection of Philippine cases as identified in Chapter 3, a map 
of the approximate locations of the four cities is provided in Figure 12, followed by 
each of the case reports. 
 
                                                          
18 1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 26 
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2. Naga City (innovative case) 
a. City Profile and Innovations 
Naga City is located in the province of Camarines Sur in the Bicol Region.19 It 
is about 269 kilometers southeast of Manila, and can be reached from the capital 
city in 7-8 hours by land or 45-60 minutes by air.20 Currently Naga is classified “first 
class” in terms of LGU income and is an “independent component” city of the 
province21. The city is known as the “Heart of Bicol” not only due to its central 
location within the region but also for its important role as the commercial, 
financial, educational, cultural, and religious center of Bicol. The city is also known as 
“Queen City” due to being one of the largest Marian pilgrimage sites in the 
Philippines.  
At the latest 2010 census, Naga had a population of 174,931, which account 
for 9.3 percent of Camarines Sur’s population, spread over 27 barangays. Naga’s 
average yearly population growth rate was 2.69 percent between 2000 and 2010, 
1.95 percent between 1990 and 2000, and 2.71 percent between 1980 and 199022. 
This suggests that Naga is still experiencing quite rapid population growth. The Bicol 
Region is also known as one of the country’s poorest regions. Forty three out of 100 
Bicolaños were considered poor in 2012 (Calleja 2014, Balisacan and Hill 2007).  
Naga City occupies an area of 84.48 square kilometers that stretches about 
21 kilometers from the city center on its west to the slopes of Mount Isarog on its 
                                                          
19 There is another city called Naga in Cebu Province, Central Visayas. 
20 Naga City website (http://www.naga.gov.ph/cityprofile/physical.html) 
21 National Statistical Coordination Board website 
(http://www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/municipality.asp?muncode=051724000&regcod
e=05&provcode=17) 
22 The city’s population was 137,810 in 2000, 115,329 in 1990, and 90,712 in 1980  
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east. Naga City and 14 surrounding municipalities in Camarines Sur collectively make 
up the Naga metropolitan area, which is managed by Metropolitan Naga 
Development Council.  The city serves as the urban core of this metropolitan area 
while the other municipalities mainly produce or provide food, water, and space for 
the city’s expanding industries and housing. 
Innovations 
Since the 1990s, Naga has received numerous honors that signify excellence 
and innovations in public management. The Galing Pook Foundation to date has 
awarded Naga with 11 prizes for ‘outstanding’ and ‘trailblazing’ initiatives, including 
an ‘Award for Continuing Excellence’ (ACE) for having won three awards with 
sustained impacts. Many of Naga’s awards have been related to the 
institutionalization of people empowerment, professionalization of public 
bureaucracy, and improvement of education (see Table 14). 
Table 14: Galing Pook Awards for Naga City 
Year Name of Program Description 
1994 Metro Naga 
Development Council 
Collaboration between 15 LGUs that make up the 
Naga Metropolitan Area to share resources, 
complement and improve each other’s capacity for 
the benefit of the overall region. 
1994 Emergency Rescue Naga Mobilizing & unifying the resources of local police and 
fire departments, hospitals, schools, media and 
barangay councils to provide quick emergency rescue 
services. 
1994 Partners in Development 
(Kaantabay sa 
Kauswagan) 
Facilitating squatters to organize and obtain land 
tenure by relocating to new areas, buying land from 
landowners. The city provided free legal and technical 
assistance, infrastructure, and revolving loans.  
1995 Productivity 
Improvement Program 
Adopting merit-based, result-oriented, and efficiency-
focused management of public resources, where 
government personnel are assessed and incentivized 
regularly. 
1996 Government Developing management information system to 
deliver effective and efficient services for residents 
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Year Name of Program Description 
computerization and businesses, including population database, 
geographic information system, and computerization 
of critical government functions. 
1996 Early education and 
development 
Combining public day-care service with Montessori 
system of pre-school education to improve child 
preparedness to enter elementary school as well as 
tend to children with disabilities. 
2002 People empowerment 
program 
Institutionalizing the principles of “people power” 
through the creation of Naga City People’s Council as 
federation of local people’s organizations and formally 
giving space for representatives of civil society to 
influence the city’s political decision-making. 
2004 Reinventing the Naga 
City School Board 
Expanding the role of the school board to include 
planning, monitoring and budgeting, enlarging its 
membership to include representatives from diverse 
stakeholders, and giving its members voting rights. 
2004 i-Governance Program Expanding e-government and ICT functions to 
encourage good governance, by improving people’s 
access to two-way communication with the city 
government.   
2007 Preparing Future 
Leaders 
An internship program where every month, top youth 
leaders get a chance to work in the mayor’s office, the 
city council, and various government departments and 
NGOs/POs in the city.  
Source: Galing Pook Foundation (various years) 
 
Naga has received other recognitions from national and international 
organizations. For example, Asiaweek in 1999 declared it as one of Asia’s “most 
improved” cities, while UN-HABITAT awarded the city multiple times for its housing 
and participatory planning programs. Naga was also internationally acknowledged 
for its use of ICT for promoting good governance and for its effective public 
bureaucracy. More recently, Naga has actively adopted various media (magazine, 
gazettes, radio, television, and Social Media) to communicate their policies and 
activities with the public. 
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In the 2014 Philippines Cities and Municipalities Competitiveness Index, 
Naga was identified as the third most competitive city in the Philippines, behind only 
Makati and Cagayan de Oro. It ranked first for government efficiency, fourth for 
economic dynamism, and eighteenth for infrastructure. The city has been well 
established as a model of good governance and public performance throughout the 
Philippines. Every year Naga would receive 10,000 to 12,000 “governance tourists”, 
who sometimes come in bus loads.23  
With these achievements and attention, it has been arguably easier to find 
literature on Naga City and the way it has been governed (Koppel 1987, Kawanaka 
2002, Rodriguez and Min 2003, Robredo 2004, Angeles 2007, Puatu 2010, Scharff 
2011) as well as related social background (Carpio 2002, Hill and Angeles 2009, Hill 
2011, Santos and Cordero 2013) 
b. Society and Leadership 
Society 
Before the arrival of the Spaniards, Naga was already a thriving village on 
the confluence of two rivers that unify a large, fertile hinterland. Spanish troops 
established a city out of the village in 1575 and called it (Nueva) Cáceres. It was the 
third city formed in the Philippines after Cebu and Manila. The influential bishop of 
Cáceres sits at the metropolitan cathedral, and various religious organizations 
flourished and built important institutions such as Ateneo de Naga High School and 
University of Santa Isabel. 
The Filipino revolution started in the Tagalog region but quickly spread to 
Bicol and from thereon gained a national character. Bicol is known as one of the 
                                                          
23 Interview with Alec Santos, City Arts, Culture & Tourism Officer, 2014 
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centers of Filipino uprising; many Bicolaños were captured and killed during the time 
for engaging in revolutionary activities. In 1896, the local revolutionaries staged an 
uprising and defeated the Spanish governor of Bicol based in Nueva Cáceres. Again 
in 1942, guerilla forces freed Naga from the Japanese. Names of civic leaders who 
sacrificed themselves to free the people, such as Elias Angeles and Juan Q. Miranda, 
are honored as streets and plazas (General and O’brien n.d.).  
Until today, Bicol Region is known as one of the nation’s centers for liberal, 
progressive, and “people-power” movements against Marcos’ martial law regime. 
Naga is also known as an “activist city” where civil society is strong and the people 
are critical of how the government is run. Public forums and political debates are 
common, supported by a tradition of free speech and the presence of various media 
outlets.24 The city has been the base for NGO activities in the Bicol region. Due to its 
strategic location, many NGOs would set-up a regional office in Naga. This was 
facilitated by leaders of Ateneo de Naga, who provided a ‘base camp’ for NGO 
activists from Manila who happened to be in Bicol, or were planning to set up a new 
program in the region.25 
Ateneo de Naga influenced many of Naga’s brightest students to be civic 
leaders through theology of liberation and the motto “to be men for others”. One 
teacher, Father James O’Brien, was remembered fondly by Naga’s activists (Castilla 
2013). O’Brien was from New York, but was teaching Bicol culture and history based 
on local materials that he compiled. He constantly reminded his students to go back 
                                                          
24 Interview with Johann de la Rosa and Danilo Ludovice, 2014 
25 Interview with Gabriel Bordado, Jr., 2014 
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to their hometown if they continued their studies in Manila, and challenged them to 
develop the region.26 
Nueva Cáceres regained its indigenous name of Naga during the American 
occupation and was later chartered as a city in the modern Philippine era in 1948. 
However, throughout most of the 20th century Naga City grew sluggishly and local 
politics was dominated by a paternalistic clan that dominated much of the 
Camarines provinces (Kawanaka 2002). The city’s hinterland remains mired in 
poverty.  
Leadership 
The main figure behind Naga’s transformations was the late Mr. Jesse M. 
Robredo, city mayor for six terms (three terms in 1988-1998 and another three in 
2001-2010). Shortly after serving as mayor, Robredo was appointed as Secretary of 
Interior and Local Government under President Benigno Aquino III, until a plane 
crash took his life in 2012. Since 2010, Naga has been led by Atty. John G. Bongat, 
who previously served as City Councilor for three terms (2001-2010) under 
Robredo’s slate. It could be argued that for 26 years since 1988, Naga City has had a 
stable and continuous leadership. 
Jesse M. Robredo 
Robredo was born and raised in Naga and went to Ateneo de Naga high 
school. He then studied engineering and business administration at De La Salle 
University and University of the Philippines (UP) at Diliman, respectively. During his 
“break” as mayor in 1998-2001, Robredo studied for a Master of Public 
Administration degree in Harvard University. Robredo was in Manila working for San 
                                                          
26 Interview with Gabriel Bordado, Jr., 2014 
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Miguel Corporation when the People Power Revolution took place. Inspired by the 
movement and seeing the change in politics as opportunity to serve, Robredo came 
back to Naga in 1986 to get into public service (he was Program Director of the Bicol 
River Basin Development Program) and then into politics (he was first elected as 
mayor in 1988 at the age of 29) (Santos and Santos 2013).  
Robredo was known for his approachable and ‘listening to the people’ style 
on the one hand, and demanding high performance from his staff on the other hand. 
People who worked closely with Robredo believed many of his innovations were 
inspired by modern management techniques that he learned in the private sector, 
as well as his commitment to the ideas embedded in the people power revolution.27  
After the revolt, many were calling for ‘people empowerment’, but very few had a 
clear idea on how to operationalize it. Based on close consultation with civil society 
activists, Robredo led Naga City to devise the People Empowerment Program, where 
the civil society became part and parcel of the city’s decision-making and 
development process. Robredo also instilled the value of frugality in running the 
government, and prioritized the productivity of his employees over beautifying city 
hall. The leadership style of Robredo have been explored in the literature (Kawanaka 
2002, Robredo 2004, Puatu 2010, Santos and Santos 2013). 
John G. Bongat 
Bongat grew up in Naga and also went to Ateneo de Naga High School. He 
then studied political science at Ateneo de Manila and law at UP Diliman. In Manila, 
Bongat worked for reputable law firms and was also the Vice President of 
Megaworld Corporation (a major real estate company). He was also the Director for 
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Legal Aid at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, where he provided free legal 
assistance to those in need.  
Bongat returned to Naga in 1998 to take care of his family, continue his 
private law practice, and later get into politics as part of the Robredo team. He 
garnered massive support from Nagueños for his approachable, communicative, and 
responsive leadership style. During Bongat’s term, Naga continued to maintain its 
status as a highly efficient and effectively run city. Under his leadership, innovations 
in the use of social media have flourished to further improve the quality of 
governance and communications between city government and its stakeholders. 
c. Transaction Costs  
The following describes the transaction costs faced by various mayors of 
Naga in governing the city and introducing public innovations. 
Information Costs 
Travels and familiarity with other cities 
Robredo and Bongat were well-traveled, both in the Philippines and abroad. 
They would often get sponsored invitations to present Naga programs. For Robredo 
and Bongat, a valuable aspect of those travels was the chance to see directly what 
other cities were doing, how they did it, and how Naga could learn and benchmark 
itself against it. 
Bongat admitted that he gets many ideas every time he travels. For 
example, when he went to the U.S. and Korea in 2014, he saw how health services of 
the city were “downloaded” to the local village level. This provided him with the 
idea of establishing a hospital in the city’s outlying areas, catering to 5-6 outlying 
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barangays, and equipped with first aid facilities, delivery room,  and round the clock 
nurses and doctors to attend to emergencies.  
Many of Naga’s innovations were not directly modeled after programs in 
other cities. Part of the reason is because Naga has been among the most advanced 
in the Philippines in terms of people’s empowerment. Head of the city’s IT Office 
pointed out how in the early 2000s Naga was the first to use ICT as a tool for 
engaging people in public affairs through the i-Governance program (Rodriguez and 
Min 2003). While no particular city was cited as a source of inspiration, he 
mentioned that this idea took shape after Robredo returned from studying public 
administration at Harvard University. Previously, Naga was simply using ICT to 
promote the city on the Internet and automating public services.  
Networking Opportunities 
Many of Naga’s innovations tend to be generated from the mayor’s close 
network. This includes both the internal network within city government, as well as 
the external network outside of the public sector. Robredo had a close network of 
colleagues with whom he met frequently to discuss issues facing Naga. The group 
mainly included social activists who later would become government officials (some 
of whom are still active). Some of them sparked some ideas for programs that had 
not existed elsewhere, such as the adoption of a Citizens’ Charter and the People’s 
Empowerment Ordinance. 
Beyond the network within city government, Naga’s innovations were 
attributed to a wider network that included, most prominently, civil society 
organizations (CSOs). In Robredo’s era, the Productivity Improvement Program (PIP) 
was designed to have a feedback mechanism from the barangays. For this, Robredo 
partnered with CSOs; this eventually led to the creation of the People 
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Empowerment Program. Similarly, in trying to improve the lives of the urban poor, 
Robredo partnered with Community Organizers of the Philippine Enterprise (COPE). 
This eventually led to the Kaantabay sa Kauswagan or Partners in Development 
program for participatory relocation and development of low-income settlements.  
Access to ICT 
Naga’s position as the hub of the region helped ensure that it had enough 
Internet bandwith to serve the numerous universities and colleges, as well as banks 
and Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) companies. By 2014 Naga City has been 
able to attract companies such as IBM, Concentrix, Stellar, and Sutherland, which 
altogether employed some 3,500 young people from the city and surrounding areas.  
Both Robredo and Bongat believed in the power of ICT to improve the 
performance of the public sector, to better engage the people in the conduction of 
public affairs, and to empower the people in general through access to information. 
Bongat was a heavy user of smartphones, where he would extensively search the 
web to find ideas and use Facebook to keep in touch with his citizens.  
Naga’s application of ICT evolved from technology-driven in the mid-1990s 
(‘Government Computerization’ to increase revenue generation), to service-driven 
in the late 1990s (as part of PIP to improve delivery of public services), to people-
driven starting in the early 2000s (“i-Governance” to improve engagement between 
city government and citizens).28 In the 2010s, Bongat extensively used Facebook to 
further intensify engagement and connected the i-Governance program with the 
goal of local economic development (thus the “i-LED” program). 
                                                          




Relationship with city council 
When Robredo first became mayor in 1988, he won by a very small margin: 
900 votes out of 60,000 voters. Gabriel Bordado, Jr., who worked closely with 
Robredo in various contexts, including as campaign manager, noted that this was 
“too close”.29 In his first term (1988-1992), only two out of 10 city council members 
were affiliated with Robredo, and seven were allied with the opposition. Robredo 
had a hard time dealing with the city council; various initiatives, such as the PIP, 
could not fully take-off due to funding rejections. Opposition councilors refused to 
approve many of his initiatives, culminating in rejection of Robredo’s 1992 budget.30  
However, Robredo had gradually built sympathy and credibility with citizens 
due to his performance and commitments. When he ran for re-election in 1992, he 
rallied for those who supported in him to also vote for politicians affiliated with him. 
It was a call for “all or nothing” (Ubos kung ubos, gabos kung gabos). As result, 
Robredo won by more than 24,000 votes. All of his team members won:  
congressman, vice mayor, and city councilor candidates (Kawanaka 2002).  
Despite coming from the same political slate, Robredo he did not force his 
councilors to follow his directives. Disagreements among councilors or between 
councilors and the mayor were normal. For example, in 1995, it took Robredo and 
Councilor James Jacob more than one year to convince the rest of the city councilors 
to adopt the People Empowerment Ordinance.31 This was the ordinance where a 
                                                          
29 Gabriel Bordado, Jr. worked with Jesse Robredo as campaign manager, city councilor, vice 
mayor, and various other positions. 
30 Interview with Gabriel Bordado, Jr., 2014 




representative of the civil society (embodied by the Naga City People’s Council) 
would be given one additional seat at the council, bringing the total number of 
councilors up to 11. Bordado recalled this was only adopted as an ordinance in 1995 
after intense disagreements and threats of resignation from James Jacob.  
Until today, critical debates remain present in the city council. For example, 
in November 2014, Bongat vetoed a council-sponsored ordinance to move the 
minibus terminal to a location which he considered inappropriate (as it would cause 
major congestion). However the mayor’s veto was overridden by the council. Bongat 
ended the meeting by saying, ‘You may decide to override my veto, but you are the 
one who must explain to the people, because it will cause much chaos’.32 
Vice Mayor Nelson Legacion, as presiding officer of the city council, 
explained that there was a good working relationship between the executive and 
legislative. The city council provides an ‘enabling environment’ for innovation by 
allowing the executive to implement on small scale (pilot project) before bringing it 
to the council for formal endorsement. The city council also tries to be innovative 
within its jurisdictions, with innovative programs such as student participation in 
council activities and empowerment of and evaluation of barangay councils.  
Relationship with citizens groups 
Upon winning his first term, Robredo and team built the support of the 
people. He showed his commitment to people’s concerns, for example, by clearing 
Naga’s commercial center from lewd shows, moving the terminal away from main 
city streets, and declaring war against bribes and illegal gambling. Robredo tackled 
these head on, and in return he faced more than 30 law suits filed against him by 
those who were impacted. But most importantly, he was able to send a signal to the 
                                                          
32 The researcher was present at this meeting as an observer. 
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people that he had the political will to do difficult things that had long plagued 
people’s concern. 
Bongat confirmed that the most influential voice in Naga is the civil 
society’s. The Naga City People’s Council (NCPC) is a confederation of 84 federations, 
associations, and organizations that has one representative sitting as a voting 
member of the city council.33  One of the NCPC members, the Urban Poor 
Federation, is composed of 70 organizations with a total of 15,000 individual 
members. It was formed in 1986, right after the EDSA People Power Revolution. 
The strong role of CSOs in Naga is not only because of Naga City People’s 
Council, but also because there had been many CSOs since the past, and the city 
government has empowered and worked closely with them. Many of the city’s 
politicians and key officers had a background of being a staff or a member of these 
CSOs. Bongat believed that the CSOs were genuinely concerned about long-term 
collective interests rather than short-term individual interests. 
Businesses, similarly, had been a close partner of the city government, for 
example, through the joint organization of Bicol Business Week, which has been 
conducted annually since the early 2000s. The chamber of commerce also admits to 
have been closely consulted in the drafting of upcoming city ordinances.34 
Healthy leadership rivalry 
Robredo emerged as a political personality in 1988 and continued to be so 
regardless of his political party. Between 1988 and 1995, he was affiliated with the 
Lakas parties. In 1998, when he was barred from the elections due to term limits, 
                                                          
33 Naga City People’s Council website (https://peoplescouncil.wordpress.com/about/) 
34 Interview with Nicholas B. A. Priela, 2014 
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Robredo shifted to the Aksyon Demokratiko Party (Kawanaka 2002). However, since 
the 2004 election, he was with the Liberal Party. 
Robredo was initially supported by his uncle, Luis R. Villafuerte (argued to be 
the main political patron of Camarines Sur province), to curb the rise of the Roco 
clan (Kawanaka 2002). However, after becoming mayor, Robredo distanced himself 
from Villafuerte’s patronage politics and the latter’s attempt to intervene in the 
city’s affairs. From then on, Robredo became Villafuerte’s political opponent.  
In the 1992 elections, Villafuerte joined forces with Roco to curb Robredo’s 
rise, but their mayoral candidate lost substantially to Robredo by 24,000 votes 
(Kawanaka 2002). In 1995, Robredo practically ran unopposed, winning the mayoral 
race by 37,000 votes. Robredo could not run for a fourth consecutive period in 1998, 
so he reconciled and formed a coalition with the Rocos, and supported Sulpicio S. 
Roco to win the mayoral election against Villafuerte’s son by almost 18,000 votes. 
Robredo came back to Naga politics in 2001 and his team again substantially won all 
the political positions in Naga City. Until today, there has not been a significant rival 
that could unseat Robredo’s team.35 When he was no longer mayor, Robredo would 
still campaign and endorse candidates.  
Enforcement Cost 
Capable civil servants  
Before the time of Robredo, patronage politics ran rampant in Naga City 
Hall. Gabriel Bordado remembered how human resources were mismanaged, such 
as nurses assigned in departments in charge of gardening and planting, and 
                                                          
35 This is confirmed by evaluating election results from Commission on Elections, where 
members of ‘Team Naga’ would win consistently by large margin. 
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engineers not given appropriate tools to work with. There was also low productivity: 
government employees would work for half a day and then relaxed.  
When the Productivity Improvement Program (PIP) was introduced it was “a 
shocker” for many employees. An aptitude examination for civil servants was also 
instituted; this caused unrest and resistance, especially from “old-timers” who had 
been accustomed to lax working environment for many years.36  
Currently, however, Naga City Hall is largely manned by a “highly motivated 
workforce”. Many, if not most, of the current officers have worked closely with 
Robredo and have been accustomed to the working habits that he instilled. Bongat 
have also known many of the current officers since he became a city councilor in 
2001. As the current leader, he has developed a culture where officers and staff do 
not have to follow whatever the mayor says, but are given the opportunity to think 
and act creatively within their jurisdictions. 
Capacity building activities 
Seeing the low capacity and motivation of City Hall employees in the late 
1980s, Robredo introduced the PIP with two components: ‘system change’ and 
‘people change’.37 The former refers to the way things are done, such as 
computerization. The latter means change in attitude, behavior, and culture. 
Although difficult to achieve, Robredo believed that leadership could change 
systems and that systems, in turn, could change people’s attitude. 
The PIP was developed based on insights from the private sector. The 
executive officer of the program was recruited from Johnson and Johnson. There 
                                                          
36 Interview with Gabriel Bordado, Jr. and Melissa Sieglinde Bulaong, 2014 
37 Interview with Melissa Sieglinde Bulaong, 2014 
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were aptitude tests, visioning workshops, staff trainings, assessments, and 
incentives and disincentives. Under the PIP, each department would create a 
“productivity improvement circle” involving their stakeholders, where they would 
collectively devise ways to improve their performance. This led each department to 
develop performance standards, which would later be incorporated as part of the 
City Charter. Many of the principles from PIP have been institutionalized not only for 
the city, but for the wider Philippine government, as part of the Civil Service 
Commission’s standards. 
An important part of capacity building was constant and close 
communication between the leader and staff. The Management Committee (the 
mayor and all department heads/officers) meets every Tuesday at 7 AM to 
coordinate with each other. This has been institutionalized since Robredo was 
mayor and still ongoing at the time of research in 2014.38  
Aside from having a good capacity building system for employees, having a 
“role model” leader was regarded with utmost importance. For example, Robredo 
and Bongat come in at 07:30 AM just as expected from government employees 
although they were not required to. Robredo was also known for being thrifty; he 
did not mind that the City Hall was not beautiful as long as the people were happy 
with its services. The same tradition has been continued by Bongat. 
Incentives and disincentives 
The PIP includes incentives and disincentives, many of which have been 
incorporated into the civil service law. In Naga, performance bonuses and 
“employee awards” were given not just to incentivize performance, but also for 
coming up with good ideas. These were something new before it was 
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institutionalized nationally. In Naga, the bonuses were not really big, sometimes just 
5,000 pesos. But as noted by a head of city department, what matters more is not 
the size of the bonus, but the pride obtained and the attention given by the leader. 
He said, “A pat on the back is more important to us rather than monetary reward, 
especially if the pat comes from the leader.”39  
Sometimes appreciation comes in the form of opportunity to travel to other 
places. But also important is that employees understand the good impact of their 
work in the grander scheme of things: that the work which they did well contributes 
towards in the development of Naga City and its people. 
Summary 
The following table summarizes the presence or absence of factors related 
to leadership, society, and transaction costs of conducting public innovations in 
Naga.  
Table 15: Case Summary:  








A2. Leader’s charisma  A3. Leader’s experience 
YES: Mayors worked 
hard, were 
approachable, and lived 
humbly in both personal 
and public life 
YES: Mayors were able to 
get people to follow 
through example, 
persuasion, and integrity 
YES: Mayors had 
experience working with 
large companies in Manila. 
They were already activists 
before getting into politics. 
Leadership: 3/3 (YES) 
B. 
Progressive 
B1. Favorable history  B2. Progressive local 
organizations 
B3. Good local norms 
                                                          





YES: Naga has been the 
commerce, finance, 
education, culture and 
religious hub of Bicol 
region. It had a history 
of “liberators” who 
freed the city.  
YES: NGOs and POs had 
established regional 
offices in Naga, with 
support from local 
organizations such as 
Ateneo. Churches, 
schools, people’s 
organizations thrive with 
activities.  
YES: Ateneo de Naga 
advocated the value of 
being “men for others”. 
There was a strong sense 
of community, helping 
others in need, and 
tradition of healthy 
political debates. 









C1.3. Use of ICT  
YES: Mayors were often 
invited to share in 
national & international 
forums 
YES: Mayors were part of 
internal “activist” 
network. They partnered 
with CSOs to design new 
programs.  
YES: Naga had good ICT 
infrastructure, related to 
presence of universities, 
banks, etc. ICT was used to 





C2.1. Supportive city 
council 
C2.2. Supportive citizens 
groups 
C2.3. Healthy leadership 
rivalry  
YES (not initially): All 
councilors came from 
the mayor’s political 
party (but not so in 
Robredo’s first term). 
There was good 
communication and 
understanding between 
executive & legislative. 
YES: There were many 
active & organized 
citizens groups, including 
NGOs and business  
associations, with good 
relationship with city 
government 
YES: Since Robredo’s 
second term, the mayors’ 
political slate had always 
won by a landslide. There 
was a rivalry dominating 
the province & nearby 
cities, but not disruptive 






C3.1. Capable civil 
servants 
C3.2. Capacity building 
activities 
C3.3. Incentives & 
disincentives 
YES (not initially): Many 
department heads and 
key officers were highly 
motivated and activist 
types (but not so at 
beginning of Robredo’s 
terms). Aptitude tests 
conducted to select 
staff. 
YES: Flagship programs 
like PIP focused on 
‘system change’ and 
‘people change’, adopting 
private sector techniques. 
Management committee 
meetings take place 
weekly. 
YES: The city conducted 
employee awards. 
Incentives such as bonuses 
were given for 
performance and new 
ideas.  





3. Dagupan City (typical case) 
a. City Profile and Innovations 
Dagupan City is located in the province of Pangasinan in the Ilocos Region. It 
is about 200 kilometers north of Manila and can be reached from the capital city in 
three hours by car. The city was an “independent component” city of Pangasinan 
and classified as “second class” in terms of LGU income. Dagupan had been one of 
the centers for trade, finance, media, education, and medical services in Northern 
Luzon and the only chartered city out of nine cities in the Ilocos Region.  
The population of Dagupan was 163,676 at the 2010 census.40 This was 
equivalent to about 5.9 percent of the province’s population and 3.5 percent of the 
region’s. However, its “daytime population” was closer to a figure of 500,000 due to 
the number of people from surrounding areas conducting their daily activities in the 
city.41 Dagupan’s average yearly population growth rate was 2.3 percent between 
2000 and 2010, 0.64 percent between 1990 and 2000, and 0.79 percent between 
1980 and 1990. This suggested that Dagupan had been experiencing rapid 
population growth in the recent past decade despite having slower growth in the 
previous decades. 
Dagupan City occupied an area of 44.46 square kilometers on the shore of 
Lingayen Gulf. Seven rivers crisscrossed the city and created an abundance of 
brackish water bodies (ponds, swamplands, etc.), suitable for growing bangus 
                                                          
40 National Statistical Coordination Board website: Pangasinan Province Profile 
(http://www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/province.asp?provCode=015500000&provNam
e=PANGASINAN&regCode=01&regName=REGION%20I%20%28Ilocos%20Region%29) 
41 Interview with Brian Lim, 2015 
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(milkfish). The city’s land area was mostly allocated for agriculture, including 
fishponds (35.9%), residential areas (22.8%), and other water bodies (15.2%).42 
Dagupan prides itself as home of the “tastiest bangus in the world”. 
Between 2001 and 2003, the city contributed about 16.8 percent (35,560 metric 
tons) of the province’s total milkfish production (NSCB n.d.), and in 2013 the region 
contributed about one quarter (104,308 metric tons) of the country’s milkfish 
production (Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources I 2013). Despite having 
significant proportion of land for agricultural purposes (22.3 percent for fishponds, 
13.6 percent for cropland), Dagupan’s economy was mostly dominated by the trade 
and services subsectors.   
Innovations 
Dagupan had not received any Galing Pook Awards, but the city’s “My River, 
My Life” initiative was one of the top-23 programs assessed by Galing Pook 
Foundation in September 2012. The same program was also recognized as finalist in 
the 2011 International Awards for Liveable Communities43 and the 2012 United 
Nations Public Service Awards (City of Dagupan 2012). “My River, My Life” 
responded to the deterioration of river water quality due to uncontrolled growth of 
fish pen operation by developing an eco-tourism destination in Dawel River, 
complete with rehabilitation of mangroves and river cruise to traditional fishing 
villages. However, the success of the program was debatable, and it was ultimately 
scrapped off by the subsequent (rival) mayor after the following election. 
Despite not having won an award for public innovation, Dagupan had been 
recognized for good performance in other fields. For example, the city’s Disaster Risk 
                                                          
42 Dagupan City 2013: Socio Economic Profile 2013. 
43 Livcom Awards Website (http://www.livcomawards.com/2011-awards/finalists.htm) 
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Reduction and Management Council was given a national award for “Best City 
Disaster Coordinating Council” in 2009 (Sotelo 2009), and a regional award for 
outstanding contributions in strengthening community resilience in 2014. Also in 
2014, Dagupan was the regional winner of Presidential Award for Child-friendly 
Cities for the category of independent component cities. This seemed to indicate 
that Dagupan had been doing relatively well in terms of performance, though 
perhaps not specifically for innovations. 
The Philippine Cities Competitiveness Ranking of 2009 ranked Dagupan as 
the most competitive among the country’s “emergent cities”. The 2014 Cities and 
Municipalities Competitiveness Index, however, ranked Dagupan at 44th (out of 136 
cities) nationwide in terms of Overall Competitiveness, 37th for Government 
Efficiency, 46th for Economic Dynamism, and 76th for Infrastructure. 
b. Society and Leadership  
Society 
The Lingayen Gulf, where Dagupan is located, is a strategic place that 
connects the rice-producing plains of Central Luzon with the South China Sea. Its 
geography has made Dagupan the center of trade for the Pangasinan area for many 
centuries. The name Dagupan came from a local word which means “where people 
meet”. As shown in its official seal, the city sees itself as a magnet on the crossing of 
a highway and a railroad. The Manila-Dagupan railway (currently non-operational) 
was the first stretch of railroad that the Spaniards built and operated in the 1890s, 
signifying the city’s geographic importance as the commercial and population hub of 
Northern Luzon.  
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Dagupan City suffered massive damage from a 7.8 Richter scale earthquake 
in 1990, but soon after a period of construction and economic boom followed (Basa 
1997). When this research was conducted in 2014, it had remained as one of the 
largest centers of commerce, finance, education, religion, and healthcare in the 
region. The city hosted a large number of banks and financial institutions (239 in 
201344), 15 universities and colleges, and 12 hospitals,45 which was quite substantial 
for a city of 163,676 people in 2010. The student body in Dagupan’s universities 
included some foreign students, including from other Asian and African countries, 
who were mainly studying nursing.46 Dagupan has also been the seat of the 
Archdiose of Lingayen-Dagupan. 
Media outlets in Dagupan were also thriving and vocal. In 2013, the city 
hosted two TV and 14 radio broadcasting stations, three national daily newspapers 
and 20 local periodicals. Among the notable community newspapers based in 
Dagupan was the regional icon The Sunday Punch, which was established in 1958 by 
local ‘martyr of press freedom’ Ermin Garcia, Sr. (Basa 1997). The media in Dagupan 
had been known for their free and critical stance on public and political affairs. For 
the most part, discussions on politics were open and people freely voiced their 
opinions.47 Generally community groups are seen to have strong bonds, and have 
helped each other especially in facing natural disasters and economic downturns.48 
Business and economic development issues tend to occupy a large part of the 
                                                          
44 National Competitiveness Council Website 
(http://www.competitive.org.ph/cmcindex/cityhistoricaldata.php?cityh=Dagupan%20City) 
45 Dagupan City 2013: Socio Economic Profile 2013 
46 The researcher also met some of these students during fieldwork in Dagupan 
47 Interview with Joey Tamayo and Ryan Ravanzo, 2014 
48 Interview with Reagan Lim, 2014 
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attention (Ortigoza 2012), but local political scandals were also common, and often 
raised and discussed (Cardinoza 2014, City of Dagupan 2013). 
Leadership 
For the past 22 years, Dagupan City’s leadership had been dominated by two 
prominent and opposing political sides: the Fernandezes and the Lims (Cardinoza 
2013).  
Al Fernandez & Family 
Mr. Alipio (“Al”) F. Fernandez, Jr. was city mayor for three consecutive terms 
(1992-2001), and was later re-elected for one more term (2007-2010). Prior to 
becoming mayor, he was vice mayor for three consecutive terms (1983-1992). Al 
Fernandez was the son of Dagupan’s first mayor, and started his political career in 
1972 as city councilor. He was supported by many of Dagupan’s old, established 
clans, many of whom owned universities and schools in the city.  
Between 2001 and 2007, Al Fernandez became Undersecretary of DILG and 
Commissioner of Immigration, until he returned to the city in 2007. Al Fernandez 
had a reputation for being conservative, as hinted by his slogan: ‘Doing ordinary 
things in extraordinary ways’ (City of Dagupan 2009). He was a traditional politician 
who was good at wooing people’s support (i.e., he was against rising taxes), and 
prioritized basic services.  
Al’s family was heavily involved in politics. His son, Alvin Fernandez, served 
as vice mayor between 2001 and 2007 (when Al was away), and was then appointed 
as his city administrator in 2007-2010. Al’s other son, Alfie Fernandez, was in 2014 
serving his third term as city councilor, a post which he has held since 2007. His 
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nephew, Mike Fernandez, was also a three-term councilor (2001-2010). Mike’s wife, 
Maybelyn dela Cruz-Fernandez, was serving her second term as councilor in 2014.  
Benjie Lim & Family 
In 2001, Dagupan’s leadership was taken over by Mr. Benjamin (“Benjie”) S. 
Lim, a political rival of Fernandez who served as mayor for two terms between 2001 
and 2007, and another term in 2010-2013. Benjie Lim left the Dagupan political 
scene in 2007 to run as congressional representative, but lost. He then returned to 
Dagupan for the 2010 elections and was re-elected as mayor for his third term 
(2010-2013), defeating Al Fernandez by a narrow margin (Micua 2010). In 2013, 
Benjie Lim again ran for mayor, but was defeated by Ms. Belen Fernandez, who had 
been a close political ally of Al Fernandez. 
Benjie Lim was known for his innovations and marketing skills. He was a 
successful retail businessman that owned shopping malls and supermarkets 
throughout the region under the Magic Group of Companies. He also highlighted the 
need to raise taxes if the city were to achieve greater things. It was during Benjie 
Lim’s period that Dagupan proclaimed itself as the “bangus capital of the world” and 
started conducting the annual Bangus Festival in 2002. The Dagupan river cruise was 
also started during Benjie Lim’s period. The Philippine Center for Investigative 
Journalism honored Benjie Lim with a “Local Government Leadership Award” as one 
of the six outstanding city mayors of 200349. He was, however, criticized by his rivals 
as brash and not transparent in dealing with public finance.50  
                                                          
49 Center for Local and Regional Governance 2006 (http://pcij.org/blog/wp-
docs/LGLA_Awardees.pdf) 
50 Interviews with Belen Fernandez and city councilors, separately, in 2014 
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Benjie’s son, Marc Brian C. Lim, was the current vice mayor of Dagupan 
(2013-2016), after previously serving as city councilor in 2010-2013, when his father 
was mayor. With political rivalry between the Lims and the Fernandezes, Brian 
viewed himself as ‘leader of the city’s political opposition’.51  
Belen Fernandez 
Currently (2013-2016) Dagupan’s leadership was held by Ms. Belen 
Fernandez, who defeated Benjie Lim in the 2013 election. Although Belen and Al 
share the same family name, they were not related. They shared a political affiliation 
and the two previously ran on the same slate. Belen first entered politics as city 
councilor in 1995, then served as vice mayor for Al Fernandez in 2007-2010, and as 
vice mayor for Benjie Lim in 2010-2013. Belen’s background was more similar to 
Benjie Lim than to Al Fernandez. She also owned successful shopping malls in the 
region under the banner of CSI Group of Companies, which made her one of the top 
realty tax payers in Dagupan (Basa 1997). Belen Fernandez’ family and the Lim 
family were rivals in both business and political domains (Cardinoza 2013).  
Experience in managing big business was often cited by both camps as 
drivers for their innovations and leadership style. Belen Fernandez would say that 
her private sector experience allowed her to be resourceful,52 while Benjie Lim 
would highlight how he had a long-term business proposition for Dagupan that was 
not based on short-term political opportunism.53  
                                                          
51 Vice Mayor Brian Lim’s official profile at Dagupan City Website 
(http://dagupan.gov.ph/vice-mayor/); accessed December 2014 
52 Interview with Belen Fernandez, 2014 
53 Interview with Brian Lim, 2015 
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c. Transaction Costs 
The following describes the transaction costs faced by various mayors of 
Dagupan in governing the city and introducing public innovations. 
Information Cost 
Travels and familiarity with other cities 
Belen Fernandez and Benjie Lim were well-traveled politicians and business 
people. They have visited many cities, be it in the Philippines or abroad, both for 
political and business reasons. Some of the cities in the Philippines that provided 
inspiration for Benjie Lim were San Fernando City in Pampanga (for its economic 
growth and efficiency of business processes), Marikina City in NCR (for cleanliness), 
Iloilo City in Western Visayas (for river management), and Davao City (for public 
order and security). In terms of international cities, Lim was most impressed at how 
organized Singapore was. He also admitted to have learned much from Seoul and 
Busan in Korea, and several cities in Japan.  
Similarly well-traveled, Belen Fernandez acknowledged several cities which 
Dagupan could model itself after, but she was particularly impressed at Singapore’s 
success in transforming a dirty river into a clean one. That provided her with more 
motivation to clean the rivers in Dagupan. For her “One Barangay, One Fish” 
program, Belen Fernandez visited Thailand to learn how the villages conducted their 
“One Town, One Product” program. She believed that innovations do not have to 
start from scratch, and that it was more efficient to learn from the experience of 




Al Fernandez, Belen Fernandez, and Benjie Lim were politically well 
connected and had access to national resources that could provide the city with 
more support. For example, Benjie Lim was head of President Fidel Ramos’ 
campaign team in Pangasinan province in 1991, before he entered local politics. 
Afterwards in 2000 he was appointed as head of Duty Free Philippines, which was 
the country’s fourth revenue earner at the time.54 Al Fernandez, after completing his 
first three years as Dagupan mayor, was appointed as Undersecretary of DILG and 
Immigration Commissioner. 
Belen Fernandez also had good contacts with important figures in the 
national government such as DILG Secretary Mar Roxas, as well as private 
companies with generous CSR support. For example, she gained access to DILG 
funding for improving the livelihoods of bangus fishers through a bottom-up 
budgeting program. She also worked with Procter & Gamble to develop a “waste to 
worth” program, where the city’s waste was to be transformed to biogas. Belen also 
worked closely with congressional representative Gina de Venecia in convincing the 
President to build a fishing port in Dagupan.  
Dagupan’s mayors have also been actively involved in the League of Cities of 
the Philippines. For example, Benjie Lim was national treasurer of the LCP, and Belen 
Fernandez was the focal person for the LCP’s Senior High School program, 
conducted in partnership with the Department of Education.55 
                                                          
54 Interview with Brian Lim, 2015 
55 League of Cities of the Philippines website (http://www.lcp.org.ph/38/national-executive-
board) accessed January 2015 
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Access to ICT 
Dagupan has had relatively favorable access to ICT, enabled by the city’s 
good transportation and communication infrastructure. Major players in the 
telecommunications industry, such as PLDT, were present and have laid out the 
infrastructure that catered to the need of media outlets, financial, education and 
healthcare institutions in the city, including more recently, business process 
outsourcing companies. 
Belen Fernandez and Benjie Lim used the internet intensively both to 
communicate and to search for information. Dagupan City also had no shortage of 
information and knowledge as it was the regional center for media companies in 
Ilocos Region. Dagupan has plenty of local and national chapters of television and 
radio stations, as well as print publications.  
Negotiation Cost 
Relationship with city council 
The Dagupan city council has largely been dominated by the pro-Fernandez 
faction. Since the 2010 elections, the Fernandezes had been running under the 
banner of the Liberal Party, but previously they were affiliated with Lakas-CMD. In 
the current term (2013-2016), Belen Fernandez and her slate won six out of 10 
council seats. However, Belen claimed that two out of the four opposing councilors 
have now joined her side. The Fernandez slate had also dominated the city council 
before, holding seven seats in 2010-2013 (when Benjie Lim was mayor), and nine 
seats in 2007-2010 (when Al Fernandez was mayor).  
Political affiliation played a large role in determining how votes were cast in 
Dagupan city council. Benjie Lim’s former city administrator lamented how the city 
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council in 2010-2013 (then presided by Belen Fernandez as vice mayor) blocked 
major policy propositions from then mayor Benjie Lim, resulting in delays and 
costs.56 Currently Brian Lim, in his capacity as vice mayor, declared that the city 
council would not obstruct, simply for politics’ sake, Fernandez’ programs which 
they think were worthy to be conducted.57 Belen Fernandez, however, argued that 
this was an excuse from Brian Lim to justify his low attendance in the office or city 
council meetings.58 
Relationship with citizens groups 
An important constituent of the city were the fishers. Belen Fernandez 
claimed that during the Lim administration, small fishers were marginalized from 
their livelihoods: their fish pens were removed in the name of “maintaining river 
quality”, while investors from outside the city came and put in big fish pens in their 
place. Her program was therefore to “bring the river back to the people” by telling 
the big investors to pack up and leave, while helping the smaller fishers to develop 
their business through a “One Barangay, One Fish” concept. Belen Fernandez tried 
to please businesses by ensuring that the city processed their permits as efficiently 
as possible. She was also planning to develop a new “growth center” for Dagupan, 
and promised to give tenancy priority to local businesses. But most of all, Belen 
supported businesses through her pledge to not introduce any new taxes. Instead, 
her strategy to increase city revenue was by intensifying collection of existing taxes.  
Benjie Lim, on the other hand, saw himself as a ‘reformer’ who was free 
from short-term political interests and therefore he was not afraid to propose 
difficult solutions for the long-term benefit of the city. For example, he raised taxes 
                                                          
56 Interview with Vladimir Mata, 2014 
57 Interview with Brian Lim, 2015 
58 Interview with Belen Fernandez, 2014 
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because the tax rate that the city was utilizing in the early-2000s was over 20 years 
old.59 He also cleaned up people’s fish pens in the river because of their negative 
impact on the environment. Some of these bold steps were not popular among the 
general population, but he had support from people who thought that he had sound 
vision and courage to go against popular sentiments.  
Healthy leadership rivalry 
Dagupan had been involved in bitter political rivalry between the 
Fernandezes and the Lims since at least the late 1990s. Fernandez supporters would 
accuse Benjie Lim of being brash in his steps, often taking short-cuts, and lacking 
transparency and accountability (City of Dagupan 2013, Sunday Punch 2014).60 On 
the other hand, Lim supporters would accuse Al Fernandez of political patronage, 
‘making politics as his family business,’ and being ‘pro-status quo’.61 Al Fernandez 
was supported by many of the city’s established clans who owned prominent 
educational institutions in Dagupan and strongly opposed Benjie Lim’s increase of 
taxes. 
Many of Benjie Lim’s programs which could be considered ‘new’ were not 
continued in 2007-2010 when Al Fernandez was re-elected as mayor. Some of these 
programs were re-enacted when Benjie Lim was again mayor for 2010-2013, but 
many were again disbanded in the current period of Belen Fernandez. Brian Lim 
claimed that many of his father’s programs were worthy of continuation, but he 
lamented that ‘politics was the whole reason for halting a predecessor’s good 
program’.62 A former Dagupan city administrator agreed that politics played a strong 
                                                          
59 Interview with Vladimir Mata, 2014 
60 Also, interviews with Belen Fernandez and city councilors, 2014 
61 Interview with Brian Lim, 2015 
62 Interview with Brian Lim, 2015 
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role in how Dagupan City was run. Instead of relying on having long-term goals and 
proper procedures that last many years, politicians tend to come up with their own 
“10-point agenda” every time were elected, scrape off programs of the past leader, 
and create new ones with their ‘signature’.63  
Belen Fernandez and supporters claimed that Benjie Lim mismanaged the 
city’s funds such that when Belen came as mayor in 2013, the city had no money left 
to spend. The root of the problem, claimed Belen, was corruption and lax attitude to 
spending. This claim was strongly refuted by Lim’s supporters, who accused 
Fernandez of conducting smear campaign with support from Dagupan media which 
were largely in favor of the Fernandezes. Lim’s supporters challenged Belen to show 
the financial records to the public and prove her claims. Political rivalry continued to 
be present in Dagupan, with court cases having been filed involving accusations of 
underpriced sale of city’s assets  (Jurado 2013, Sunday Punch 2014, Villamente 2014) 
as well as an attempted murder of a radio broadcaster which may or may not be 
related to the former case (Cardinoza 2014). 
Enforcement Cost 
Capable civil servants 
Belen Fernandez argued that civil servant capacity was not really a problem, 
but the main issue was the leader. She claimed that if the leader was corrupt, the 
staff would also be corrupt.  Still, she found some staff to be ‘problematic’ that she 
had to recruit new ones to replace those who had ‘issues’ in following her 
directions.64 
                                                          
63 Interview with Vladimir Mata, 2014 
64 Interview with Belen Fernandez, 2014 
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Brian Lim believed that capacity of Dagupan’s government staff was typical 
of that found in a developing country context, where people live close to poverty 
and were generally struggling to make ends meet. In general he considered Dagupan 
staff to be accustomed to slow pace and inefficient work. However, he also agreed 
that staff’s performance largely depends on what the leader/mayor demands of 
them.  
Capacity building activities 
Both Benjie Lim and Belen Fernandez mobilized efforts at equipping staff 
with skills to improve their performance. During Benjie Lim’s term, trainings were 
given in relation to the city’s new branding programs (Bangus Festival) and efforts to 
make Dagupan into a business-friendly convention center. Other capacity building 
programs were conducted in relation to a major computerization of the city hall in 
2003 and effort to ISO-certify the city’s ‘One Stop Shop’. 
Belen Fernandez spent much effort to make her staff aware and accustomed 
to the way she works and her expectations, so that they could match her work ethic. 
For example, early in her tenure as mayor, Belen worked with her staff until 2AM for 
a couple of times, simply to let them know that there is now a new standard. She 
also gave “coaching sessions” to different departments, usually three departments 
at a time, before she moved on to others. In these coaching sessions, she met with 
their key staff intensively, told them her objectives, and discussed their issues. Little 
by little, she admitted that the staff was coping with her new style. “Now they 
follow, and they are good already.” She also claimed that graft and corruption has 
decreased substantially. 
Incentives and disincentives 
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Belen Fernandez imposed a strict leadership style, where she would 
threaten to fire her staff if they refused to cooperate or continue to be corrupt for 
six months after she gave the chance to improve. She claimed that she could fire civil 
servants provided that there was a violation. However, she admitted that she had 
not fired anybody yet. Instead of firing, Belen chose to transfer some of her 
“difficult” staffs to less prominent roles in another office. At the same time, she was 
also recruiting new staff to lead the vacated post, sometimes by transferring 
promising candidates from other departments.  
Not much response was garnered on the incentives and disincentives 
question. Brian Lim admitted that his father gave bonuses to well-performing staff. 
Belen Fernandez, however, highlighted how the city under her leadership was able 
to generate substantial savings, despite the initial condition of “bankruptcy”, such 
that she was able to pay 14th month salary bonus. The bonus, however, was given 
for all employees regardless of performance. 
Summary  
The following table summarizes the presence or absence of factors related 
to leadership, society, and transaction costs of conducting public innovations in 
Dagupan.  
Table 16: Case Summary:  







A2. Leader’s charisma  A3. Leader’s experience 
YES: Belen Fernandez 
worked until late. Benjie 
Lim took risk by 
conducting unpopular 
policies. Both had 
nothing to lose. 
NOT ALWAYS: Leaders 
had strong charisma, but 
their influence tend to 
be limited to their own 
supporters.  
YES: Belen Fernandez & 
Benjie Lim ran successful 
retail businesses. Al 








B1. Favorable history  B2. Progressive local 
organizations 
B3. Good local norms 
YES: Dagupan has been 
the commerce, finance, 
education, religion, and 
healthcare hub of 
Pangasinan & Ilocos. It 
is a meeting place. 
YES: Presence of strong 
and vocal media, 
universities, and church 
groups. 
NOT ALWAYS: People 
had higher demands for 
business/ economic 
development issues, but 
less so for government/ 
public service issues. 









C1.3. Use of ICT  
YES: Mayors were well-
travelled politicians and 
business owners. They 
had good knowledge of 
other cities as reference 
for Dagupan. 
YES: Mayors were well 
Connected with national 
government officials. 
They also participated 
actively in the League of 
Cities. 
YES: Dagupan was hub 
of media outlets, and 
has laid out 
infrastructure to support 
media and BPO 
companies. Mayors used 





C2.1. Supportive city 
council 
C2.2. Supportive citizens 
groups 
C2.3. Healthy leadership 
rivalry  
NOT ALWAYS: Most city 
councilors come from 
the Fernandez’ political 
faction. Benjie Lim did 
not have full support 
when he was mayor. 
NOT ALWAYS: Citizens 
were largely divided in 
their support for either 
political faction.  
NO: The Lims and the 
Fernandezes were rivals 
both in business and 
politics. Each faction 
ruled one after the 
other, cancelling 






C3.1. Capable civil 
servants 
C3.2. Capacity building 
activities 




government staff simply 
followed leader’s style. 
Lim thinks civil servants 
were accustomed to 
slow pace & 
inefficiency. 
YES: Fernandez oriented 
her departments in 
batches. Benjie Lim 
trained staff for various 
city branding & 
computerization 
programs. 




threaten to fire staff but 
had not done so. The 
‘14th month salary’ is 
paid to all employees.   





4. Marikina City (innovative case) 
a. City Profile and Innovations 
Marikina City is one of the 17 LGUs that make up the Philippines’ National 
Capital Region (NCR). The city is located on the easternmost part of the NCR, 
bordering Rizal Province to its east, about 16 kilometers away from Manila City. 
Marikina is considered a “highly urbanized” city and is rated “first class” in terms of 
LGU income. The city is also nicknamed “the shoe capital of the Philippines” due to 
large presence of shoe-making industries, especially throughout most of the 20th 
Century until the late 1980s.  
Marikina had a population of 424,150 based on the 2010 census – or 
equivalent to about 3.58 percent of the NCR’s population (11,855,975 in 2010) 
(National Statistics Office 2012). There were 91,414 households and 222,787 
registered voters in 2010, spread out over two congressional districts and 16 
barangays. The average yearly population growth rate between 2000 and 2010 was 
0.81 percent per annum, between 1990 and 2000 was 2.34 percent per annum, and 
between 1980 and 1990 was 4.66 percent65. This suggests that Marikina has had its 
fastest population growth periods behind. 
The city occupies an area of 21.52 square kilometers on the foothills of 
Sierra Madre Mountains. The Marikina River cuts through the city, bringing fresh 
water from the mountains through a number of LGUs66 until it merges with Pasig 
River, from which the water is channeled into Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay. Before 
                                                          
65 The city’s population was 391,170 in 2000, 310,227 in 1990, and 211,613 in 1980. 
66 The Marikina River flows through San Mateo Municipality, Marikina City, Quezon City, and 
Pasig City before it merges with the larger Pasig River. 
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the time of roads and automobiles, Marikina River was one of the most important 
means of transportation in the region. Nowadays the river serves mainly as a canal 
which sometimes gets flooded, especially during monsoon seasons. One of the 
worst recent disasters related to Marikina River flooding occurred in September 
2009, when tropical storm Ondoy (Ketsana) caused water levels to rise by 6.1 
meters, and left 464 people dead (Rappler 2013). 
Innovations 
Since the 1990s, Marikina has been recognized for its government’s 
outstanding performance and innovations, and has become one of the most 
awarded LGUs in the country. From the Galing Pook Foundation alone, Marikina has 
won nine awards to date (see Table 17), one of which was an “Award for Continuing 
Excellence” (ACE). Many of Marikina’s awards were related to infrastructure 
development, environmental management, and change in people’s behavior. 
Table 17: Galing Pook Awards for Marikina City 
Year Name of Program Description 
1995 Save the Marikina River 
Providing a 96-meter easement for the river, 
relocating the squatters, and turning the riverbanks 
into a flood control zone cum recreation area 
1997 
Red Sidewalk 
(“Discipline in the 
Sidewalk”) 
Cleaning the sidewalks from encroachment of 
personal use; bringing public space back into the 
public domain 
1998 Squatter-free Marikina 
Relocating 7,000 squatter families to resettlement 
sites, where each family was given serviced lots with 
low mortgage rates 
1998 Barangay Talyer 
Communal shops at the barangay level where various 
tools are stored and can be used for free by residents 
2003 
Award for Continuing 
Excellence 
Given to LGUs that have previously won three awards 
and have demonstrated that the awarded programs 
have been sustained and improved over the years and 
created a “culture of excellence” within the LGU 
2005 Bicycle-friendly City Building a network of 66 kilometers of dedicated 
bicycle lanes. The project started in 1999 and by 2005, 
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Year Name of Program Description 
29 kilometers (44%) have been completed. 
2007 Eco Savers 
School children bring recyclable waste to school to 
earn points, which can be exchanged with school 
supplies or grocery items. This program has been 






A warehouse where all materials and supplies needed 
by city departments and affiliated institutions are 
consolidated, purchased, stored, and distributed 
according to need 
2009 
Clean Food and Water 
Laboratory 
A laboratory that helps ensure safety, health and 
sanitation standards in the public market by regularly 
conducting tests on water and food being sold there 
Source: Galing Pook Foundation (various years) 
 
Aside from the Galing Pook Awards, Marikina has received numerous other 
awards from the mid-1990s until today. These will not be named one by one, but 
some of the notable ones include: Cleanest and Greenest Local Government Unit, 
Best Public Market, Most Outstanding Police Station, Best Website, and “Most 
Outstanding LGU” in various fields, including public health, population management, 
environmental management, disaster risk management, business-friendliness, and 
child-friendliness. Marikina has also won international awards and recognitions, 
such as those given by the World Health Organization for Healthy Cities, and by 
Microsoft Asia Pacific for Wireless Integrated Network, both in 2008. The city’s Eco 
Savers Program, which won the GP Award in 2007, became a ‘best practice’ which 
was piloted in a number of other Southeast Asian cities by DELGOSEA.67  
The 2014 Cities and Municipalities Competitiveness Index identified 
Marikina as the fifth most competitive city in the Philippines, behind only Makati 
City, Cagayan de Oro, Naga City, and Davao City. Marikina is ranked third nationwide 
                                                          
67 Eco Savers Profile at DELGOSEA website (http://delgosea.eu/cms/Best-Practices/Thematic-




in terms of Infrastructure, 16th in terms of Government Efficiency, and 19th in terms 
of Economic Dynamism. Ten years prior in 2004, Marikina was ranked number one 
in overall competitiveness. 
b. Society and Leadership  
Society 
The founding of Marikina can be traced back to 1630, when the Spaniards 
established a mission and settlement called Mariquina alongside a river, not far from 
Manila. One of the city’s defining historical moments happened in the 1880s, when a 
local landowner tore apart a pair of imported shoes and taught himself and others 
to make shoes. This started the growth of family-owned shoe manufacturers in 
Marikina. By the 1970s, 70 percent of the shoes circulating in the domestic market, 
or about 33 million pairs a year, were made in Marikina (Tanchuco 2005).  
The tide turned and by 2001 cheaper imported shoes from China made up 
about 80% of the domestic market. Marikina’s footwear cluster is now only a 
fraction of what it once was, but it still makes up a substantial proportion of what is 
left of the industry. In 2001, more than 80 percent of the country’s 2,148 registered 
footwear manufacturing companies remain located in the NCR and the Southern 
Tagalog region. Within the NCR, 73 percent of the shoe manufacturing firms and 61 
percent of their employment were found in Marikina (Tanchuco 2005). 
With the decline of the shoe industry many jobs were lost. Meanwhile, 
people from other places in the Philippines kept migrating into Metro Manila. In the 
1980s, Marikina was mostly regarded as a “murky, low-profile town” (Galing Pook 
Foundation 2003) that was “muddy” and had a high crime rate (Dalizon 2014). The 
streets and sidewalks were unruly, and the river was polluted and lined with 
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squatter settlements. Squatters made up about thirty percent of the city’s 
population in the early 1990s (Ishii, Hossain, and Rees 2007).  
A series of transformations started in the 1990s and within the next two 
decades Marikina changed its image. It is now commonly viewed as a multi-award 
winning city known for discipline, cleanliness, good infrastructure, good governance, 
and public innovations. It became a city where citizens proudly see themselves as a 
“Little Singapore”, where children keep candy wraps in their pockets until they find a 
rubbish bin (Siao 2013), and those who did not separate their trash pay a hefty fine 
or serve time doing community service.68 City hall employees changed from coming 
to the office in torn jeans and undershirts to wearing Salvation Army-style uniforms. 
Marikina’s citizens changed from being apathetic individuals to concerned civil 
society groups, where almost all sectors and interests of the society are organized as 
associations that are formally involved in the governing of the city. 
Leadership 
Marikina’s transformation was commonly attributed to the leadership of Mr. 
Bayani F. Fernando (BF) between 1992 and 2001. BF’s leadership was followed by 
that of his wife, Mrs. Maria Lourdes Carlos-Fernando (MCF), who served the 
subsequent three terms (2001-2010), and then by Mr. Del R. De Guzman, the 
current mayor (2010-2016). De Guzman had close working relationship with both 
past mayors, serving as vice mayor for BF in 1992-2001, and as congressman 
representing the city when MCF was mayor in 2001-2010. Although each mayor had 
a unique leadership style, it can be argued that Marikina has had stable leadership 
for 23 years (1992-2014), where good programs from the preceding period were 
further continued and improved. 
                                                          
68 This was observed by the researcher 
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Bayani F. Fernando 
BF was an engineer and owner of BF Corporation, an AAA-rated general 
contractor that was involved in many high-profile projects throughout the 
Philippines, including 39-storey Rufino Tower and 50-storey PBCom Tower. He is the 
son of Mr. Gil Fernando, an important figure in Marikina’s history who served as 
mayor in the 1950s. BF was already successful at his business when he won the 1992 
mayoral election. Interviews confirmed that he was known for hard-working, 
disciplined, and “strong” (some would say “iron-handed”) personal character that 
typifies many construction project managers. His campaign slogans were “Marikina 
needs an engineer” and “BF gets it done!” which signaled many citizens’ frustration 
with the lax way the city was run. After completing three terms as mayor, BF 
became chairman of Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) in 2002-
2009. He then ran as the Philippines’ vice presidential candidate in 2010 69, and 
subsequently went out of politics.  
Marides Carlos Fernando 
MCF was the daughter of a local business tycoon, with qualifications in 
business management from UP and Cornell University. When BF was mayor of 
Marikina in 1992-2001, MCF was the vice president for administration and finance 
for BF Corporation.70 She ran the city as one would run a corporation. A sign in 
Marikina City Hall, which she put, reads: “We manage our city like a private 
corporation… One where there are stakeholders, workers and customers. We treat 
them as our clients whom we want not only to satisfy, but also to delight”. MCF 
considered her leadership period as continuation and development of what her 
                                                          
69 BF joined forces with Senator Richard Gordon, former mayor of Olongapo City, to run as 
vice president and president of the Philippines in the 2010 general election. They both lost.  
70 City Mayors website (http://www.citymayors.com/mayors/marikina-mayor.html) 
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predecessor has established. Her campaign slogan was “BF built you a house; MCF 
will make it a home”. During her time Marikina was dubbed as “the city in the pink 
of health” due to her heavy emphasis on public health issues, and the city formally 
adopted a vision to be a ‘Little Singapore’ (Alquitran 2006).  
Del De Guzman 
De Guzman has been a politician since he was elected as Marikina’s 
municipal councilor in 1988. He has never lost any elections that he participated in, 
be it as vice mayor for BF (1992-2001), Marikina’ representative in congress (2001-
2010), or mayor (so far, two terms between 2010-now). De Guzman parted ways 
with the Fernandos in 2010, when he decided to join the Liberal Party, while BF ran 
as vice presidential candidate under a different political banner. De Guzman largely 
continued and built on the programs and achievements of past leaders. But he also 
brought a new leadership style that was more consultative and participatory. He 
also put more emphasis on revitalization of the shoe industry. 
c. Transaction Costs  
The following describes the transaction costs faced by various mayors of 
Marikina in governing the city and introducing public innovations. 
Information Cost 
Travels and familiarity with other cities 
BF and MCF traveled extensively and brought inspiration from other cities to 
Marikina in various ways. The city administrator, who worked with BF and MCF, Mr. 
Melvin Cruz, remembered how every time they traveled, they would explore the city 
and afterwards sit down and discuss: “What makes this city better than ours?” and 
“How can this be implemented in Marikina?” Everything would be written down and 
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briefed with other staff at the city hall during their weekly Monday afternoon 
meeting. During these trips, BF would always bring a camera, a clipboard with pencil 
and paper, and measuring tape. They would take pictures, measure items, and draw 
them. At one point, Cruz remembered how they were chased by police officers in 
Hong Kong because they tried to lift the flood drain cover so they could measure its 
thickness.71  
BF found a close model for Marikina in the former U.S. Naval Base at Subic 
Bay, about 2.5-hour drive away. Recently converted into a Freeport zone in 1992, 
Subic was clean and orderly, and almost everything was up to “American standards”. 
BF wanted to ensure that Marikina public servants had the same standard as he 
does, so he brought many public officers there in batches. These include elected 
officials and career civil servants, from heads of departments to street sweepers. BF 
led the trip, delivered lectures himself, and showed everyone what he meant by 
“clean” and “orderly” through real-life examples.  
After achieving Subic Bay standards, Marikina’s benchmark was raised 
during the time of MCF with a vision of “Marikina as a little Singapore”. Similar to 
what BF did with Subic Bay, MCF brought many staff to Singapore in batches (but 
not the sweepers).  
Marikina leaders were often invited to speak in seminars and conferences. 
This provides them with opportunity to hear and learn from other cities. Some of 
Marikina’s heads of departments admit that they replicated programs which they 
saw in other cities, but with some adjustments. For example, the city’s multi award-
                                                          
71 Interview with Melvin Cruz, 2014 
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winning Eco Savers program was modeled after a similar program in a town in 
Thailand.72  
Networking Opportunities 
During the period of BF, many of Marikina’s innovations came from the 
ideas and initiatives of the mayor. However, since the time of MCF, the city has 
relied on a larger network to provide inputs and inspirations. These include city hall 
employees, Marikina citizens, other city government leaders, and national 
government figures.  
In terms of internal networks, De Guzman conducts regular weekly meetings 
every Monday afternoon with his key staff, mostly head of departments, to discuss 
development progress as well as seek feedback on new ideas.  External networks 
also mattered in the development of new programs. In terms of domestic city-to-city 
networks, Marikina has been actively involved in the League of Cities of the 
Philippines (LCP), where De Guzman was currently the secretary general,73 and MCF 
was deputy secretary general.74 In terms of international networks, Marikina was 
also actively involved in Cities Alliance and CityNet.  
Access to ICT 
Being located in Metro Manila, especially close to two large campuses (UP 
Diliman and Ateneo de Manila), as well as the GMA Tower, allowed the city to 
experience among the best access to ICT in the country. In 2006, Nasdaq-listed ICT 
Group, Inc. established a call center employing 800 people in Marikina, which was its 
                                                          
72 Interview with Gloria Buenaventura, 2014; Ms. Buenaventura was City Environment Officer 
who initiated the Eco Savers program in Marikina 
73 League of Cities of the Philippines Website (http://www.lcp.org.ph/38/national-executive-
board) 
74 City Mayors Website (http://www.citymayors.com/mayors/marikina-mayor.html) 
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third site in Metro Manila after more high profile sites such as Makati City and 
Ortigas Center (Estavillo 2006). 
Marikina’s mayors have placed high importance on the use of ICT.  For 
example, MCF connected all city government offices (including barangay offices) 
within a Local Area Network. Developing an ICT-based knowledge center and 
improving e-government were among two of MCF’s key programs (Balaba 2006). 
Currently the city has a flood management system where real-time water levels in 
different locations of Marikina River are monitored.  
Marikina officials actively used the Internet to search for information. De 
Guzman would browse the Internet to review programs from other cities which 
share similar conditions. Also, the city’s Environmental Management Office would 
browse the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s website to see programs that 
were being implemented in various American states. Other department heads 
admitted that they were often pushed by MCF to “think out of the box,” and to 
benchmark themselves against best practices in other Asian or world cities. This 
typically led the departments to conduct online research.  
Negotiation Cost 
Relationship with city council 
When BF won his first mayoral election in 1992, the majority of city 
councilors were not politically aligned with him. His first two years was a challenge 
because the city council was not supportive. But since Marikina at the time did not 
have money to build anything significant, there was no real need to get funding 
approvals from the council. BF’s first signature programs were efforts to clean the 
city from unruly behavior, which required more political-will rather than funding 
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(more about this below). After winning the trust of the people, between 1995 and 
2000 the Fernandos and their slate consistently won elections by a landslide and 
tipped the council’s political composition in their favor. Out of 20 elected positions, 
at most only 2 or 3 would not be affiliated with BF and MCF.  
After the era of the Fernandos, De Guzman (2010-2016) and his slate – 
mostly composed of politicians with a history of affiliation with BF and MCF – 
continued to dominate the council. In 2010-2013, nine out of 16 elected councilors 
sided with De Guzman, but over time he was able to win more support and currently 
only one councilor is not politically aligned with him.75  
De Guzman explained that there has been a covenant agreed before 
election among politicians from his slate, that they will support each other in 
programs that bring benefits to the people. Every Monday after the flag-raising 
ceremony, the mayor would have a breakfast meeting with all city councilors in his 
meeting room. De Guzman understood the issues facing councilors because he used 
to be a city councilor and a vice mayor who presided over the council. 
Marikina’s innovativeness has expanded beyond city hall into the city 
council.76 One of the council’s latest innovations is paperless meeting, where every 
councilor would have a tablet and all the files related to the meeting were pre-
loaded. This was admittedly driven by the need to save money for papers and 
printing, but also due to the limited space for filing cabinets. The council also 
streams their meetings online, and they have a legislative tracking system, which is 
an online database of ordinances and resolutions in their draft and final forms.  
                                                          
75 Interview with Joseph Banzon, 2014 
76 Interview with Reginald Tamayo, 2014 
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Relationship with citizens groups 
During BF’s era, the relationship between the mayor and citizens were 
characterized by notions of a benevolent autocrat. One of BF’s earliest programs 
was “Discipline in the Sidewalk”. Back then, Marikina’s sidewalks were not walkable 
as people put things that they did not want in their homes there: clothes lines, 
broken vehicles, sheds, etc. BF dismantled these and did not repave the sidewalks 
after the clean-up because the city did not have money to do so (Gonzalez 2009).77 
Interestingly, BF won citizens’ votes by disciplining them. This was counter-intuitive 
for most politicians.  
BF and his team faced much opposition initially. The city administrator 
admitted that he would find the tires of his car punctured and the paint damaged by 
solvents. However, ultimately people got used to the changes. One of the 
department heads attributed BF’s success to the fact that he always delivered his 
promises. Even if the services that he delivered were basic, people had longed to see 
basic things working properly that they were impressed. To further facilitate his 
relationship with citizens, BF instructed community groups to organize themselves 
into associations. The latter would register with the city’s community relations office 
and be invited to various consultative meetings.  
After the era of BF, there has been a more open, consultative relationship 
between city hall and citizens groups. De Guzman views Marikeños mature enough 
to be involved meaningfully in different councils, and to give inputs directly to him 
and other government officials. He also believes that there is a friendly working 
relationship between the government and the business sector. One of De Guzman’s 
                                                          
77 By not repaving the sidewalk, BF brought a stronger message that the cleaning was not 
done because a repaving project was being prepared, but it was wrong to put personal 
belongings in public domain (Interview with Melvin Cruz, 2014). 
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campaign slogans, seemingly to distinguish himself from his predecessors, was “Tao 
Naman”, which means “The people’s turn”. Every Thursday, De Guzman would 
conduct “People’s Day”, where citizens would come in and line up to see the Mayor. 
But this has actually started since the period of MCF.  
One sector that recently became the city’s focus is the shoe industry, with 
the set-up of Marikina Shoe Industry Council during De Guzman’s period. Marikina 
tries to revive the shoe industry by linking production with an education support 
program, where the city gave 35,000 needy students a pair of leather shoes, made 
by local shoe manufacturers. Thirty small and micro shoe manufacturers 
participated in the program, each producing 1,000-1,200 pairs.78 The business 
chamber appreciated the support from the city government, but preferred the city 
to build a trade center and brand incubator for made-to-order shoes. In general, 
business practitioners found the mayor to be quite accessible.79 
Healthy leadership rivalry 
Since BF ran for re-election in 1995, he and his successors have not had any 
meaningful rival in the local political scene. The couple established a local political 
vehicle called the Kabayani Party, which was affiliated with Lakas-CMD at the 
national level. BF and MCF encouraged Marikeños to vote for them and other 
candidates from the Kabayani Party so they could win by a landslide. One of their 
slogans was “landslide victory to avoid being cheated!” The Fernandos were also 
supported by effective and well-funded campaign machinery. 
In the 2010 election MCF was no longer eligible to run as mayor while BF 
joined forces with Senator Richard Gordon to run for vice president and president, 
                                                          
78 Interview with Lourdes de la Paz, 2014 
79 Interview with Roger S. Py, 2014 
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respectively, under the newly established Bagumbayan-VNP party. The couple 
adopted this party as their new political vehicle in 2010, and rested their support on 
Dr. Marion Andres (MCF’s past vice mayor), to run as the next mayor. At the same 
time, De Guzman chose to side with the Liberal Party (LP), led by Benigno S. Aquino, 
III (who eventually became president). This led to a break-up among affiliates of the 
Kabayani party, with some siding with De Guzman and others with Andres.80 
Eventually BF lost his 2010 political bets, both at the national level as well as in 
Marikina. De Guzman won the mayoral election by a landslide, winning 66% of the 
votes. The LP also won the vice mayor and two congressman positions, as well as 
nine out of 16 city council seats. 
Following their loss in the 2010 election, BF and MCF returned to managing 
their company, and the Kabayani party eventually subsided. Meanwhile, De Guzman 
won the subsequent 2013 election by winning 96% of the votes, and his slate of LP 
candidates took all but one city councilor position. After the short political tension 
between De Guzman and Andres in 2010, things went back to normal.  
Enforcement Cost 
Capable civil servants 
Back in 1992, the capacity of city hall employees reflected much of the 
problems that the city was facing. A lax atmosphere dominated, where civil servants 
would arrive late in ‘ripped jeans and undershirts’.81 But over time, with the change 
of culture instilled by the three mayors, there has been much improvement. 
Currently many donor agencies and companies’ CSR programs liked to work with 
                                                          
80 Interview with Melvin Cruz, 2014 
81 Interview with Melvin Cruz & Gloria Buenaventura, 2014 
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Marikina on ‘pilot projects’ because the city offered a high chance of successful 
implementation.82   
Many of Marikina’s current department heads have been with the city since 
the era of BF and MCF. They had the experience and skills, and most importantly, 
they know the rationale behind most of Marikina’s current programs. The city 
administrator noted that BF and MCF have instituted many of their past initiatives, 
such that 80% of current programs are those which have started during their era. 
Staff capacity, however, still remains an issue at the middle and lower level 
civil servants. Two heads of departments admitted that they were not happy with 
the capacity of their staff. Being located in the NCR, Marikina competes with many 
large organizations and companies to attract the best local talents.  
Capacity building activities 
To improve staff capacity, Marikina’s heads of departments were keen on 
sending their staff to attend trainings. De Guzman, the city administrator, as well as 
department heads believed in trainings and encouraged their staff to look for 
seminars, short courses, or other ways to build their capacity. 
Capacity building activities also occurred through direct interaction between 
staff and leader. BF was noted as someone who changed the habits and mind-set of 
his staff. As admitted by one department head, BF always kept his employees on 
their toes. By working with him, there was no alternative but to take one’s work 
seriously. He scolded and demanded his staff to complete their assignments and was 
always checking on their work.83  
                                                          
82 Interview with Gloria Buenaventura, 2014 
83 Interviews with Gloria Buenaventura and Lourdes de la Paz, 2014 
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BF also excelled in class settings. Many of Marikina’s public servants were 
literally trained by BF. He consistently held weekly meetings with key staff every 
Monday afternoon, and would reschedule other appointments to be present at 
these. Consequently, all department heads were also expected to be there, 
otherwise they would get a memo. This tradition has been continued until now. 
Until now, much of BF’s leadership style is continued by the department 
heads. Perhaps not his “iron-handed” ways, but a style that keeps employees on 
their toes, such as making sure everyone has a job for the day, conducting regular 
orientations of standard procedures, and in-house trainings done by department 
heads for the staff.  
Incentives and Disincentives 
Since the time of BF, Marikina has used incentive and disincentive systems 
to encourage good performance. Every year the city hall gives out bonuses, beyond 
than that provided by law, as rewards for productivity and meeting work targets. 
The bonus would be decided after going through a system of quarterly rating of all 
employees done by department heads. After completing the ratings, department 
heads would submit their results to be assessed by the city administrator’s office.84  
Every year, casual employees who occupied the bottom 2% as identified by 
ratings would have their contracts terminated, and the city would “bring fresh 
blood” into the system. For regular employees, the disincentive would be to receive 
fewer bonuses than what they received the previous year, or being stagnant in their 
career. On the other hand, those who performed well would get a bonus equivalent 
to one month’s salary or more. 
                                                          




The following table summarizes the presence or absence of factors related 
to leadership, society, and transaction costs of conducting public innovations in 
Marikina.  
Table 18: Case Summary:  







A2. Leader’s charisma  A3. Leader’s experience 
YES: BF was willing to 
be unpopular with his 
disciplinarian 
programs. This was 
continued with more 
approachable and 
responsive leadership. 
YES: BF was able to get 
people to follow 
through strong 
character, MCF & De 
Guzman through 
persuasion 
YES: BF & MCF were 
leading an AAA-rated 
construction company. 
De Guzman is a career 
politician with 
experience in national 
congress. 




B1. Favorable history  B2. Progressive local 
organizations 
B3. Good local norms 
NO: Marikina in the 
1980s used to be a far-
flung suburb 
associated with crime.  
YES (not initially): 
Communities have 
become organized 
based on interest groups 
and participate in 
governing affairs. 
YES (not initially): 
Citizens are known for 
discipline, and have 
come to expect high 
performance and 
quality services from 
the public sector. 









C1.3. Use of ICT  
YES: BF, MCF & De 
Guzman have 
travelled extensively. 
BF made conscious 
effort to brainstorm 
lessons after travel. 
YES: Marikina leaders 
were active and held key 
positions in national and 
international city 
networks. They were 
also well connected 
politically.  
YES: Mayors & heads of 
departments actively 
use internet to search 
for best practices. ICT is 
intensively used as part 




C2.1. Supportive city 
council 
C2.2. Supportive citizens 
groups 




Cost YES (not initially): 
Most city councilors 
come from mayor’s 
political party. There 
was good 
communication 
between executive & 
legislative. (These 
were not the case in 
BF’s first term) 
YES (not initially): 
People supported BF’s 
disciplinarian programs 
despite initial grudges. 
De Guzman gained 
support by being 
supportive to interest 
groups. 
YES: BF, MCF, and De 
Guzman did not face 
meaningful rival. After 
BF & MCF stepped 
down, some rivalry 







C3.1. Capable civil 
servants 
C3.2. Capacity building 
activities 
C3.3. Incentives & 
disincentives 
YES (not initially): 
Many department 
heads have held the 
job since BF era. 
Donors like to work 
with Marikina due to 
high chance of 
success. 
YES: Marikina conducts 
& sends staff to attend 
trainings. Mayor & 
department heads 
would also train staff 
intensively. 
YES: Quarterly rating of 








5. Malabon City (typical case) 
a. City Profile and Innovations 
Malabon City is one of the 17 LGUs that make up the Philippines’ National 
Capital Region (NCR). The city is located on the northwestern-most part of the NCR, 
bounded by the cities of Navotas, Caloocan, and Valenzuela, as well as Bulacan 
province. It was considered a “highly urbanized” city and is rated “first class” in 
terms of LGU income. Malabon does not have a specific moniker, except that some 
parts of the city had been sarcastically referred to as “Local Venice” due to being 
constantly flooded.  
Malabon’s population was 353,337 at the 2010 census, or equivalent to 2.98 
percent of the NCR’s.85 The population of the city grew annually by an average of 
3.90 percent between 1980 and 1990, 1.92 percent between 1990 and 2000, and 
0.42 percent between 2000 and 2010. This seems to indicate that Malabon has seen 
its fastest periods of population growth behind.  
The city is located near the shores of Manila Bay, only about three 
kilometers away from the Manila port, on the flat and low-lying confluence of 
Tullahan River and Polo River. Malabon is close to the sea, but it is not a “fishing 
village ". Instead, the Tañong fish market and other consignación areas along the 
Malabon River have made the city as one of the fish trading hubs in the NCR.  
For several decades, Malabon’s economy and employment had been largely 
generated from manufacturing and retail activities (Magno 1993).86 Its 19.77 square 
                                                          
85 National Statistical Coordination Board Website 
(http://www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/municipality.asp?muncode=137502000&regcod
e=13&provcode=75) 
86 Also: Malabon City Facts & Figures 2012 
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kilometers area is divided into 21 barangays, and allocated mostly for residential (38 
percent), industrial (32 percent), and commercial (19 percent) uses.87 Large 
proportions of the land are below sea level (fish ponds and ex-fish ponds) which also 
serve as rainwater catchment area. However, many fish ponds have been reclaimed 
as formal and informal housing areas. Malabon experiences heavy flooding during 
the monsoon seasons. 
Innovations 
Malabon has not received the Galing Pook award or other notable national 
and international recognitions. However, several individuals from city government 
have won regional awards for good performance, including the city’s fire marshal 
(2005 and 2007), a barangay nutrition scholar (2014), and manager of the 
employment office (2015). In 2014, one of Malabon’s local advisory committees was 
recognized as “most responsive” in terms of compliance with Department of Social 
Welfare and Development’s directives.88 Current mayor, Antolin (“Len-len”) A. 
Oreta, III, was acknowledged in 2014 as one among five Kaya Natin champions of 
good governance and ethical leadership (Kaya Natin 2014). 
When asked for some of the city’s innovative programs, Oreta pointed 
towards the Community-based Solar Lighting program, where chlorinated water in 
plastic bottles were used to retain solar power to light up some areas without 
electricity. The program was conducted in collaboration with MyShelter Foundation, 
where Malabon was one of many cities worldwide that implemented it in 2014.89 
                                                          
87 Malabon City Website – Physical Features  
(http://malabon.gov.ph/physical-features/#sthash.GofTUBOX.dpuf) 
88 Department of Social Welfare and Development website 
(http://www.ncr.dswd.gov.ph/2014/03/pantawid-pamilya-local-advisory-committee-in-
malabon-city-receives-award-from-dilg/); accessed February 2015 
89 Liter of Light Website (http://literoflight.org/about-us/); accessed January 2015 
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This program was diminutive in scale and simply a direct implementation of an NGO-
initiated program. 
In terms of competitiveness, Malabon City was ranked 48th out of 136 cities 
on the 2014 Cities and Municipalities Competitiveness Index. A breakdown of the 
overall competitiveness found that Malabon was ranked 24th for Economic 
Dynamism, 30th for Infrastructure and 88th for Government Efficiency.  
b. Society and Leadership 
Society 
As one of the few areas in the NCR located on the confluence of several 
rivers, Malabon has had a long history. By the 19th century, Malabon was already an 
important processing and trading hub for grains and other produce coming from the 
farmlands of Pampanga and Bulacan. Along with sugar mills and tobacco factories, 
fishponds were also a significant generator of the city’s economy. Its people were 
considered ‘industrious’ and ‘intelligent’ (Marcelo 2004).90 Grand heritage houses 
from the late 19th and early 20th century currently still stands in Malabon as 
testimony of the city’s past glory. 
For Malabon’s local elites, ownership of land, including those used as 
factories and fish ponds, has been an important source of political power. However, 
during the martial law regime of the 1970s, many fishponds were expropriated for a 
reclamation project to build low-cost housing (Magno 1993). The project, however, 
ignored the ecological role of Malabon fishponds as water catchment area, and 
resulted in worsening flooding problems (ESSC n.d.).  
                                                          
90 The book has a quote from Don Isabelo de Los Reyes, ‘father of Filipino socialism’, which 
said: “If only the Filipinos were as industrious and intelligent as the people of Malabon! The 
economic triumph of these islands would be assured!” (p.76) 
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The formal reclamation of fishponds in Malabon started parallel, private 
initiatives to do the same, where crowded units lacking services were illegally built 
by crime syndicates and rented out to recent migrants. After the People Power 
revolution of 1986, many poor migrants from remote provinces came to Manila in 
search of livelihoods. Malabon was one of the places near the harbor where shanty 
towns were erected to accommodate their housing demand. The city’s 
transformation was described as such: “Its waters teeming with fish have been 
replaced by slums teeming with hungry people” who are attractive to local 
politicians as potential voters (Magno 1993). The local syndicates have opposed 
various programs of the city government to regularize illegal housing.  
Meanwhile, decades of neglect have brought into Malabon high crime rate 
(murder, robbery, kidnapping) related to illegal businesses (drug gangs, cockfight 
gambling, money lending, squatter syndicates) that even involves some of the city’s 
most prominent clans (Galupo 2014, Mangunay and Melican 2012). Interviews 
suggest a perception that people generally have lax attitude and low discipline, and 
many of the new generation of migrants have “transient” mentality and low sense of 
belonging to the community.91 
Leadership 
The Oretas 
Since 1988, the Oreta clan had played an important role in Malabon’s 
leadership. Prospero I. Oreta was mayor for two terms (1988-1995), and his cousin, 
Canuto (“Tito”) S. A. Oreta, was mayor for almost three terms (2004-2012). In 2013, 
Len-len Oreta (Tito’s nephew) was elected as mayor.  
                                                          
91 Interview with Alan Gatpolintan, 2014 
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The Oretas was a rich and powerful clan whose primary business is 
construction. A.M. Oreta & Co. Inc. is an AAA-accredited general contractor started 
in 1946 by Antolin M. Oreta, Sr. (Len-Len’s grandfather, Tito’s father). The company 
has been involved in many high profile projects, including the Ninoy Aquino 
International Airport and the Manila Hilton.  
Tito Oreta had international experience as an engineer, and his last position 
at the firm (before he went into local politics) was vice president of engineering. It 
was during Tito Oreta’s period that Malabon constructed a new 11-storey city hall 
and embarked on computerization of city government (Botial and Laude 2006). Tito 
Oreta was notable for his quiet and cheerful (“happy-go-lucky”) attitude, but also for 
having a “lax” approach to governing that was arguably well-received.92 He was also 
politically successful, able to reconcile different political factions, and ran for mayor 
in 2007 and 2010 without any opposition or rival (Melican 2012).  Tito Oreta died as 
mayor in 2012 due to lung cancer.  
Antolin M. Oreta, II (Len-len’s father, Tito’s brother), was married to Teresa 
Aquino-Oreta (sister of late Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.). During the Marcos era, 
some of the Aquino and Oreta family members were detained or exiled. Len-len 
Oreta grew up in the U.S. and Sri Lanka, and studied business in Japan. After working 
for several multinational companies, he came back to Malabon as a politician and 
became a city councilor (2007-2010), vice mayor for Tito Oreta (2010-2013), and 
mayor (2013-2016). Len-len claimed that he was trying to change Malabon’s 
bureaucratic culture, making it more disciplined, efficient, and responsive to 
people’s needs. However, he had faced challenge especially from those who thought 
he is not rooted enough to know how things worked in Malabon. 
                                                          




Between the eras of Prospero Oreta and Tito Oreta, the mayor position was 
held for three terms by Amado S. Vicencio (1995-2004). The Vicencios were not a 
very rich and powerful clan. Amado’s father was an attorney at the city’s fiscal 
office, and other Vicencio family members were in businesses such as gamecock 
breeding, logging, and spa.93 Amado Vicencio was popular among the people for his 
friendly, easy-going ways. However, he was suspended as mayor during the final 
months of his third term after the president’s office found him “guilty of abuse of 
authority” (Tandoc 2003). Following the suspension, clash took place on the streets 
between supporters of Vicencio, who was keen on remaining in office, and those of 
his vice mayor, Mark Yambao, who was keen on taking over (Laude 2003). 
After Amado’s three terms as mayor, his son, Arnold D. Vicencio, was vice 
mayor for Tito Oreta for two terms (2004-2010). Arnold, however, died in a 
motorcycle accident in 2012. His wife, Nadja M. Ortega-Vicencio, is currently a city 
councilor. 
Other clans 
Aside from the Oretas and Vicencios, Malabon’s prominent clans include the 
Sandovals, who owned Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. (i.e., current Vice Mayor Jeannie S. 
Sandoval), the Lacsons, who were well-known in the money-lending business (i.e., 
current Congresswoman Josephine V. Lacson-Noel), and the Yambaos (i.e., current 
Councilor Maria Anna Yambao, former Vice Mayor Mark Yambao). These clans do 
not always get along with each other, as shown by various political frictions which 
had occured. 
                                                          
93 Interview with Anonymous supporter of Vicencio clan, 2014 
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c. Transaction Costs 
The following describes the transaction costs faced by various mayors of 
Malabon in governing the city and introducing public innovations. 
Information Cost 
Familiarity with other cities 
Len-len Oreta saw Malabon as a city with unique circumstances, and thus he 
chose his references carefully. Impressive projects from cities that were not 
comparable to Malabon did not attract his attention. During a group interview, one 
of his staff mentioned Taguig City’s ‘mega health centers’, which were hospital-like, 
24-hour facilities. However, due to budget differences, Oreta was quick to point out 
that Malabon and Taguig were not comparable. Another staff pointed how the 
urban greenery of Singapore was a good model to be adopted in Malabon, especially 
along the river banks. Again, Oreta was not impressed and argued that Marikina in 
the NCR may be more appropriate.94 
Oreta noted several similarities between Marikina and Malabon: both lied 
on the outer parts of the NCR, with similar land area and population size. He also 
noted how Marikina also had many informal squatters on its riverbanks, and that the 
city was dirty and did not have enough funds for development. However, with 
strong will to instill discipline, the city became better over time. Despite the 
similarities between Malabon and Marikina, Oreta argued that there were enough 
differences to distinguish the two. An important difference was that Malabon had 
                                                          
94 Group interview with Len-len Oreta, Alan Gatpolintan, and Cleah Nava, 2014 
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weaker social capital and less support from businesses, while in Marikina businesses 
were more willing to rally and support the community.95  
Networking Opportunities 
In Malabon, initiatives for new projects may come from either the mayor or 
head of local departments, based on opportunities presented by national 
government schemes. For example, the city’s Tullahan River Development project 
was initiated by the city engineer, who identified a potential support facility from 
the national government that Malabon could tap into to clean their rivers.  
Personal networks also played an important role in generating ideas for new 
projects. For the community-based solar lighting program, Oreta and one of the 
partner NGO’s founders went to the same school. As for his referencing and 
modeling of Marikina, Oreta is quite close to current Marikina mayor, Del De 
Guzman. The two often met on occasions related to the Metro Manila Development 
Authority.  
Malabon, however, had not been actively involved in the League of Cities of 
the Philippines, or other international city-to-city networks. 
Access to ICT 
Being located in Metro Manila, the city’s leaders and staff have had 
relatively good access to ICT infrastructure. The Malabon city government used the 
internet mainly to look for technical references. For example, the engineering 
department would look for comparative structures from other countries.96  
                                                          
95 Interview with Len-len Oreta, 2014 
96 Interview with Alan Gatpolintan, 2014 
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The city’s Digital Infrastructure Project, started by Tito Oreta in 2006, was 
only completed in 2012 and mostly used to improve tax collection purposes (PNA 
2012). This was, arguably, rather late and limited in scope for a city located within 
the NCR. The Internet was not used extensively or institutionally to search for 
inspiration to develop new programs. Oreta saw that Malabon faced basic issues 
that did not need to be dealt with fancy programs, but a disciplined approach as 
exemplified by Marikina.  
Negotiation Cost 
Relationship with city council 
In Tito and Len-len Oreta’s era (2004-16), political factions in Malabon city 
council were largely tipped in favor of the Oretas. In the current term (2013-2016), 
eight out of 12 elected councilors were from Len-len’s political vehicle, the Liberal 
Party. Meanwhile, the four others are from the UNA, NPC, NP, and an independent. 
In 2010-2013, Tito and Len-len Oreta’s political parties (LKS-KAM and LP, 
respectively) together won seven out of 12 seats, making their coalition as the 
majority in city council. Similar situations have occurred since 2004, regardless of the 
political party they were associated with at the time.97   
During Amado Vicencio’s terms (1995-2004), however, the city council was 
not necessarily tipped in his favor. In 2004, four opposition city councilors filed an 
administrative case against Vicencio for ‘gross abuse of authority in the purchase of 
some P88 million worth of property’, which eventually led Vicencio’s suspension as 
mayor (Wendell Vigilia 2003). 
                                                          




Political affiliations mattered in Malabon because city councilors typically 
would act along the directives of their political patrons. This was admitted by Len-
len Oreta based on his experience as city councilor for 2007-2010. At the time, even 
if he did not agree with some of Tito Oreta’s policies, Len-len would still be a ‘good 
soldier’ and follow his directives.98 However, in his experience, even if there were 
disagreements, in general the relationship between executive leaders and legislative 
members was smooth, in ‘quid-pro-quo’ manner. 
Relationship with citizens groups 
Len-len Oreta’s administration had tried to build good working relationship 
with some citizen groups. For example, the city typically worked together with 
AIMM (Malabon’s urban poor alliance) for its housing programs. Being a federation 
of 128 homeowners and neighborhood associations, affecting the lives of 18,000 
families, AIMM was a powerful organization that sat on the city’s housing board, 
anti-squatting board, and the city development council. 
One program conducted by the city government in partnership with AIMM 
was the Community Mortgage Program (CMP). The CMP buys back land currently 
occupied by squatters from the original owners, lays down proper infrastructure, 
and subdivides the land so that each occupying household – organized in 
homeowners associations - would have a land title. This program, however, 
formalized the squatters and took business away from local crime syndicates who 
thrived on providing illegal shelter.99 
In opposition to this program, the local syndicates had hit back by killing 
several homeowner associations’ activists (Felipe 2011, Laude 2012); the latest 
                                                          
98 Interview with Len-len Oreta, 2014 
99 Interview with Carlos Dias, 2014 
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incident occurred in October of 2014. This had created fear among potential 
beneficiaries of the CMP program and prevented community members from 
becoming homeowner association presidents. Mr. Carlos Diaz, chairman of AIMM, 
admitted that his position was a dangerous one and that he had received numerous 
death threats. 
In a different effort to instill more discipline among the citizens, Oreta had 
hired officers to go around and fine people who litter. However, this had also 
created some tension and backlash. Oreta acknowledged that this initiative was not 
a good move politically, and that he might need to change his tactics and be more 
accommodative in 2015, in light of his upcoming 2016 re-election bid.100 
Healthy leadership rivalry 
The Oretas were such a strong clan that others had decided not to challenge 
them at times. For example, in 2013, Len-len Oreta ran unopposed, and Tito Oreta 
faced similar circumstances in 2010 and 2007. However, for other clans, rivalry 
remains quite strong.  
An anonymous supporter of past mayor Vicencio claimed that upon rising 
into power, Oreta marginalized the Vicencio clan members from important positions 
in City Hall.101 Rivalry among clans was strongest in 2003, when Vicencio (who was 
suspended) tried to retain his authority from Vice Mayor Mark Yambao (who was 
scheduled to take over as acting mayor). Both leaders one morning ordered all 
department heads to meet them in their respective offices, causing confusion and 
                                                          
100 Interview with Len-len Oreta, 2014 
101 Vicencio did not want to be interviewed for this research. The interviewed respondent 
requested for anonymity. 
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tension. The police had to be mobilized to prevent supporters of both camps from 
clashing outside of city hall (Laude 2003).  
In a bout of rivalry for congress representative, Josephine Lacson-Noel, who 
was defeated by Alvin Sandoval in 2007, managed to get the Electoral Tribunal to do 
a recount following her charges of ‘massive poll fraud’ (Botial 2009). After the 
recount, Sandoval (brother-in-law of current vice mayor Jeannie Sandoval) was 
ousted, and the post was handed to Lacson-Noel in 2009. More recently in 2013, 
rifts occurred between the vice mayor and opposing city councilors, resulting in the 
council being unable to work on legislative issues for months (Melican 2013).  
Enforcement Cost 
Capable civil servants  
Some Malabon department heads claimed that the city needed more staff 
to complete projects on time and to deliver services smoothly. In the Engineering 
Department, for example, project backlogs persisted and the city engineer 
attributed this to the low number of staff relative to the department’s workload.102 
In late 2014, he had requested an increase in the number of permanent staff from 
11 to 28.  
Recruiting permanent staff remained the most viable way for the city to hire 
qualified people. However, they argued, once staffs were tenured they became 
assured of lifetime employment and their work motivation tend to decline. Len-len 
Oreta lamented: ‘Once you are a regular employee, basically you don't do any work, 
because it's hard to take you out. They have to find due cost to take you out, or you 
have to do something really bad to be taken out’.  
                                                          
102 Interview with Alan Gatpolintan, 2014 
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Issues related to staff quality and motivation plagued Malabon. A 
department head acknowledged that many of her staff lacked the capability to 
perform their duties and functions. Some department heads faced difficulty in 
making their employees work diligently, that sometimes they had to take their staff 
to lunch (‘feed’ them) using their own money so that the staff would follow 
directives.103 Len-len Oreta noted that, ‘most LGUs are actually run by contractual 
and casual (employees), because they have something to prove, because as mayor, I 
can take them out any time.’  
Capacity building activities 
To improve staff capacity, Malabon used a system of performance-based 
output, which had been mandated by the Philippine Civil Service since 2012. The 
system included a planning workshop at the beginning of each year in each 
department, wherein after the workshop, each staff would sit down with his or her 
superior to agree on achievement targets for the upcoming year. This agreement 
was formalized and signed between the staff and the superior officer, and would be 
reviewed every semester.  
Low capacity and motivation has ‘forced’ the city to send staff to special 
trainings to build a culture of ‘service-excellence’. Under the leadership of Len-len 
Oreta Malabon was declared as a ‘caring government,’ therefore much pressure had 
been placed on frontline workers, especially in the social service sectors. Training 
and retraining of staff to fulfil that vision was necessary, but Malabon faced difficulty 
in finding the resources for it. 
                                                          
103 Interview with Cleah Nava, 2014 
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Incentives and disincentives 
Oreta and his department heads agreed that a system of monetary 
incentives for staff performance was difficult to implement in Malabon. Giving 
monetary incentives and disincentives to staff based on their performance 
presented challenges as it was prone to biases. Therefore, the current incentive 
scheme only applied to measurable and quantifiable targets. Malabon officers were 
of the opinion that cities had to seek approval from a higher government authority 
in terms of amount and procedure of such incentives.  
Aside from national regulations, there were also social norms that 
prevented mayors or department heads from giving incentives to well-performing 
staff. Oreta and his department heads acknowledged the presence of pakikisama 
norm in Malabon, where in a negative context it was used to justify everyone 
‘getting along’ with each other by not punishing a colleague for non-performance. 
This resulted in ‘no one really gives anyone a bad grade’.104 Even if there was an 
incentive scheme, it was perceived that a department or section head may likely 
respond with the ‘socially acceptable’ way of recommending everyone for good 
grades, and sharing the incentive evenly. A department head remarked, ‘How could 
you give to some and not to others? Christmas is fast approaching. How could you 
not recommend (them for good performance)?’ 
 Summary  
The following table summarizes the presence or absence of factors related 
to leadership, society, and transaction costs of conducting public innovations in 
Malabon.  
                                                          
104 Interview with Len-len Oreta, Alan Gatpolintan, and Cleah Nava, 2014 
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Table 19: Case Summary:  








A2. Leader’s charisma  A3. Leader’s experience 
NOT ALWAYS: Len-len 
Oreta recently started 
discipline-building 
programs. But past 
mayors have been lax 
and did not take 
unpopular steps. 
NO: Mayors have been 
well liked by their 
respective constituents, 
but had not the 
influence to fully 
implement their visions 
due to various 
challenges. 




was more a local 
politician. 





B1. Favorable history  B2. Progressive local 
organizations 
B3. Good local norms 
NOT ALWAYS: Malabon 
had favorable distant 
history (hub for 
processing & trading) 
but not so favorable 
recently (transient 
migrants). 
NO: Local organizations 
were weak against rent-
seeking crime syndicates 
and local politicians who 
capitalized on transient 
migrants.  
NO: There was high 
crime & poverty rate, 
and low discipline and 
sense of belonging to the 
community. ‘Pakikisama’ 
norm used as excuse to 
tolerate lax 
performance. 









C1.3. Use of ICT  
NOT ALWAYS: Mayors 
were familiar with 
other cities, but found 
it hard to find 
appropriate references 
for Malabon. 
YES: Mayors had access 
to national government 
programs, politicians, 
and had favorable 
personal networks 
YES: Located in the NCR, 
Malabon benefited from 
the capital’s ICT 
infrastructure. However, 
city officials’ use of 
internet was more 
limited to finding 





C2.1. Supportive city 
council 
C2.2. Supportive citizens 
groups 
C2.3. Healthy leadership 
rivalry  
YES: City council usually 
tipped in favor of the 
Oretas (who had ruled 
longest). Generally 
issues could be solved 
in ‘quid-pro-quo’ 
manner. 
NOT ALWAYS: The city 
worked closely with 
AIMM (urban poor 
alliance), but 
‘syndicates’ opposed 
such programs, often 
with violence. 
Businesses tend to be 
NO: Clan rivalry, 
including sidelining one 
another for political and 
administrative positions, 








C3.1. Capable civil 
servants 
C3.2. Capacity building 
activities 
C3.3. Incentives & 
disincentives 
NO: Leaders admitted 
shortages of staff. 
Among those available, 
performance and work 
ethic was low. 
NOT ALWAYS: There was 
a signed ‘performance 
commitment’ between 
staff & superior. 
However, Malabon had 
limited resources for 
training. 
NO: There was difficulty 
in providing performance 
incentives due to fiscal, 
administrative, and 
social constraints.  




Chapter 5: Indonesian Cases  
 
1. Background 
Reform and Decentralization 
Indonesia’s “people power” moment took place in 1998, ending Suharto’s 
32 years of authoritarian rule. The movement, called Reformasi, promised to bring a 
new era of democracy and decentralization. Within a few years after Suharto 
stepped down, the original 1945 Constitution was amended to curb the powers of 
the executive, strengthen the legislative, adopt direct elections, acknowledge 
human rights, and enable a larger governing role for sub-national governments.  
The 1998 reform mandated decentralization through an increase in 
“regional autonomy” (devolution). Indonesia’s “big bang” decentralization started in 
1999 with the passing of two laws that devolved authority and responsibility, and 
distribute monetary resources from the central to regional governments.105 The 
extent of responsibility being distributed covered almost everything except foreign 
affairs, defense, justice, finance, religion, and natural resources.  
Upon embarking on decentralization, the central government increased 
transfers to regional governments (provinces, cities, and regencies). Just before 
decentralization started, 14.9% of total central government expenditure was 
transferred to regional governments; one year afterwards in 2001, that figure 
                                                          
105 The first post-reform decentralization laws were Law no. 22/1999 on Regional 
Government and Law no. 25/1999 on Fiscal Balance between Central and Regional 
Governments. Prior to that, Indonesia adopted a largely centralistic law on regional 
government (Law no. 5/1974). 
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jumped to 23.7%.106 The average annual proportion of transfers to regional 
governments was 19.6% for the period of 1990-2000, but increased to 30.9% for the 
period of 2000-2010. The central government also shifted many staff to local 
government payroll, with an increase in the percentage of local civil servants from 
12.2% to 66.7% between 1999 and 2001 (World Bank 2003). 
Transfers from the central to regional government consist of three types of 
funds: general-purpose grant (Dana Alokasi Umum or DAU), special-purpose grant 
(Dana Alokasi Khusus), and revenue sharing (Dana Bagi Hasil). Each regional 
government receives transfers directly from the central government. Similar to the 
IRA in the Philippines, Indonesia’s DAU is also determined by the region’s land area 
and population. The DAU is noteworthy because it is proportionately large: it made 
up 64.1% of total regional government revenue in 2003, but has decreased to 46.9% 
in 2008 and to 42.4% in 2013.107 It is also ‘unconditional’, meaning regional 
governments can use it as they see fit, with no link between such entitlement and 
performance (Ahmad and Mansoor 2002, Lewis 2010). 
Meanwhile, the power of regional governments to raise their own revenue 
remains limited. Income tax and value-added tax, as well as revenue from natural 
resources, are collected by the central government. Part of natural resource revenue 
is shared back with province and local governments according to a formula which 
favors the locality where the resource is found. Other than that, taxes that can be 
collected by local governments include hotel and restaurant tax, entertainment tax, 
and advertising tax. Local governments could also collect fees for services from the 
                                                          
106 Indonesia’s national budget (APBN), 1990-2012, from Statistik Ekonomi dan Keuangan 
Indonesia, Bank Indonesia (http://www.bi.go.id/id/statistik/seki/terkini/keuangan-
pemerintah/) 
107 Indonesia’s sub-national budget (APBD), 1994-2014, from Directorate General of Fiscal 




public and businesses, but – unlike in the Philippines – there is no requirement for 
businesses to register with the local government on a regular basis. 
Local Governance 
Before 2001, Indonesia adopted top-down decentralization, where 
development in the regions was conducted by the central government through their 
regional chapters. Provinces were called ‘first-tier’ regions, while cities 
(predominantly urban districts) and regencies (predominantly rural districts) were 
‘second-tier’ regions that report to the provinces. Under the decentralization 
framework, however, provinces, cities and regencies are all called ‘autonomous’ 
regions. Politically, each is accountable to the people, but administratively, they 
receive money from and report to the national government. Since decentralization 
started, cities and regencies were at the forefront of regional autonomy, while 
provinces merely held a coordinative role.  
The sudden gain of authority in the regions presented some challenges, such 
as lack of coordination, increase in the number and types of predatory local taxes, 
and local regulations that tend to discriminate against people from other regions. 
Many also highlighted the rise of local dynasties. In response to these challenges, 
the original 1999 decentralization laws have been gradually revised to better clarify 
the authority and responsibility of the province and local governments, re-
strengthen the role of the province in coordinating and ensuring local government 
performance, and enable more democratic local elections.108 
                                                          
108 The original 1999 decentralization laws were updated with multiple laws, including Laws 
no. 32/2004, 33/2004, 12/2008, and 23/2014. Other legislations, such as Laws 8/2005, 
22/2014, 1/2015, 2/2015, and 8/2015 specifically stipulate issues related to regional 
elections and the roles of regional chief executives and vice chief executives. 
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Until 2004, governors, mayors, and regents were appointed by their 
respective legislative councils (whose members were directly elected). Since 2005 
onwards, however, regional leaders have been directly elected by citizens109. A law 
on rural villages (desa) was passed in 2014, extending some autonomy to villages, 
entailing direct election of village heads and councilors, direct transfer of funds, and 
autonomy to utilize such funds. 
As of December 2013, there were 539 autonomous regions, consisting of 34 
provinces and 505 local governments (412 regencies and 93 cities)110. Local 
governments are further broken down into sub-districts (kecamatan – 6,994 in total) 
and villages (urban kelurahan or rural desa – 72,944 in all). Following the Ministry of 
Public Works’ city size classification, 12 cities were considered “metropolitan” 
(population larger than 1 million), 14 are “large” (population 500,000 – 1 million), 58 
are “medium” (population 100,000 – 500,000), and nine are “small” (population less 
than 100,000). See Figure 13. The average population for Indonesia’s 93 
autonomous cities is 482,203, while the median is 254,450. 
Mayor candidates typically run in the local election with support from one or 
more political parties, although independent candidacy is also possible. The mayor is 
elected together with the vice mayor as a ‘pair’ and serve a five-year term. 
Afterwards, they could serve only one more term (maximum of 10 years). Many of 
these pairings take place due to political considerations, with political parties 
forming coalitions and matching one popular candidate with another to win the 
                                                          
109 Direct election of regional leaders started in 2005 as per Law 32/2004. However, Law 
22/2014 returned the authority to elect regional leaders back to the regional councils. Due 
to widespread rejection, the government vetoed the law in a count of two days. 
110 These do not include 5 cities and 1 regency in the Jakarta Special Capital Region which are 
“administrative” rather than “autonomous”. Data from Ministry of Home Affairs 
(http://www.kemendagri.go.id/) – Daerah Otonom (Provinsi, Kabupaten, dan Kota) di 
Indonesia per Desember 2013  
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election. Such coalitions often disintegrated after the pair assumes power, and many 
mayors would run for their second term against their former vice mayor. 
Figure 13: Number of Indonesian cities by population, 2013 
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs 2013 
The regional legislative agencies (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or 
DPRD) pass regional regulations (Peraturan Daerah or Perda), approve the regional 
budget, and watches over the executive. For cities and regencies, the DPRD has 
between 20 and 50 councilors elected in their legislative districts. Out of 93 
Indonesian cities, the average number of councilors is 33.65 and the median is 30. 
Regional councilors serve a five-year term, and can be re-elected with no term 
limits. The political composition of Indonesia’s legislative councils, be it at national 
or regional level, is rarely dominated by one or two political parties alone.  
Case Locations 
Based on the selection of Indonesian cases as identified in Chapter 3, a map 
of the approximate locations of the four cities is provided in Figure 14, followed by 













































































































































2. Balikpapan City (innovative case) 
a. City Profile and Innovations 
Balikpapan lies on the eastern coast of East Kalimantan Province, facing the 
Makassar Strait. It can be reached from Jakarta via a direct two-hour flight. As per 
2010 census, Balikpapan had a population of 557,579, or equivalent to about 15% of 
the province’s population. The city’s population grew by 3.2% per annum between 
2000 and 2010, which is a high growth rate. Previously the city recorded an annual 
population growth rate of 8.3% between 1971 and 1980, 2.1% between 1980 and 
1990, and 1.7% between 1990 and 2000.  
Balikpapan is known as Indonesia’s “oil city” (kota minyak) due to the 
substantial presence of oil and gas processing and storage activities. Oil and gas has 
been an important defining feature of Balikpapan, with the city’s foundation 
coinciding with the founding of the first oil well in the region by Dutch companies in 
1897.  
Balikpapan city proper measures about 503 square kilometers large, but 
most of the area is covered by hills. Only 15% of the city’s land is relatively flat 
(mostly along the eastern coast). The remaining area consists of reservoirs and 
protected forests. Balikpapan is part of the larger eastern Borneo rainforest: the 
second largest remaining rainforest in the world after the Amazon. 
Oil and gas are not found in Balikpapan City, but in surrounding areas (“Blok 
Mahakam”). However, the city is where oil and gas are stored and processed, and 
where related activities are managed. In 2000, more than half (51.9%) of city’s GRDP 
was generated from oil and gas-related activities.111 This sector’s dominance in the 
                                                          
111 BPS Kota Balikpapan. Gross Regional Domestic Product by Industrial Origin, 2012 
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city’s economy, however, has been reduced. In 2011 it makes up only 29.8%. This 
reduction is not caused by the decline of oil and gas (it has remained constant), but 
by the rise of other sectors, most prominently property (from 6.8% in 2000 to 18.9% 
in 2011). The economic value of the construction sector has risen by 493% between 
2000 and 2011, from Rp 667 billion to Rp 3,287 billion (2000 constant price). 
Innovations 
Balikpapan is considered to have been well-managed for several decades, 
and innovativeness was a characteristic often attributed to the city. Balikpapan 
received three Urban Management Innovation (Inovasi Manajemen Perkotaan or 
IMP) Awards, each for 2008, 2010, and 2012. The city also won third prize for the 
‘Innovative Land Use Planning Competition’ (Lomba Karya Inovasi Tata Ruang) 
hosted by the Ministry of Public Works in 2008, and was one of the 10 finalists for 
the Innovative Government Award of 2011, conducted by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs.  
One of the city’s award-winning programs was community-based relocation 
of informal settlement in Margasari village on the Balikpapan Harbour. Initially, 
some parts of the coastal areas in Margasari were occupied by dense informal 
settlements (140 houses) that stood on stilts over a tidal zone, with no sewage 
system. Worse, they were located on the buffer zone of Pertamina’s oil refineries, 
making the settlement highly prone to fire and other safety hazards. In 2005, the 
community initiated relocation to the other side of the bay, away from the buffer 
zone but with access to the waters.112  
The move took place over a period of three years through a participatory 
process, with support from the city government, the central government, and 
                                                          
112 Interview with Arbain Side and Mulyanto, 2014 
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Pertamina. A whole new village was constructed on stilts, complete with access road 
for fire vehicles, village halls, parks, and football fields. Clean water and sewage 
systems were put in place, mangroves were planted, and the community agreed on 
a charter to keep their new village clean and orderly. When the research was 
conducted in 2014, Margasari has remained a well-managed, unique, and scenic 
settlement.  
Another award-winning innovation of Balikpapan is the local land-use 
regulation that safeguards green open space to a minimum of 52% of the city’s land 
area (allowing only 48% for built-up area).113 This was more than the 30% stipulated 
in Indonesia’s land use law of 2007.114 Furthermore, Balikpapan mayors have issued 
a regulation banning any coal mining activity in the city,115 despite the fact that 
Balikpapan’s soil contained high-quality coal (Ibrahim 2005). This highlighted 
Balikpapan’s commitment to long-term sustainability, safeguarding land for future 
generations at the expense of short-term profit. The city, however, faced constant 
opposition from several interest groups which argued that natural resources should 
be duly exploited for the benefit of the society (Syafar 2014). 
Balikpapan has also won awards for various aspects of public management, 
other than innovation. For example, the city has won the Adipura Kencana Award 
for garbage management and pollution mitigation 18 times since the award was first 
conducted in 1986. It also has won the Wahana Tata Nugraha Award for traffic and 
transportation management 18 times since 1992. In 2014, the city was nominated as 
                                                          
113 This is stated in the city’s regulation (Peraturan Daerah or Perda) no. 20/2006 about 
Balikpapan Land Use Plan 2005-2015, and again reinstated in Perda no. 12/2012 on 
Balikpapan Land Use Plan 2012-2032.  
114 Law no. 26/2007 on Land Use is relatively new and answered previous concern on the lack 
of a minimum standard for green open space in cities 
115 Mayor’s regulation (Peraturan Walikota or Perwali) no. 12/2013 
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Indonesia’s “most livable city” by the Indonesian Association of Urban Planners 
(Alexander 2014). However, as the case of other cities with relatively higher quality 
of life, living costs have been steeply increasing (Wibisono 2012). 
At the international level, Balikpapan was one of the 10 cities that won the 
ASEAN Environmentally Sustainable Cities award in 2014, along with Melaka in 
Malaysia and Bandar Seri Begawan in Brunei.116 The award was given for excellence 
in three categories: clean land (Balikpapan converts rubbish in their landfills into 
methane gas), clean water (a waste water management system was installed in the 
water village of Margasari), and clean air (protection of forests within the city’s 
boundaries) (Karim 2014). 
b. Society and Leadership 
Society 
Oil and gas have played an important role in determining the institutional 
structure that supported Balikpapan’s growth. To ensure security of vital facilities, 
the regional headquarters of the Indonesian armed forces (TNI), as well as that of 
the Indonesian police forces (POLRI), have been based in Balikpapan rather than in 
the provincial capital (Samarinda City), which is only 100 kilometers away. Until the 
fall of Suharto’s new order regime, Balikpapan was always led by a mayor with 
military background.  
The rise of Balikpapan as an oil and gas processing hub made the city 
attractive to many people and businesses. By the 1920’s, it was already teeming 
with skilled professionals working for BPM (a joint subsidiary of Royal Dutch and 
                                                          





Shell), as well as manual laborers brought in mainly from Java (80%), and some even 
from China (Pratama n.d.). The city was basically a Dutch operation, built by Dutch 
planners and architects. Other companies such as Chevron and Texaco followed suit 
and established operations in Balikpapan and surrounding area.  
Balikpapan became a destination for many people from different parts of 
Indonesia, predominantly the Javanese and the Bugis. Many of them were not 
specifically working in the oil and gas sector, but provided related services to 
companies and workers. Seaports, airports, power and telecommunications 
infrastructure also developed to keep up with the increasing demands of the 
growing city (Subiyakto 2014). Since Balikpapan did not have its own food source, 
trade became an important supporting sub-sector of the economy.   
The relatively new and outward-oriented history of Balikpapan made the 
city very diverse in terms of ethnic composition. Most of the city’s residents are 
migrants whose family has stayed for three generations at the longest, and they 
came to Balikpapan with a common goal to improve their livelihood. As long as the 
city government could provide that, they were more than willing to follow rules and 
do their part as a citizen. 
The economic composition of the city is not so much in the form of a 
pyramid, but more of a vase, where the middle class dominated the structure. Only 
6% of the Balikpapan’s “formal” population was considered “poor,” and the city 
largely has resources to improve the poor’s living conditions.117  
Various community interests in the city are organized, and the city has a 
plethora of ethnic groups and business chambers. Balikpapan mayors have generally 
                                                          
117 Interview with Imdaad Hamid, 2014 
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maintained and institutionalized good relationship between the city government 
and such associations. Civil society groups were similarly strong and have 
established good network among themselves. NGOs conduct regular discussions on 
various issues with university lecturers and students.118  
Many of the city’s interest groups held relatively higher standard for public 
services, and would not hesitate to complain to the city government. This was 
confirmed by a senior NGO activist who claimed that Balikpapan residents tend to 
exercise greater public control and would raise issues related to public services, 
either directly to top-level officials or through the media.119 Newspapers such as 
Kaltim Post are responsive to these issues, and once the issue becomes news item 
the city government is even quicker to respond. 
Leadership 
Syarifuddin Yoes and Tjutjup Suparna 
Balikpapan had been led by mayors with military background throughout 
Suharto’s New Order era. The most notable mayors from that era were Col. 
Syarifuddin Yoes (1981-1989) and Col. Tjutjup Suparna (1991-2001). Interviews with 
various respondents as well as internet research seem to agree that for the most 
part, they were honest and capable leaders. 
Yoes had high aspirations for Balikpapan: it was during his time that 
Balikpapan airport first became an international airport. His successor, Tjutjup, 
largely continued Yoes’ leadership style and achievements. They both instilled a 
military-level of discipline and commitment to their jobs, and expected the same 
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from their staff.120 For example, Tjutjup was always 10 minutes early for every 
appointment. He was also friendly and sincere. Every Sunday morning he would ride 
his bicycle along Balikpapan’s streets, identified parts of the city that needed 
attention, and ended the ride by having breakfast at a food stall in a market 
together local people who happened to be in the area (Muttaqin 2011).  
Tjutjup was known by a popular moniker wagiman (short for Walikota Gila 
Taman, or ‘park-obsessed mayor’). He was very keen on building parks throughout 
the city and ensuring that they were properly designed and maintained. This, later, 
became one of Balikpapan’s trademark programs related to cleanliness, liveability, 
and environmental quality. 
Imdaad Hamid 
Tjutjup was succeeded by Imdaad Hamid, SE (2001-2011), the first of 
Balikpapan mayors with non-military background. Imdaad was a career civil servant 
who worked closely with Tjutjup. He served as regional secretary (equivalent to 
permanent secretary) for eight years (1991-1998) during Tjutjup’s administration. 
Imdaad was elected by city council members as mayor of Balikpapan for 2001-2006. 
In 2006, he ran for mayor in the city’s first direct election and was elected to lead 
the city again for 2006-2011.  
Imdaad had advanced managerial and communication skills and applied 
much of what he learned from his predecessors.121 He was also very keen on parks 
and had a program to ensure every office and housing compound applied green 
open space standards. Imdaad had good working relationship with NGOs and 
people’s organizations, and was not afraid to make unpopular decisions, such as 
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prohibiting coal mining and safeguarding land from urban encroachment. NGO 
activists, university professors, and business practitioners generally see him in 
positive light. 
Rizal Effendi  
Imdaad’s successor and current mayor was Rizal Effendi, SE (2011-2016). 
Rizal was a senior journalist who assumed top editorial position in East Kalimantan’s 
leading newspaper, Kaltim Post, before he was elected as Imdaad’s vice mayor in 
2006-2011. Rizal has been known to continue his predecessors’ policies and 
provided similar level of commitment to the environment. His signature program is 
called CGH (clean, green, and healthy). During Rizal’s period, the city’s land use 
regulation that maintains 52% requirement for green open space was re-established, 
and mayor’s regulation to ban coal mining activities was issued. 
Rizal’s current vice mayor (2011-2016) was Heru Bambang, SE, who 
previously served as regional secretary under Imdaad’s second term in 2006-2011. 
Heru was a career civil servant who worked directly under previous mayors Tjutjup 
and Imdaad. During their campaign in 2011, Tjutjup supported Rizal and Heru for the 
fact that they had the most continuity with previous leaders. Thus it could be argued 
that Balikpapan has maintained steady and continuous leadership over multiple 
decades.  
c. Transaction Costs 
The following describes the transaction costs faced by various mayors of 




Travels and familiarity with other cities 
Balikpapan leaders have had the opportunity to be familiar with other cities, 
be it domestically or internationally. Most prominently, Singapore has been 
Balikpapan’s main reference. Imdaad and Rizal provided several reasons why 
Balikpapan leaders see their city as similar to Singapore: First, Balikpapan does not 
have natural resources within its immediate jurisdictions. The oil and gas that is 
processed within the city comes from other neighboring regencies. Also, land is hilly 
and not fertile enough for farming such that food has to be shipped from other 
places. Fresh water sources are also limited to a few rivers and reservoirs. Second, 
Balikpapan only has a small proportion of indigenous people. Most of its residents 
are migrants who came in search of better livelihood.122  
Following Singapore, Balikpapan sees that the city’s most valuable resource 
is its people and natural environment. Much attention has been given to develop 
people’s skills through vocational schools and higher education institutions. 
Balikpapan also places much emphasis on conserving the natural environment and 
creating a livable city.  
From other cities within Indonesia, currently Rizal is learning from Surabaya 
on how to develop the city’s e-government system.  
Networking opportunities 
In terms of external networks, Balikpapan mayors have been active 
members of city associations, both nationally and internationally. Tjutjup was 
among the founders and the first vice chair of Indonesia’s City Government 
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Association (APEKSI) when it was first established in 2000. Currently Rizal sits on 
APEKSI’s national executive board.  
Balikpapan has also been active in international city networks. It is one out 
of 10 Indonesian cities which are members of ICLEI (Local Governments for 
Sustainability), and among 19 which are members of CityNet. Rizal is currently 
president of the Indonesia chapter of CityNet for 2012-2016. Balikpapan mayors 
have traveled to many cities in Indonesia and Asia in relation to these roles.  
Balikpapan also has excellent network with the national government. 
Considering the city’s strategic position, and the fact that it is home to East 
Kalimantan’s main airport, Balikpapan mayors have had plenty of chance to interact 
with central government officials who visit the province. As admitted by Imdaad, 
sometimes Balikpapan mayors are asked by East Kalimantan governors to greet 
ministers who are passing by or transiting in Balikpapan. Tjutjup, Imdaad and Rizal 
often utilized the chance to have lunch or dinner with the minister. 
Access to ICT 
Due to its history as one of Indonesia’s main oil and gas processing hubs, 
with presence of multinational and high profile national companies, Balikpapan has 
had more advanced ICT access than most other Indonesian cities. The Kalimantan-
wide regional division of PT. Telkom (the state-owned telecommunications 
company) is headquartered in Balikpapan.  
Currently Telkom is working together with the Balikpapan city government 
to develop Balikpapan into a ‘cyber city’ by installing 1,000 WiFi.id hot spots 
throughout the city (Susanto 2014). These are installed in public spaces such as 
parks, schools, universities, government offices, banks, restaurants, and even 
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religious facilities. The city government, simultaneously, is preparing its ‘smart city 
blueprint’. 
Aside from ICT access, Balikpapan has been for many decades the regional 
home of national media groups, where local newspapers, radio stations, and TV 
stations flourish.  Two of the largest newspapers covering East Kalimantan are 
Kaltim Post and Tribun Kaltim (part of the nationwide Jawa Pos and Kompas-
Gramedia groups, respectively). The media plays an important role in Balikpapan’s 
development and political issues, with various city stakeholders actively using the 
media to advance their interests. Much of political debate and agenda-setting also 
take place in the media, and this has been claimed as one of the reasons why street 
demonstrations are a rare event in Balikpapan.123  
Negotiation Cost 
Relationship with city council 
For the most part in Balikpapan’s recent history, there had been no major 
political issue in the relationship between executive and legislative. Part of the 
reason was because Balikpapan mayors have risen to power largely due to their 
personal characters and achievements, and not so much due to the support of 
political parties. Therefore, once the mayor is in power and faces the city council in 
seeking support for policies and budget, political parties do not matter that much. 
At the latest mayoral election of 2011, Rizal and Heru’s candidacy were 
supported by a coalition of seven political parties: Golkar, PDIP, Demokrat, Gerindra, 
PKB, PAN and PBB (Abdi 2011). At the time, 26 out of 45 city councilors were from 
these seven parties. In the current legislative term, there were even more councilors 
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who are politically aligned with Rizal and Heru’s supporters: 29 out of 45 councilors 
(almost two-thirds) are from Golkar, PDIP, Demokrat, and Gerindra. 
Imdaad acknowledged that political parties did not play a significant role in 
determining approval or rejection of his policies by the city council. What mattered 
more were the individual councilors and their personal political ambitions, 
regardless of their party. Convincing the councilors was sometimes difficult and 
Imdaad admitted that he had to manage the issues sensitively. There had been 
several cases where the city council, driven by certain individuals, did not approve 
budget requests from the mayor. For example, in 2013 the city council rejected the 
mayor’s requested international travel budget (RSH and FAR 2013).   
A past city councilor acknowledged that currently times have changed and 
political rivalry in the city council has been more intense. He attributed this to the 
overall condition in Indonesia, where political rivalries are increasing, especially in 
the capital. He also explained that Balikpapan’s past leaders were so respected such 
that they could prevent political frictions from taking place in the city council. 
Currently, however, political tensions between the executive and legislative, as well 
as within the city council, are increasingly taking place.124 
Relationship with citizens groups 
In general there has been a willingness of Balikpapan mayors to consider 
inputs from NGOs and civil society groups.125 For example, each week on Monday at 
8-11am, Imdaad would conduct a ‘coffee morning’ session. Within a month, there 
would be at least four chances for the mayor to meet with different interest groups: 
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the department heads, the kecamatan and kelurahan chiefs, and the chamber of 
commerce.  
Businesses are among the most vocal and demanding groups in the city. 126 
Imdaad used to have very open and cordial working relationship with the chamber 
of commerce. During these coffee morning sessions, issues would be discussed 
freely. Often solutions would be decided on the spot. Sometimes the discussions 
would get heated up to a point where Imdaad would be blamed and told to step 
down. However, he handled it calmly and said that enduring critiques are part of 
being a leader. 
Balikpapan also has strong people’s organizations. The city has registered 
106 community associations, most of which were ethnic-group related (reflecting 
the diversity of the residents’ regional origins). At the city level, these associations 
form a collective ‘communication forum’ (Forum Paguyuban Kota Balikpapan). 
During the time of Imdaad and previous mayors, every month the mayor would host 
a dinner for the forum and chat with various ethnic leaders.  
These regular, cordial communications, Imdaad argued, was how he could 
maintain peace and defuse possible tensions before they could happen. It was also a 
medium for the mayor to present a message that he wanted to disseminate to 
different groups in Balikpapan as he knew these messages would be retransmitted 
by the groups’ chiefs to their members during their respective meetings. 
Healthy leadership rivalry 
Balikpapan has not experienced major political rivalry. In the latest 2011 
mayoral election, Rizal and Heru competed with three other pairs and won 60% of 
                                                          
126 Interview with Slamet Brotosiswoyo and Herry Johanes, 2014 
194 
 
the votes; meanwhile, their closest rivals obtained 31% (Soebijoto 2011). At the time 
of the election, Rizal and Heru held prominent public positions (city vice mayor and 
regional secretary), and were supported by seven large political parties. 
Previously in the 2006 mayoral election (the first direct election in 
Balikpapan), Imdaad and Rizal also won by securing 56% of the votes. At the time, 
they were backed by PDIP, PKB and three smaller political parties and competed 
against two other pairs. One pair was led by Mr. Mukmin Faisyal, who was Imdaad’s 
vice mayor during 2001-2006. In 2001, the mayor and vice mayor was elected by the 
city council. The Imdaad and Mukmin pair was backed by Tjutjup, the incumbent 
mayor at the time, in his effort to ensure continuity of leadership. Tjutjup has 
continued to support Imdaad-Rizal in 2006 and Rizal-Heru in 2011.  
Enforcement Cost 
Capable civil servants  
Generally, Balikpapan’s mayors, heads of departments, city councilors, 
business representatives, and NGO activists agreed that the city government has 
conducted a good job of managing the city. They also believed that good norms and 
values have been established among the city’s employees. For example, city 
government leaders were generally quite modest (they do not ride around in fancy 
cars, unlike in other cities), and even the mayor’s official residence was just an old 
Dutch building (which was only renovated in 2012). Tjutjup used to be very polite 
and modest on the road, always telling his driver to stop and allow pedestrians to 
cross, and let other cars take over if necessary.  
Much of these qualities have been adopted by the city government staffs, 
who were generally very responsive. The award-winning community-based 
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relocation of slum settlement (Margasari village-on-water) was initiated by the local 
village head (lurah), and supported by the mayor. Even presentations to the central 
government in Jakarta, as well as lobbying for funding support, was initially done by 
the village head and local staff.127 These highlight the high level of initiative found 
among city government officials. 
Capacity building activities 
Balikpapan leaders believe in building staff capacity through trainings, but 
more importantly through interactions and direct modeling of behavior, as done by 
mayors such as Yoes, Tjutjup, and Imdaad. The discipline of military leaders was 
engrained through constant interaction, learning by example, and sanctions from 
the mayors.128 The weekly “coffee morning” meeting with mayor was several times 
cited as one of the important occasions where the mayor would show his staff how 
to lead meetings, handle issues, and agree on solutions. The presence of the 
regional armed forces in the city, with the mayor often a part of the armed forces’ 
leadership, helped to instill a sense of discipline.  
Current Balikpapan’s leaders consistently tried to continue good habits, 
programs, and policies of past mayors. Messages about discipline, service and care 
for the environment are constantly repeated in various meetings with different 
interest groups. 
Incentives and disincentives 
In line with principles commonly held by military leaders, incentives and 
disincentives were an integral part of how Balikpapan mayors managed their staff. 
Regulations about these are stipulated in the mayor’s decree that is still in effect 
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until now. For example, tardiness or absence could lead to a 12% pay cut. This 
applies from the lowest level staff to heads of departments.  
As for incentives, Balikpapan has not started to use monetary incentives. 
Among the mid-level officials, those who display positive traits are typically 
rewarded with travels to attend events or to conduct comparative surveys in other 
cities abroad. Singapore is one of the popular destinations of choice. For the higher 
level officials, aside from rewards in the form of paid travels, Balikpapan also 
implements a system of ranking where those who were able to reach certain 
rankings would be offered higher level positions. Similarly, those who already held 
higher-level positions, but were not able to maintain a high ranking, would see those 
positions handed over to someone else.  
Summary  
The following table summarizes the presence or absence of factors related 
to leadership, society, and transaction costs of conducting public innovations in 
Balikpapan.  
Table 20: Case Summary:  







A2. Leader’s charisma A3. Leader’s experience 
YES: Mayors typically 
worked hard, are 
disciplined, and humble. 
Tjutjup’s strong 
commitment to parks 
gained him the moniker 
“park-obsessed”. 
YES: Mayors ensured 
staff conducted their 
jobs well by strong 
motivational skills 
coupled with direct 
modelling of good 
behavior.  
YES: Balikpapan’s mayors 
had varied background. 
Yoes and Tjutjup were 
from the military. Rizal 
was a journalist. Imdaad’s 
background was public 
administration.  




B1. Favorable history  B2. Progressive local 
organizations 
B3. Good local norms 
YES: Natural resources 
did not turn Balikpapan 
YES: Balikpapan’s 
migrants contributed to 
YES: Disciplined 
behaviour and good work 
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not into an extraction 
area, but a 
manufacturing area that 
attracts skilled migrants. 
a vibrant civil society. 
NGOs, associations, and 
business chambers keep 
the government on their 
toes. 
ethic permeates from 
manufacturing industries 
and military-trained 
mayors to the general 
population.  








C1.3. Access to ICT  
YES: Balikpapan’s 
leaders were familiar 
with many cities, but 
model their city 
primarily after Singapore 
for emphasis on human 
development and 
environment protection. 
YES: Balikpapan mayors 
were active in national 
and international city 
networks, and had good 
access to national-level 
officials who visit the 
province. 
YES: The city hosts PT. 
Telkom’s regional 
headquarters for the 
whole of Kalimantan, as 
well as a thriving national 




C2.1. Supportive city 
council 
C2.2. Supportive citizens 
groups 
C2.3. Healthy leadership 
rivalry  
NOT ALWAYS: Mayor 
was typically detached 
from political parties. 
While there were no 
major issues, the 
relationship was not 
consistently 
harmonious. 
YES: The city 
government has been 
responsive to NGOs, 
people’s organizations, 
and business groups. 
Good relationship has 
been built and kept 
through regular 
meetings.  
YES: Mayors have won 
elections by large margin. 
There have been no 
major political challenges 




C3.1. Capable civil 
servants 
C3.2. Capacity building 
activities 
C3.3. Incentives & 
disincentives 
YES: City government 
officials were judged to 
be capable, responsive, 
and held relatively good 
norms.  
YES: Capacity building 
was conducted through 
formal trainings, on-the-
job trainings, and direct 
modelling by leaders.  
YES: Disciplinary issues 
could lead to pay cut. 
Performance is rewarded 
by travels and 
promotions, while non-
performance sanctioned 
by loss of position. 






3. Samarinda City (typical case) 
a. City Profile and Innovations 
Samarinda is the capital of East Kalimantan province. It lies on low, flat land 
along the mighty Mahakam River, about 20 kilometers before the 980 kilometer long 
river reaches its delta and flows into the Makassar Strait. The administrative area of 
the city is quite large, measuring 718 square kilometers, divided into 10 kecamatan 
and 53 kelurahan. The city of Balikpapan (currently where the main airport is 
located) is only about 100 kilometers to the south of Samarinda, and could be 
reached by about two hours-drive. 
In 2010, Samarinda had a population of 727,500, which was equivalent to 
about one-fifths of the province’s population. The city’s population grew by an 
average annual growth rate of 7.5% in 1971-1980, 4.5% in 1980-1990, 2.4% in 1990-
2000, and 3.4% in 2000-2010. Although population growth is no longer as high as it 
was several decades ago, 3.4% per year is still very considerable.  
Samarinda is rich in natural resources; it produced 760,467 tons of natural 
gas in 2009, and 4,397,739 tons of coal in 2008.129 However, the Kutai Kartanegara 
regency that geographically envelops Samarinda is much richer. Natural resource 
extraction areas such as the Sanga-Sanga block (operated by VICO) and the Offshore 
Mahakam block (operated jointly by Total E&P and INPEX) are some of the country’s 
largest sources of oil and gas. Part of the revenue from production is shared back by 
the national government to the province, city, and regency, making East Kalimantan, 
Kutai Kartanegara, and Samarinda City among the richest regional governments in 
Indonesia.  
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The large amount of money circulating in Samarinda helped establish it as a 
center of trade and services of the region. In 2013, the tertiary sector made up 
71.5% of the city’s GRDP, where the largest sub-sector was trade, hotels, and 
restaurants (38.2%). Mining and quarrying used to make up 20.9% of the GRDP in 
2011, but with the drop in commodity prices, the percentage has dropped to 12% in 
2013. Only about 4.6% of the population lived below the poverty line in 2013. 130  
Innovations 
Samarinda city government has received some recognition from the central 
government, such as Top-10 cities for local government implementation reporting in 
2013 (HMS2 and WAZ 2015), traffic management award in 2013 and 2014 (Jalil 
2013), and healthy city award in 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013 (Amirullah 2011). These 
awards, however, were not necessarily for innovations, but more on compliance 
with central government standards and regulations.  
When asked specifically about the city’s innovative programs, current mayor 
Mr. Syaharie Jaang explained about how his government has built many parks 
throughout the city to increase the size of green open space. Jaang also considered 
himself innovative in how he communicates with his staff, and that he would 
sometimes conduct coordination meetings on site when he was inspecting various 
projects.  
Samarinda regional secretary, Mr. Zulfakar Noor, explained that one of 
Samarinda’s innovations was paving the streets with concrete instead of asphalt, 
because concrete could better withstand the damage caused by floods. As of 
November 2014, almost all (85%) of the city streets, including small neighborhood 
lanes, have been paved with concrete. The city is also conducting physical 
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improvements of kampongs that specialize in traditional weaving. Other programs 
which he thought were innovative included bottom-up planning and budgeting 
(musrenbang) and implementation of performance targets for civil servants (sasaran 
kinerja pegawai). These were more ‘top-down innovations’ based on directives from 
the central government. 
Civil society groups, such as JATAM (Mining Advocacy Network) and Pokja 
30, however, did not agree that Samarinda City has an innovative public sector. They 
claimed that the city’s program to build parks throughout the city was a recent 
attempt to improve the mayor’s public image, driven by court decision that 
instructed the city government to improve the quality of natural environment which 
have been damaged by coal mines. Other than that, they claimed that the mayor has 
merely been following policies and implementing programs of the province and 
central government. 
b. Society and Leadership 
Society 
The 920 kilometer-long Mahakam River has played an important role in the 
political, economic, and social history of the region. For many centuries, the 
Mahakam was controlled by the Kutai Sultanate, which acted as intermediary in the 
trade between modern goods (i.e., tools and clothes) brought by Buginese and 
Chinese seafarers with forest products (i.e., rattan and resin) brought by the inland 
Dayaks. Samarinda started as an area granted by the sultan for Buginese settlement, 
and then grew to be a trading post for the region (Magenda 1991).  
The Kutai Sultanate made deals with the Dutch that gave the latter 
concessions (i.e., trade monopolies, plantations, and explorations of coal and oil) in 
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return for royalties and protection (Magenda 1991). A portion of the city was 
granted to the Dutch as the seat of their Eastern Kalimantan residency. It was from 
Samarinda that the Dutch oversaw various logging, coal-mining, oil & gas-drilling and 
other activities around the resource-rich region, and shared a portion of the revenue 
with the Sultan.  
Samarinda continued to grow as the trade and service hub for natural 
resource extraction activities happening in surrounding areas. Due to the large size 
of general trade and services sub-sector, the city has been easier for low-skilled 
workers to survive in (Magenda 1991). It has therefore tended to attract the less-
skilled and lower-educated migrants. After decentralization, Samarinda experienced 
fast growth, both in terms of economy and population. The city has been struggling 
to keep up with this growth and faces mounting challenges in the form of flooding, 
pollution, and traffic congestion.  
Many attributed Samarinda’s flooding and pollution to the coal mining 
frenzy that took place between 2003 and 2013.131 When decentralization provided 
mayors and regents with the authority to issue coal mining permits, Samarinda’s 
leaders did not hesitate. Between 2003 and 2009, the mayor issued as many as 65 
mining permits covering 71% of the city’s land area. Negative impacts from these 
activities triggered a citizens’ class action lawsuit in 2013 against the mayor and 
other public agencies, in which defendants were eventually deemed guilty of 
neglecting environmental responsibilities. However, despite the relative success of 
the class action lawsuit, Samarinda’s NGO activists claimed that the city had 
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relatively weak civil society organizations, and NGO activists tend to lose their 
idealism once appointed to hold public office positions.132 
Leadership 
Not much information was found on Samarinda’s mayors before 2000. Mr. 
Andi Waris Husain was mayor for 10 years (1985-1995); it was during his period that 
the city developed Citra Niaga, an urban redevelopment project that won the 
prestigious Aga Khan Award for Architecture.133 Husain’s successor, Col. Lukman 
Said, was mayor for one period during Samarinda’s transition into the 
decentralization era (1995-2000). His vice mayor, Mr. Achmad Amins, eventually 
became Samarinda’s first mayor of the decentralization era. 
Achmad Amins 
Amins was a local politician who started his political career in local youth 
organizations in the 1960s. By 1993, he became chief of Golkar party’s Samarinda 
branch. As leader of the city’s largest political party, Amins was chosen by the city 
council as mayor in 2000, in partnership with Mr. Syaharie Jaang as his vice mayor. 
He and Jaang stood for re-election in 2005 and kept their positions for five more 
years. Amins was Samarinda’s first mayor during the decentralization era, when the 
authority to issue mining permits was handed to mayors and regents. He issued 
most of the city’s mining permits between 2003 and 2009. In 2014 Amins was 
elected as member of the national legislative (DPR) in Jakarta, representing the 
National Democrat Party. He no longer lived in Samarinda. 
                                                          
132 Interview with Carolus Tuah 2014 




Jaang was Amins’ vice mayor for two periods (2000-2010), and is currently 
mayor of Samarinda (2010-2015). He was trained as a lawyer in a local university, 
and worked in companies based in Samarinda (a developer for five years, two 
mining companies for 10 years). Jaang founded a coal mining company in 1999 and 
remained a shareholder there. His political career started as chief of PDIP party’s 
Samarinda branch in 1998, which brought him to be elected as city councilor in 
1999.  
Many saw Jaang as ‘Amin’s prodigy’134, and that he had learned much from 
his senior in terms of keeping the city’s politicians in harmony. As mayor, Jaang was 
much less aggressive in issuing mining permits. However, civil society groups argued 
that was because Samarinda has run out of land to be apportioned. Jaang was also 
considered ‘unlucky’ because the negative impacts of the 2003-2013 coal mining 
bonanza (flooding, mudslides, pollution, etc.) primarily occurred during his term as 
mayor, not so much during Amins’.  
Samarinda’s leaders have had some issues with corruption at the executive 
and legislative level. In 2010, seven high-level city government officials were 
arrested for mark-up of land acquisition for the national power company’s 
substation (ART and KRI 2010). The city’s leaders have also struggled to secure 
central and province government support, i.e., for development of a new, 
international airport. The airport has been planned since the late 1980s; 
construction has started but completing it in the near future will remain a political 
challenge (RIL, FER, and FAR 2014).  
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c. Transaction Costs 
The following describes the transaction costs faced by various mayors of 
Samarinda in governing the city and introducing public innovations. 
Information Cost 
Travels and familiarity with other cities 
Samarinda’s leaders actively sought models from other cities which they 
could emulate. Cities in Java provided reference for Jaang’s initiatives to develop 
parks and green open spaces (Silaban 2014). Modeled after those in Surabaya, 
Yogyakarta, and Batu, currently Samarinda has developed a Senior Citizens Park, a 
Smart Park, and two Lantern Gardens (YES and NIN 2015).  Inspiration came as Jaang 
visited the earlier cities on business and personal trips.  
Cities from outside of Indonesia also provide inspiration on how the parks 
would take shape. Singapore’s Gardens by the Bay was cited as an inspiration for 
Samarinda’s Vertical Park (900 flower pots on a circular four meter-tall frame) that 
has been built in the median of the city’s main intersection (Pardede 2014). Jaang 
said this would entertain those who are in their cars while waiting for the traffic light 
to turn green.  
Exposure to New York City’s Central Park made Jaang aware that Samarinda 
did not have a substantial green open space. Samarinda is currently developing its 
own open space landmark by converting two of its oldest secondary schools (located 
across each other along the city’s main avenue) as the park (Pardede 2013). In late 
2014, Samarinda was also starting to develop a plan to become a waterfront city, 
based on inspiration from Melaka in Malaysia. The Mahakam River is much bigger 
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than the Melaka River and provides plenty of opportunity to be a core element in 
the city’s urban structure (RIZ and ER 2015). 
Networking opportunities 
Jaang has a close network with 18 other Indonesian mayors and regents 
who spent five weeks together during an executive training program at Harvard 
University in 2012. Admittedly, personal network is an important aspect of how he 
gets new ideas. Typically Jaang hears about promising programs from other cities 
from his personal networks. Afterwards, he would find more information about 
them, either by asking his staff to do more research on those programs, or by 
browsing the web himself. 
Samarinda is involved in inter-city networks. For the current period, Jaang is 
appointed as the chair of the Kalimantan regional chapter of APEKSI (Indonesia’s city 
government association). Samarinda sends top-level officials on trips to other cities 
in Kalimantan, and sometimes would host other mayors when APEKSI’s events are 
conducted in the city.  
The city’s international network, however, is more limited and Samarinda is 
not currently a member of prominent international city association. Networks with 
national and provincial officials are also not as close as the mayors had hoped, as 
shown by Samarinda’s difficulty to complete several large projects which have been 
stalled for many years, such as the second bridge over Mahakam River and the 
Samarinda International Airport.  
Access to ICT 
Being a sizeable capital of a rich province, access to ICT in Samarinda is 
typically not an issue. In 2013, the city hosted six state-owned higher learning 
206 
 
institutions (universities, polytechnics, institutes, and academies) and 23 privately-
owned ones.135 Jaang was well aware of the potential of social media and made 
references to how the city government used Facebook to communicate his policies 
to residents. Latest updates from the Facebook account, however, came in 
December 2013, while the Twitter account’s latest activity was in 2010.  
Currently Samarinda is trying to be a “smart city” (Amirullah 2015).  They 
have an SMS-gateway system and coordination among community leaders and 
department heads are facilitated via a Blackberry Messenger group. Telkom is 
installing 500 WiFi points in Samarinda as part of the collaboration between the 
state-owned telecommunications company with the city’s department of education. 
The WiFi points will be installed in the city departments’ offices, as well as sub-
offices in each kecamatan, schools, and community learning centers (Rochim 2012).  
Negotiation Cost 
Relationship with city council 
Jaang and his vice mayor, Nusyirwan, were elected in 2010 with support of 
five political parties: Demokrat, PKS, PPP, Pelopor, and PBR. At that time, members 
of these parties occupied 18 out of 45 (40%) seats in the Samarinda city council. 
Between 2010 and 2014, Jaang theoretically had large political support that would 
require merely five more votes to make a decision.  
The fact that Jaang’s political coalition did not continue after the election did 
not present much issue. No political coalition in Samarinda has been identified as 
‘opposition’, and the relationship between Samarinda’s executive and legislative 
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branches has been harmonious over the years.136 In recent history there has never 
been any case where a mayor’s proposed program or policy was rejected by the 
council.  
Jaang agreed that the city council has largely been supportive to his 
proposed programs. He attributed this to his communication skills. Jaang would 
inform councilors about his upcoming plans during informal settings, such that the 
councilors were already aware of his ideas before these were formally tabled. He 
would also speak to the media to generate public support. 
Civil society groups such as Pokja 30 and Jatam also agreed that there was a 
harmonious relationship between the city council and the executive. However, they 
attributed this to the mutual personal interests of elected leaders that were 
disruptive to the interests of the people. Many of the city council members were 
individuals with direct or indirect interest in the mining industry. Rather than 
conducting supervision on the executive, legislative members were generally seen as 
part of the city’s ‘problems’.137  
Relationship with citizens groups 
Samarinda has been facing much critique from civil society groups over the 
way the city managed its public affairs. In 2013, a class action lawsuit was filed by 19 
citizens against the Samarinda city mayor and four others for imposing the negative 
impacts of mining activities on residents.138 Such impacts include substantial 
increase in the incidence of flooding, pollution, mudslides, destruction of farming 
                                                          
136 Interview with Sahib Heri Sutomo and Heri Nurdi, 2014 
137 Interview with Kahar Albahri and Carolus Tuah, 2014 
138 The lawsuit was registered in Pengadilan Negeri Samarinda on 25 June 2013 as civil law 
suit number 55/Pdt.G/2013/PN.Smda. The four other defendants, other than the mayor, 
was Samarinda city council, East Kalimantan governor, Indonesia’s minister of energy and 
mineral resources, and Indonesia’s minister of environment. 
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and fishing grounds, as well as death of nine children in un-reclaimed coal mines. 
The mayor was specifically sued for issuing coal mining permits without proper 
environmental impact analyses, requirement to reclaim land after mining activities, 
adequate supervision of mining activities, and by violating the city’s own land use 
plan. The city council was charged with neglect in conducting a supervisory role on 
behalf of the public interest. 
The court in July 2014 granted parts of the lawsuit’s charges and deemed 
the defendants guilty of neglect in creating a good and healthy living environment in 
Samarinda. The defendants were also required to pass a new regulatory framework 
on mining activities that includes stricter supervision and evaluation, and protects 
the people’s farming and fishing grounds from pollution. Other charges, such as 
retracting all mining permits and returning the land as public space, were not 
granted. 
Jaang admitted that it was quite common for him to receive criticism from 
the people, either in print and electronic media, or even directly to his handphone. 
Admittedly, many of these complaints were related to the city’s projects which have 
been stalled for multiple years, such as the second bridge over Mahakam River 
(Mahkota Bridge). He also received criticisms related to traffic congestion and 
flooding in the city, and his newer projects, such as the city parks, have been 
responded with similar skepticism. For example, one of the lantern gardens has 
been closed after several months of operation due to conflict among different 
community groups for the right to collect informal parking fees from visitors (YES 
and NIN 2015). Jaang, however, is confident that he can win the people’s hearts 
once the projects are back on track. He tasked local community officials (lurah and 
camat) as the city’s “mouthpiece” (corong) to explain the benefits of various 
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programs to local residents. This, however, did not seem to reduce the people’s 
resentment.  
Jaang also highlighted how he was able to mobilize private sector support 
for the city through their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs. However, 
business associations are typically not involved in the city’s formal decision-making 
processes, nor were their opinions or feedbacks on certain policies formally sought. 
One of the business associations in the city, APINDO, admitted that they, as an 
organization, have not been invited to any bottom-up planning and budgeting 
meetings (Musrenbang).139  
Healthy leadership rivalry 
There has been no sharp political rivalry in Samarinda’s leadership. So far, 
the city has had two direct mayoral elections. The latest was conducted in 2010, 
when Jaang and Nusyirwan, with the support of five parties, won 47.86 percent of 
the votes, while the runner-ups won 24.11 percent. When Jaang and Nusyirwan won 
in 2010, other pairs congratulated them and there was no challenge to the results.  
Previously in 2005, Amins and Jaang were supported by Golkar and won 
43.77 percent of the votes. The runner-ups were supported by PKS and won 22.34 
percent.  In the case of both elections, incumbents won by a large margin. NGOs saw 
that politicians tend to achieve their objectives in ‘harmonious’ manner, always 
ready to negotiate rather than use force.140 
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Capable civil servants  
Jaang saw that Samarinda City had good quality civil servants. Out of the 
city’s 9,945 civil servants in 2013, over half had a bachelor’s degree. Most of the 
department heads had a master’s degree and some even a Ph.D. This, he 
considered, was better than the quality of human resources in the city’s private 
sector. When he first assumed position as mayor, Jaang conducted a competency 
exam for all his officials and was quite happy with the results. He said that 
individually the staffs were of good quality, and it was up to the city government to 
ensure that they thrive and perform.  
This seems to have been agreed by civil society groups, who did not see any 
particular issue with the technical quality of Samarinda’s civil servants.141 The issue 
that they raised, however, was more about the top leadership and whether 
government staffs were led or motivated enough to ensure satisfactory public 
service. 
Capacity building activities 
Samarinda’s leaders generally make use of the state’s civil service training 
system to build the capacity of their staff. Periodically staff would undergo trainings 
and exams to be certified and get promoted to the next level. Each level would have 
a different training curriculum. Samarinda regional secretary confirmed that the 
central government conducts various training and education programs for local 
government staff. There were also opportunities for field visits, on-the-job trainings, 
and continuing education at the master’s and doctorate level.  
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A rather unique way of capacity building that Jaang conducted was to send 
himself along with his key staff to attend theater training at the Bagong Kussudiardja 
Art House in Yogyakarta. Having participated in theater activities during high school, 
he believed that communications and inter-personal skills (both key aspects of 
public management) are best developed by engaging in role playing.  
One way for Jaang to ensure good implementation of the city’s programs 
was by conducting ‘fluid coordination’ with his staff. He said that he often 
conducted site visits to monitor projects around the city, and sometimes would even 
hold and lead meetings on the spot. These, however, were primarily done on an ad-
hoc basis. Neither Jaang nor the regional secretary answered whether the city 
conducted regular and scheduled meeting among the city’s top executives with their 
staff or other stakeholder groups.  
Incentives and disincentives 
Samarinda implements a scheme called “income improvement benefits” 
(tunjangan perbaikan pendapatan or TPP), wherein civil servants could top-up their 
basic income and benefits by showing good performance. The income improvement 
benefit is calculated largely (75%) based on timely presence in the office and partly 
(25%) based on achievement of their performance targets. Consequence of this 
measurement could lead equally to top-up or pay cuts in their income.  
The proportion of top-up is quite substantial: up to two times the size of 
their monthly salary, depending on rank and level of performance. Still, with this 
top-up, private sector jobs in Samarinda provide significantly higher salary. The city’s 
heads of departments (echelon 2) would receive an overall take home pay similar to 




Asked whether this system has worked well in incentivizing staff 
performance, both the mayor and the regional secretary replied that it was difficult 
to give direct rewards and punishments to government workers, and that they were 
‘still and constantly evaluating the system’. 
Summary  
The following table summarizes the presence or absence of factors related 
to leadership, society, and transaction costs of conducting public innovations in 
Samarinda.  
Table 21: Case Summary:  







A2. Leader’s charisma  A3. Leader’s experience 
NO: Mayors have had 
personal interest in the 
coal mining business. 
Other city officials have 
been arrested for 
corruption cases 
NO: The mayor’s self-
identified ‘innovative’ 
projects fall short of 
their models. Criticisms 
of the city’s leadership 
are easily found. 
YES: Jaang had extensive 
background in private 
companies (albeit local 
ones) before he entered 
politics. 




B1. Favorable history  B2. Progressive local 
organizations 
B3. Good local norms 
NO: The city has been 
the administrative hub 
for extraction of 
resources based on 
rent-seeking and 
feudalistic principles.  
NOT ALWAYS: Citizens 
groups won a class 
action lawsuit against 
city government. But 
NGOs and people’s 
associations remained 
weak and prone to elite 
capture. 
NO: Rent-seeking 
activities and political 
lobbying were common. 
There was lax attitude 
towards work and 
performance targets. 
Society: 0/3 (NO) 
C1. Low 
Information 









YES: Samarinda refers 
to more advanced 
cities in Java in for 
parks development. 
Singapore’s parks also 
used as model. 
NOT ALWAYS: Jaang is 
involved in national 
associations but not so 
much in international 
ones. Relationship with 
national and province 
not very close. 
YES: The city hosts many 
higher learning 
institutions. City officials 
use social media, but 
primarily for election 
purposes. Smart City 





C2.1. Supportive city 
council 
C2.2. Supportive citizens 
groups 




has been harmonious. 
Mayor and many city 
councilors share 
common interest in 
mining industry. 
NO: Critiques from 
citizens are easily found 
in print and social 
media. Citizens’ 
involvement limited as 
participants in planning 
exercises and CSR 
recipients. 
YES: Mayors have won 
elections by large margin. 
Incumbents are typically 
sought by various political 
parties to build coalition. 





C3.1. Capable civil 
servants 
C3.2. Capacity building 
activities 
C3.3. Incentives & 
disincentives 
YES: City government 
officials are individually 
capable, with good 
educational 
qualifications. 
YES: Various trainings 
and continuing 
education for civil 
servants are regularly 
conducted. Unique 
theater (role-playing) 
training for government 
leaders 
YES: Monetary incentives 
in place. Substantial 
income improvement 
benefits are possible due 
availability of city’s 
budget. 





4. Pekalongan City (innovative case) 
a. City Profile and Innovations 
Pekalongan City is a port-town located on the northern coast of Central Java 
Province, about 384 kilometers east of Jakarta and 101 kilometers west of Semarang 
(the province capital). It lies on 42 square kilometers of low, flat land along the busy 
trans-Java highway that connects two of Indonesia’s largest cities: Jakarta on the 
west and Surabaya on the east. 
The 2010 Census recorded the city as having a population of 281,434, which 
is equivalent to about 0.87 percent of Central Java’s. The city’s population grew by 
0.78 percent per annum between 1990 and 2000, and 0.71 percent between 2000 
and 2010. This signals that the Pekalongan’s population has been rather stable for 
more than two decades.  
Most of the city’s regional GDP for 2012 was composed of trade, hotels, and 
restaurants (27.2%) and manufacturing (20.1%).142  Pekalongan brands itself as “the 
world’s city of batik” due to large presence of batik and related industries; a 
substantial portion of the batik circulating in Indonesian markets is produced in 
Pekalongan.143 The city built a Batik Museum in 2006 and in 2014 became the first 
among Southeast Asian cities to join UNESCO’s Creative City Network.  
Together with neighboring cities and regencies, Pekalongan forms a larger 
urban region along Java’s northern coast that hosts nationally-prominent textile and 
garment industries. The city was also a major producer of fish. The Pekalongan fish 
                                                          
142 BPS Kota Pekalongan: Pekalongan dalam Angka 2013 
143 Pekalongan Batik Museum 2006-2007 Annual Report 
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port (PT. Pelabuhan Perikanan Nusantara Pekalongan) used to be the biggest in Java 
in terms of fish production and continues to be among the largest to date.144  
Innovations 
Since mid-2000s, Pekalongan’s public sector has adopted numerous 
breakthrough programs. The city has won 56 awards between 2010 and 2015, many 
of which are related to public management, city branding, healthcare, urban 
planning, and information and communications technology. Some of the awards are 
listed in Table 22.  
Table 22: Awards highlighting Pekalongan City’s innovations 
Year Name of Award & 
Awarded Program 
Description 
2014 IMP Award: Climate Village  Community-based upgrading and management of 
coastal flooding settlements: turning disaster into 
opportunity  
2014 IMP Award: Binatur 
Riverwalk 
Community-based upgrading and management of 
riverbank settlements: re-orienting houses to face 
the river  
2014, 
2012 
IMP Award: Prosperous & 
Healthy Market 
Empowerment of traditional market vendors 
through waste management, cooperatives, and 
community media, supplemented by health 
services. 
2012 IMP Award: Drainage 
system to alleviate coastal 
flooding 
Development of rivetments, polders, mangrove 
parks, and some reclamation of coastal areas to 
alleviate coastal flooding, also used as recreation 
area 
2013 Appropriate Technology 
Expo (Gelar Teknologi 
Tepat Guna) 
First place nationwide for community technology 
service centers (Pos Layanan Teknologi) 
2012, 
2011,  
Indonesia Open Source 
Award 
First place nationwide (local government category) 
for application of FOSS in government 
management information system.  
2012 Indonesia e-Government 
Award 
First place in Central Java province for e-
government applications 
                                                          




2012 Tourism Award (Cipta 
Pesona Wisata) 
Best in cultural tourism destination category, for 
Batik Museum and Kauman Batik Tourism Village 
2011 Indonesia MGDs Award First place nationwide for significant improvement 
in healthcare 
2011 Indonesia Innovation 
Appreciation  
Pekalongan City was recipient of Innovating Region 
Award, and Mayor Basyir was recipient of 
Innovative Leadership Award from the State 
Ministry of Research and Technology  
Source: Pekalongan city government and additional research 
 
For urban planning and management, Pekalongan has won the biannual 
Urban Management Innovation (Inovasi Manajemen Perkotaan or IMP) Award three 
time since 2008. The city has won the award on various categories, including slum 
upgrading, waste management, and traditional market management. Critical to 
winning the award has been the city’s consistent use of three-pronged approach 
(strengthening of community institutions, construction of infrastructure, and 
resource sharing among stakeholders).  
In terms of public management, Pekalongan reduced the number of 
structural positions in the city government to increase efficiency and productivity. 
For example, the mayor combined 15 city departments into nine, and 47 villages 
(kelurahan) into 27. He also reduced the number of school principals by half, such 
that each principal oversees two schools instead of one. In similar fashion, the city’s 
14 primary health care facilities (Puskesmas) have been grouped together under one 
management, led by a single director and reporting to the city’s health department. 
This strategy facilitates coordination and reduces structural costs, and allows the 
unit to manage manpower according to need. Within one year after the Puskesmas 
BLUD was established, revenue from the unit has risen from Rp 3.5 billion in 2013 to 
Rp 10.5 billion in 2014. 
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In terms of ICT, Pekalongan in 2008 started a migration to free and open 
source software (FOSS). The savings from using FOSS has helped expand ICT 
infrastructure such that currently all city government offices, down to the sub-
district (kecamatan) and village (kelurahan) offices, have been linked in a Local Area 
Network. As of late 2014, 50% of local community halls have been provided with 
internet access. Various management information systems are in place to enable 
government offices to share and exchange data. The paperless e-office application, 
for example, allows city officers to give instructions to their subordinates and track 
them until completion. 
b. Society and Leadership  
Society 
Pekalongan is unique compared to other Javanese cities because of its 
strong coastal (pesisir) character. For many centuries, the city has relied on fisheries, 
trade, and manufacturing (as opposed to agriculture) as its main sources of 
livelihood (Hidayat 2003). People from various ethnic backgrounds have come and 
settled in Pekalongan for many centuries, with some of the more prominent ones 
being Arabs and Chinese, alongside the local Javanese.  
Pekalongan is located quite far from the centers of old Javanese kingdoms, 
and is not heavily influenced by classic, hierarchical Javanese customs. Instead, 
Pekalongan people tend to be much more egalitarian.  The multi-ethnic composition 
of Pekalongan’s society has contributed to making the city more open to ideas and 
concepts which are non-native. For example, unlike Surakarta or Yogyakarta, 
Pekalongan does not have a set style of classical batik motives which are rooted in 
royal traditions. Instead, Pekalongan batik is always contemporary: combining 
Javanese lexicons with those of Chinese (“batik encim”), European (“batik buketan”), 
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Arabic (“batik jlamprang”) and others through the creativity of the designers. Thus, 
batik in Pekalongan is beyond arts and crafts, but a creative industry.145 
Despite having a multi-ethnic society, Islam remains the predominant 
religion in the city. Pekalongan is also known as a city of santri (religious scholars). 
Islamic mass organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah have 
played a big role in the city for many decades, not just in religious matters but also in 
education, community development, business, and social services.146  
Most of the economy in the city is generated by micro and small businesses. 
The largest savings and loans cooperative in Indonesia is Pekalongan-based Kospin 
Jasa. With assets of Rp 2.8 trillion in 2012, it trumps the second largest cooperative, 
Gresik-based KSW, with Rp 529 billion worth of assets in 2012 (Hakim and 
Yogiantoro 2014). The business-oriented nature of Pekalongan’s residents has 
placed entrepreneurship in high esteem, and having one’s own business (like 
Prophet Muhammad) was seen with more prestige than becoming a civil servant.147  
Pekalongan people have been known to be critical, especially towards the 
government. During the New Order era (1971-1997), Pekalongan was one of the few 
cities where Golkar (Suharto’s political vehicle) did not win the elections (Hidayat 
2003).  Instead, many Pekalongan residents affiliated themselves with the PPP party. 
Generally, people tend to speak openly in debates and do not shy away from 
demonstrations. 
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Pekalongan’s public innovativeness is a relatively new phenomenon that 
started in the mid-2000s and commonly attributed to the leadership of dr. 
Muhammad Basyir Ahmad Swawie (Basyir). In 2014 Basyir was serving his second 
and last term as city mayor, a position that he has held since 2005. Before, he was a 
city councilor from Golkar Party (1999-2004 and 2004-2009), but resigned to run as 
mayor in 2005. Basyir is a medical doctor by profession and still conducts private 
practice out of his home once a week.  
Basyir was born into a family of successful Arab-Indonesian entrepreneurs. 
He is known for outstanding communication, networking, and coalition-building 
skills, as well as risk-taking and hard-working attitude. He speaks on the local radio 
every week, and frequently visits local organizations and national-level ministries. 
His vice mayor in 2010-2015 was Mr. Alf Arslan (Alex) Djunaid, Deputy Secretary 
General of Kospin Jasa, Indonesia’s largest cooperative based in Pekalongan. 
Previously in 2005-2010, Basyir’s vice mayor was Mr. Abu Almafakhir from the PKB 
party.  
Before Basyir’s term, Pekalongan City was led by Drs. Samsudiat, MM, who 
served one term as mayor before Indonesia’s reform (1994-1999), and was re-
elected by the city council (1999-2004). He won some awards for the development 
of cooperatives and improvement of low income settlements, but was not 
particularly seen as an innovative leader. Some people saw that he ran the 
government in ‘business as usual’ manner.148  
There were no prominent political ‘clans’ in Pekalongan. If any, Basyir’s 
family may be the most politically-charged. His wife, Ms. Balqis Diab, owns a batik 
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company and is also a politician and chair of Golkar Party in Pekalongan. She is 
currently serving her second term as a city councilor, and has been elected as 
speaker of the council.  
c. Transaction Costs 
The following describes the transaction costs faced by the mayor of 
Pekalongan in governing the city and introducing public innovations. 
Information Cost 
Travels and familiarity with other cities 
Basyir admitted to have identified some cities in Indonesia as “sources of 
learning” for Pekalongan. Tips about outstanding programs in other cities were 
obtained through media reports as well as conversations with national and 
provincial government leaders. For example, upon his inauguration as mayor, the 
governor immediately suggested Basyir to learn from Sragen Regency, also in 
Central Java, which was known for its one-stop-service, with emphasis on effective 
use of ICT. Basyir also took his staff to learn from Jembrana Regency in Bali about 
using ICT to improve public services, as well as Cimahi City in West Java about 
expanding ICT access to support creative industries. Pekalongan is currently learning 
from Bandung City in West Java about expanding ICT access to mosques.  
Under Basyir’s leadership, Pekalongan has adopted an acronym of ATM 
(short for amati, tiru, modifikasi, or “observe, replicate, modify”) to promote a 
conscious approach of learning from other cities. He and his key staff had various 
opportunities to also learn from cities in other countries. From Indian cities, they 
learned about community-based efforts to improve the housing and healthcare. 
From Korean cities, they learned about integrated ICT services and e-government. In 
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Europe, Basyir and team learned about the Dutch method of coastal management 
and German method of waste management. 
Networking opportunities 
Another source of inspiration for Pekalongan’s innovativeness was Basyir’s 
personal networking efforts with various central government research agencies. 
Basyir made a conscious effort to network with the Ministry of Research and 
Technology, and encouraged his heads of departments to link with research 
institutes housed within their respective line ministries. As a result, Pekalongan 
officials were much updated about the latest trends in national-level policies and 
pilot projects that the central government was conducting. Basyir would offer 
Pekalongan as “laboratory” for the central government’s new programs or policies, 
and commit the city’s budget as share of the piloting cost. 
Basyir was often invited to present at events organized by central 
government ministries. Here he had a chance to hear similarly inspiring 
presentations by other mayors or by central government officials. Pekalongan also 
participates in Indonesia’s city government association (APEKSI). 
Basyir also understood that the diversity and dynamism of Pekalongan 
people was a potential to trigger innovation. Each city department was encouraged 
to develop an “ABCG network” (local development councils) consisting of academics, 
businesses, community groups, and government, in almost all sectors. For example, 
the ICT department hosts the ‘ICT council’ which includes ICT and media-related 
academics, businesses, community/activists, and reporters. Pekalongan had signed 
many MoU’s with rectors or directors of higher education institutions.  
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Access to ICT 
Basyir was not a smart-phone carrying, IT-savvy person. This, however, does 
not reduce his understanding, attention, and commitment to ICT. Since 2007, 
Pekalongan has celebrated the national Technology Awareness Day (Hari 
Kebangkitan Teknologi) – otherwise forgotten or uncelebrated in many other cities – 
through high profile events. Community-level innovations were showcased in these 
events and documented in a database of local innovations.149  
Currently all city government departments and offices have been connected 
through a Local Area Network. Access to ICT for community members were 
facilitated through “technology service posts” (Pos Pelayanan Teknologi or 
Posyantek) at the kecamatan level, and “technology cafes” (Warung Teknologi or 
Wartek) at the kelurahan level.  At the community (Rukun Warga or RW) level, 
“telecenters” have been established to help the people learn about ICT. As of late 
2014, more than half of the city’s RW halls have been provided with access points.150  
Negotiation Cost 
Relationship with city council 
The relationship between the executive and legislative in Pekalongan has 
been harmonious, and there has been no major problem for the council to issue 
ordinances that provide the legal foundations for Pekalongan’s innovations. Basyir 
saw the city council as “understanding and responsive”, and he believed this is 
attributable to his long and credible track record in politics and in leading the public 
sector. The relatively high turnover of city councilors across the three periods also 
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provides Basyir with political seniority. Currently in the city council, there were only 
three people who have been a city councilor for the past three periods. 
The number of votes garnered by members of his political party, Golkar, in 
the city council has been increasing. Out of the 30 available council seats, Golkar 
only had three seats in 1999-2004, but increased to five in 2004-2009, and now nine 
in 2014-2019. Golkar thus only needed to win six more votes in order to issue an 
ordinance. But even when Golkar was relatively less represented in 2004-2009, it did 
not present major issues. Upon his election as mayor in 2005, Basyir lobbied PDIP (7 
chairs) and PPP (8 chairs) to form a coalition with Golkar. This enabled the coalition 
to hold two thirds of the voting power in the council. Similar coalitions were offered 
in 2009 and 2014, and various parties again sided with Golkar to form the ruling 
coalition.  
Relationship with citizens groups 
Basyir understood very well that Pekalongan is a religious city and that many 
are concerned about religious education and the need to uphold moral values. 
Although he was not from the Islamic PPP party, Basyir was Islamic enough to act 
and speak like them. He introduced Islamic education in Pekalongan’s public 
education, where more Islamic teachers were hired, and Muslim students were 
obliged to take Quran recital sessions. He said, ‘Even when PPP won in previous 
terms, they never did anything like this’. He also attended religious events, became 
close with the religious leaders of Pekalongan, and convinced them that he was part 
of their mission. Once he obtained their trust, Basyir was able to lead the city largely 
free from political hurdles and politically-charged demonstrations that were 
previously common in Pekalongan. Basyir also committed himself to constant 
interaction with the people. Every Monday and Thursday, whenever he was in town, 
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he would participate in a radio talk show called “The Mayor Answers Your 
Questions”.  
Basyir built harmonious relationship with grass root communities by 
delivering block grants to the community level. Adding the city’s budget into the 
mix, Pekalongan expanded the National Community Empowerment Program (PNPM) 
to cover all 47 kelurahan in the city. This enabled community groups to organize 
themselves with facilitation from NGOs and learn to be involved in local political 
issues.151  
Healthy leadership rivalry 
Pekalongan has not experienced bitter political rivalry. If any rivalry were to 
occur, it would be between the Islamist political factions (i.e., PPP and PKB parties) 
and the nationalist factions (i.e., Golkar and PDIP parties). Basyir, however, 
transcended these political lines. He was from Golkar but also known to be religious 
and bonds well with religious leaders who side with PPP and PKB.  
At the 2005 elections, Basyir was paired with Mr. Abu Almafakhir, a 
grassroots leader affiliated with the PKB party. The pair won 43.4% of the votes; the 
runner up, supported by PPP party, won 22.2%. The Basyir-Abu pairing, however, 
was largely political. Abu did not feature much in Pekalongan’s governing matters 
and he ran as Basyir’s contender in the subsequent 2010 elections. 
In 2010, Basyir paired with Alex Djunaid from Kospin Jasa, and were 
supported by Golkar. Meanwhile, Abu and his vice mayor candidate, were supported 
by a coalition of seven parties. The political composition of Pekalongan’s 2010 
election seems to show that Basyir was the odd character that posed a threat to the 
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existing political establishments of the city. However, Basyir’s strong figure still won 
against a large coalition of political elites. The result: Basyir-Alex won 53% of the 
votes, while Abu-Masrof won 40.8%. 
The losing sides for the most part did not post major challenges to Basyir’s 
administration, but they were more interested in building their strengths for the 
upcoming 2015 elections. Like Abu before him, Alex as vice mayor did not feature 
prominently in Pekalongan’s governing matters. Alex was touted to run as 
Pekalongan Mayor for the upcoming 2015-2020 term under the banner of PDIP 
Party (Aji 2015).  
Enforcement Cost 
Capable civil servants  
Basyir acknowledged that at the beginning of his first term, Pekalongan had 
a paradox of too many public servants but also too few public servants. “Too many” 
because there appears to be many people floating around, but “too few” because 
out of those people, not all were utilized to their greatest potential. When Basyir 
first took over as mayor, civil servants in Pekalongan City largely had low capacity 
and a lax mindset. 
Currently, however, the capability and service orientation of Pekalongan civil 
servants have much improved, and staffs were generally responsive.152 This was 
partially achieved through proper recruitment processes over the past 10 years, 
identification of the right people to hold appropriate positions, and constant 
demands from and interactions with Basyir. This was confirmed by the researcher’s 
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fieldwork experience in Pekalongan, as well as discussions with central government 
officials who had worked with Pekalongan government on a joint project.  
Capacity building activities 
At the beginning, Basyir sent officials and staffs to attend a number of 
trainings, including the Emotional and Spiritual Quotient training and trainings in 
service excellence (Pelayanan Prima). Up to 4,700 civil servants attended these in 
batches. Staffs agreed that such trainings and managed to build motivation and 
establish a common understanding between Basyir and the civil servants in terms of 
how to deliver public service. Each city department was then tasked to issue 
“excellent services” according to their sector.  
The trainings also enabled Basyir to identify talents for a new generation of 
public leaders in Pekalongan. He asked each city department to send their best staff 
to attend the trainings, regardless of their age or rank. This enabled the rise of high 
quality second- and third-in-line department leaders. Slowly Basyir would give them 
special tasks, and made sure they were given the opportunity to handle increasingly 
larger responsibilities. By now the new generation of department leaders was 
already accustomed to Basyir’s fast-moving style.153  
Incentives and disincentives 
So far, Pekalongan was able to achieve a relatively high success rate of 
implementation without specifically monetary incentives. A ‘workload benefit’ 
scheme applied, but the amount of bonus was miniscule (about Rp 250,000 every 
three months) and it was given to all staff.  
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Many of Pekalongan’s key officials and staff have been quite proud of their 
achievement, that they could do things they didn’t think they could do, due to 
Basyir’s push. They were happy with the morale appreciation from the mayor and 
the fact that they were often visited by other city officials keen on learning from 
their experience.154 
Some key staffs looked forward to the new regulation on remuneration-
related incentives as result of good performance. However, this requires substantial 
effort geared toward reviewing staff’s performance. As of now, many of 
Pekalongan’s department heads admitted that they were overloaded in their jobs, 
and they had no time to properly review the performance of their staff. 
Summary  
The following table summarizes the presence or absence of factors related 
to leadership, society, and transaction costs of conducting public innovations in 
Pekalongan.  
Table 23: Case Summary:  








A2. Leader’s charisma A3. Leader’s experience 
YES: Mayor worked 
hard, had integrity, and 
was easily accessible. 
YES: Mayor was able to 
get people to do tasks 
through intensive 
communication, 
motivational skills, and 
making sure he had the 
right people for the job. 
YES: Mayor has 
background in medical 
field, business, and 
politics. He has private 
practice and his family 
owns a Batik company. 
Leadership: 3/3 (YES) 
B. 
Progressive 
B1. Favorable history  B2. Progressive local 
organizations 
B3. Good local norms 
                                                          





YES: Pekalongan has 
been a multi-ethnic 
trading and 
manufacturing hub. It 
has had a history of 
being an opposition 
base and 
entrepreneurial city. 
YES: The city hosts many 
religious, political, and 
interest-based 
organizations. It is home 
to Indonesia’s largest 




character of the society, 
always looking for new 
ideas. Religious morality 
is upheld consistently. 









C1.3. Access to ICT  
YES: Pekalongan 
actively learns from 
other cities & created 
the ATM acronym for 
“observe, replicate, 
modify” 
YES: Pekalongan links 
with national-level 
agencies, and actively 





YES: Mayor puts high 
priority on development 
of ICT access and 
applications. He does 
not use ICT intensively, 





C2.1. Supportive city 
council 
C2.2. Supportive citizens 
groups 
C2.3. Healthy leadership 
rivalry  
YES: Mayor’s party has 
the most seats in city 
council, and he actively 
builds coalitions with 
other parties. 
YES: Mayor actively built 
support from citizens 
groups, i.e.  By delivering 
block grants to villages, 
engaging in radio talk 
shows, and weekly visits 
to different 
communities. 




However, there was no 
bitter political rivalry. 
Basyir was allowed to 






C3.1. Capable civil 
servants 
C3.2. Capacity building 
activities 
C3.3. Incentives & 
disincentives 
YES (not initially): 
Pekalongan 
government officials 
are motivated and 
accustomed to the high 
demands of Basyir. 
YES: Various trainings to 
build motivation and 
leadership, as well as 
service excellence.   
NOT ALWAYS: The city 
did not use monetary 
incentives and 
disincentives. 
Performance is driven 
by motivation and 
rewarded with praise 
and trust.  




5. Tanjungpinang City (typical case) 
a. City Profile and Innovations 
Tanjungpinang City is located on Bintan Island, in the province of Riau 
Islands. It is about 70 kilometers southeast of Singapore and can be reached from 
the city-state by a two-hour ferry ride. Tanjungpinang used to be a sub-district 
(kecamatan) within the Riau Islands Regency (kabupaten). It had been an urban area 
for centuries, but its status was only elevated as ‘administrative city’ in 1996 and 
further elevated to ‘autonomous city’ in 1999, after decentralization. Riau Islands 
Regency eventually broke off from Riau Province in 2002,155 and Tanjungpinang was 
declared as the provincial capital of newly established Riau Islands Province. 
Tanjungpinang had a population of 187,359 in 2010, which is equivalent to 
about 11.2% of the province’s population.156 The city has had fast growth rate: an 
average of 2.74% per annum between 2000 and 2010. Tanjungpinang measures 
about 239.5 square kilometers, is largely covered by hilly terrain, and consists of 
urban and rural areas including several islands such as Penyengat and Dompak. 
The city’s economy - based on its 2011 GDRP - was primarily made up of 
trade, hotels and restaurants (29%) and construction (20.1%). The fastest growing 
sub-sectors between 2010 and 2011 were construction (12.6%), followed by 
financial, real estate and corporate services (8.8%). Most of the city’s workforce 
(79.7%) was in the services sector. Among the recent economic growth engines of 
the city were new construction of provincial and city government offices. 
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Tanjungpinang has not received an award for pubic innovation, but that 
does not mean the city has not introduced new initiatives. Past mayor Dra Hj. 
Suryatati A. Manan (Suryatati) highlighted the development of Tanjungpinang’s 
massive new executive and legislative offices in Senggarang, a relatively 
undeveloped area about 15 kilometers away from the city center.  Construction of 
the new offices started in 2002 and was completed in 2007. With the completion of 
a new road and a series of bridges in 2012, the new offices are now accessible via a 
20-minute car ride from the city center (previously the travel took about 45 
minutes). 
Relocation of city hall was motivated by a drive to spread development 
across the city’s territory and reduce density in the old city center. Since the 
presence of the new city hall, Suryatati claimed that the “urban center-point” of 
Tanjungpinang has shifted outwards to a new commercial precinct called Bintan 
Center, about half-way between the city center and the new city hall. The 
relocation, however, faced much criticism from residents because it increased 
distance between the people and city leaders.  
During Suryatati’s term, Tanjungpinang was identified as a “city of gurindam 
and pantun” (types of Malay poems), and substantial emphasis was placed on 
making the city a center of Malay literary culture. Effort was also geared to revitalize 
historic sites and to support various cultural events. Aside from the annual Gawai 
Seni festival to showcase Malay culture, there were also smaller festivals to 
showcase other ethnicities residing in the city. 
Currently, during the leadership of H. Lis Darmansyah, SH (Lis), some of the 
city’s innovations include renovation of public parks, regulation of on-street parking 
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in the downtown area, and establishment of SMS-based mechanism to register 
citizen’s complaints. The city is also in the process of installing Wi-Fi in public parks 
and bus stations near higher learning institutions.157  
Interviews with city council members, civil society organizations, and 
businessmen, however, found that such innovations were not considered useful or 
substantial enough to generate public value. There was a general perception that 
the city has not been very innovative and that the changes which were introduced 
were miniscule and have not provided much benefit. A former council member 
highlighted how the city council issued new local regulations, such as curfew for 
children above 9 PM and requirement for Muslim children to recite the Quran 
before they could enter primary school. However, the city government ultimately 
had no resource to enforce these regulations.158 
b. Society and Leadership 
Society 
Being the largest island on the busy and narrow Singapore Strait, Bintan had 
been an attractive base for various kingdoms and sultanates. The urban core of 
Tanjungpinang is located on a strategic area of Bintan Island, facing the calm Riau 
Bay, and protected by a smaller island called Penyengat. This area was once the seat 
of Bentan Kingdom (the island’s namesake), before it became part of the Srivijaya 
Kingdom in the early 1300s, the guerilla capital of Malacca Sultanate and seat of 
Johor Sultanate in the 1500s, and was taken over by the Dutch in the 1700s.  
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After the Dutch lost the battle to control Malacca Strait through the Anglo-
Dutch Treaty of 1824, Tanjungpinang became the base from where the colonial 
government administered Riau Islands Regency. However, it was clear that the 
Dutch did not consider Tanjungpinang and the Riau Islands with as much importance 
as they did before. Attention to the region was only re-established later in the 
1970s, after the founding of an industrial zone in Batam and the production of 
natural gas in Natuna Islands. Later in the 1990s a similar industrial zone was 
established in Bintan, and a special economic zone was declared in 2007 covering 
Batam and parts of Bintan and Karimun islands.  
Tanjungpinang was traditionally considered the center of Indonesia’s “Riau 
region”, which covered the country’s areas with predominantly ethnic Malay 
identity. While Malays make up the largest ethnic group (close to 50%), other 
ethnicities such as Chinese (about 25%), Buginese, Minang, Batak, and Javanese 
have sizeable presence. Income is not high, but life is generally easy with no threat 
of natural disaster and peaceful coexistence between the different ethnic groups.  
Tanjungpinang residents typically have an opinion about the way the city is 
run, but they rarely speak out through formal mechanisms. Academics pointed how 
residents would complain in social media, but would hesitate to advocate for it 
through legal means or through street demonstrations. 
Leadership  
Although Tanjungpinang has had a long history as a trading and 
administrative center, it only became a city in 1996 and until today it has only been 
served by two mayors. 
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Suryatati A. Manan 
Formal leadership in Tanjungpinang’s recent history started in 1996, when 
Suryatati was appointed as the first mayor (1996-1999) of the “administrative city” 
of Tanjungpinang.  When the city became an “autonomous city”, she was appointed 
as ad interim mayor (1999-2001) before formally elected by city council as the first 
mayor of Tanjungpinang City (2002-2007). In 2007, she won in the city’s first direct 
election by a huge margin (winning 84% of the votes) and served her second term in 
2007-2012. In total, she served 16 years as Tanjungpinang’s leader. 
Suryatati was a career public servant. After graduating from the Home 
Affairs Academy (Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri), she was hired initially as a 
contract staff, and later worked her way up to become Riau Province’s head of 
economic division (1985-1993), and head (camat) of the West Tanjungpinang 
subdistrict (1993-1995). Suryatati was also known as a poet and sometimes would 
use the pantun to deliver political messages. During both of her tenure as mayor, 
Suryatati was supported by the PDIP party, which held majority seat in the city 
council in 2002. She was not, however, a cadre of the party. 
In 2013 Suryatati and her former vice mayor, Mr. Edward Mushalli, were 
investigated for a possible corruption case involving the leasing and maintenance 
costs of the mayor’s and vice mayor’s official residences (Tribun Batam 2013). 
Afterwards both Suryatati and Mushalli were reported to have returned the money 
to the city government. There has been no update on the case (Ruslan 2013). 
Suryatati was also known to be quite lenient in dealing with her staff, and did not 




H. Lis Darmansyah, SH (Lis) is Tanjungpinang’s second mayor who was 
serving his first term (2012-2017). He was elected in 2012, after defeating – among 
others – Suryatati’s daughter, Ms. Maya Suryanti. Lis is a career politician from the 
PDIP party who served as city councilor between 1999 and 2004, and was elected as 
provincial councilor for 2004-2009 and 2009-2014 (but he resigned to run as 
Tanjungpinang mayor in 2012). During his 1999-2004 tenure in the city council, Lis 
was the council chair. 
Lis was initially educated in tourism and had the experience of working in 
hotels in Dubai, Jakarta, and Batam. He eventually studied law and switched course 
to politics, became the vice chair of PDIP in Tanjungpinang City (2000-2005), and 
secretary of PDIP in Riau Islands Province (2005-2010 and 2010-2015).  
Lis was considered as a relatively young leader and a reformer. He has 
emphasized the need for Tanjungpinang’s civil servants, entrepreneurs, and society 
to be creative and innovative in their work and business (DJO and HM 2014). Many 
of the city’s civil servants were reportedly “uneasy” (resah) when Lis won the 
election in 2012 (Handayani 2012). They foresaw that he would bring in many radical 
changes to the way the city would be run. 
c. Transaction Costs 
The following describes the transaction costs faced by the mayor of 




Travels and familiarity with other cities 
Interview with Suryatati did not identify substantial referencing of other 
cities for Tanjungpinang’s development. Malaysia’s Putrajaya, with its expansive 
“offices in the park” concept away from Kuala Lumpur, was mentioned as a model 
for shifting Tanjungpinang’s capitol. Suryatati also explained that she generated 
ideas largely by communicating with artists in her effort to make Tanjungpinang a 
cultural city.  
Current city secretary, Mr. Riono, who works closely with Lis, was able to 
identify more programs from several Indonesian cities that Tanjungpinang is 
emulating. For example, the inspiration for revitalization of city parks with free WiFi 
connection came from neighboring Batam. Also, Surabaya was cited as an example 
where the city government actively promotes engagement with citizens through ICT. 
However, no international city was cited as model by either leader.  
Networking opportunities 
Tanjungpinang have not participated much in intercity networks. Suryatati 
acknowledged that she attended the Indonesian city government association 
(APEKSI) meetings once a year, but did not play an active role in the organization. 
Tanjungpinang in Suryatati’s period did not rely much on internal networks either. 
The relationship between the mayor and her staff, as portrayed by a former head of 
department and confirmed by senior academics who were often involved in 
government meetings, was mostly top-down in character, with the mayor coming up 
with most of the initiatives and making most of the decisions.159 This condition, they 
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argued, has persisted even currently during Lis’ tenure, despite his calls for more 
creativity from civil servants.  
Lis, too, has not played an active role in APEKSI. It was only in late 2014 that 
Tanjungpinang was selected as one of the locations for GIZ-funded Urban Nexus 
project conducted by ICLEI to encourage sustainable urban management (Syamsir 
2015). In relation to this project, recently Lis has been traveling to Mongolia and the 
Philippines for workshops with city mayors from other countries. 
Being the capital of the newly established Riau Islands Province did not 
increase networking opportunities between city leaders and province leaders as 
both were primarily busy with their own turfs, despite sharing a base in the same 
city. The largest urban hub in the province is not Tanjungpinang, but Batam. When 
the provincial council of Riau Islands was selected as host for UCLG Asia Pacific’s 
meeting of regional councils in 2010, the meeting was conducted in Batam rather 
than Tanjungpinang, as the former was better prepared in terms of infrastructure 
and facilities.  
Access to ICT 
ICT did not play an important role for Suryatati to seek models from other 
cities. She did not use much of the internet and relied mostly on local print and 
electronic media. She did show an interest in e-government and visited Jembrana 
Regency in Bali that was known for their ICT-based innovations and e-government 
initiatives. However, she said that e-government was still a distant goal of the city 
because there were still people in Tanjungpinang who did not even have access to 
electricity.160 
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Lis, in contrast, has been more pro-active in using ICT to for pubic 
management purposes. His campaign in 2012 was supported by the use of social 
media, and he still uses it for political communication and seeking feedback from the 
people. Many of the city’s current programs reflect Lis’ more open approach to ICT. 
Recently city departments have also used their websites and social media more 
actively and in an interactive manner. The city’s small size, however, have prevented 
telecommunications provider from laying out extensive ICT networks and bandwidth 
in the city, and internet connection was generally unsatisfactory. 
Negotiation Cost 
Relationship with city council 
The relationship between Tanjungpinang’s executive and legislative 
branches has mostly been harmonious. When Suryatati was first elected by city 
council members in 2002, she was supported by PDIP party, which at the time held 
10 out of 25 seats in the city council. When she ran for re-election in 2007, she was 
fielded by a coalition of political parties, including PDIP, Golkar, and PKS which 
altogether held the majority seat in the council. For almost two periods, Suryatati 
had a good working relationship with the city council, especially PDIP. Suryatati was 
not a party cadre, but their relationship was mutual: Suryatati benefited from PDIP’s 
political support and PDIP from her popularity and her discretions as mayor.  
Currently in Lis’ tenure as mayor, the relationship is even more harmonious. 
Both Lis and the city council chair are from PDIP. Although not the majority, PDIP 
holds more seats (seven out of 30) than any other political party (runner up is Golkar 
with four seats). During formal ceremonies or events, the mayor typically would be 
seated next to the council chair. Outside of formal events they would also meet to 
discuss party issues.  
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Good relationship is also established between city council members and 
various department heads. The former head of tourism department, for example, 
explained how he would approach the city council chair and heads of various 
factions in advance of formal meetings to explain the importance of his upcoming 
programs, and the amount of budget that was requested.161 He highlighted how 
sometimes city councilors would encourage him to increase the budget because 
they foresaw the benefits of his programs. Sometimes his department would also 
invite city councilors to go on comparative visits such as to Bali, to see the mangrove 
forests that Tanjungpinang was planning to emulate. 
Academics, however, critiqued the harmonious relationship between the 
executive and legislative, and argued that the city council is not doing enough in 
their role to supervise the executive.162 Another academic confirmed that political 
parties in Tanjungpinang were typically vocal only during election time. A former city 
council member, Mr. Husnizar Hood, argued that debates do take place in the city 
council. For example, during his tenure, the council rejected the mayor’s proposal 
for progressive parking charges in downtown with the argument that Tanjungpinang 
residents could not afford such rates.  
Relationship with citizens groups 
Suryatati conducted monthly meetings with formal neighborhood and 
community leaders (RT and RW chiefs) to understand the issues that were facing 
residents. Whereas previously RT and RW chiefs conducted their roles voluntarily, 
Suryatati started giving an incentive of Rp 100,000 (around S$10) per month for 
each chief. The nominal was not substantial, but she said that it was a way to show 
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appreciation of their work. No relationship building was mentioned beyond that 
with formal community leaders.  
Whereas Suryatati conducted outreach through formal mechanisms, Lis was 
reaching out to the general public through an SMS-based complaint handling 
mechanism. He also speaks on the radio and encouraged feedback from listeners, 
either on-the-spot, or to be collated by the radio station. The collated feedback 
would then be discussed by the mayor and heads of departments and the relevant 
department would take action.  
Some academics and civil society groups, however, were pessimistic 
whether these complaints have been taken seriously by the city government. 
Business interests were even more skeptical. They argued how they were rarely 
consulted by the mayor, and how public projects typically only rely on consultants 
rather than gathering feedback from stakeholders. If any, it is the business 
associations which have tried to give feedback to the government but to little 
avail.163 The impact, they argued, could be seen from small size of private 
investments in the city.  
Healthy leadership rivalry 
Tanjungpinang has been largely free of bitter political rivalry. Suryatati was a 
popular figure such that during her re-election in 2007, she won 84.25% of the 
votes. Lis, too, in 2012, won 46% of the votes. Both were supported by PDIP, which 
has been consistently the biggest winner in the city’s legislative elections since 1999.  
A short period of rivalry occurred in the 2012 election, and ironically it 
occured between Suryatati and PDIP. Barred from running for her third consecutive 
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term, Suryatati approached PDIP to support her daughter, Maya Suryanti, a cosmetic 
physician, to be her successor.  PDIP, however, has been preparing Lis to run for 
mayor for some time and did not find Maya to be a very popular candidate due to 
her limited political track record. Maya was eventually supported by a Suryatati-
mobilized coalition involving Golkar, PKS, PPP, and PKNU. Her vice mayor candidate 
was Mr. Tengku Dahlan, who had been Suryatati’s regional secretary. Maya 
eventually gained 31.3% of the votes and came out second after Lis, who won 46%.  
Despite the short period of rivalry between Suryatati and PDIP, which 
impacted Suryatati’s relationship with city council in 2012, no bitter feelings were 
kept. Maya congratulated Lis, and Suryatati eventually withdrew from politics. 
Enforcement Cost 
Capable civil servants  
Tanjungpinang has had some issues with quantity and quality of government 
staff. The city was only established as an autonomous city in 2001 based on a 1999 
law. When it was an administrative city (1996-1999), Suryatati recalled that 
Tanjungpinang had only 40 staff. Now it has thousands. Still, that was considered 
insufficient to fully implement its role as a city. Some structural positions were still 
vacant and several officials held multiple positions.164  
The regional secretary acknowledged that the city was still understaffed and 
that not all civil servants were adequately qualified. A senior academic explained 
how Tanjungpinang’s elevation to be an autonomous city was initially driven by local 
political maneuvers by heads of subdistricts (camat) and villages (lurah). He believed 
that some of the city’s department heads still had the quality and parochial 
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orientation of subdistrict-level officials. A former head of department complained 
that often his instructions would be misunderstood or misinterpreted by his staff, 
resulting in low quality output.165 
Suryatati tried to fill in the vacant positions by recruiting civil servants who 
were already working at the province or other city and regency governments to be 
transferred to Tanjungpinang. However, at the same time, surrounding regencies 
were also undergoing status elevation; thus various local government units were 
similarly recruiting for staff. 
The city’s regional secretary acknowledged that Tanjungpinang’s officials 
were used to working with slower speed, such that when Lis came in 2013 with his 
more dynamic style, some were taken aback and needed time to adjust.166 Others 
highlighted how lack of initiative from city officials possibly contributed to the past 
and current mayor’s top-down approach. They said, even if the current mayor asked 
his staff to be innovative, very few people had the capacity and courage to do so.  
Capacity building activities 
Tanjungpinang’s leaders have utilized various avenues to increase the 
capacity of government staff. Suryatati relied on conducting trainings and upgrading 
of staff’s university education. Lis used those routes too, but in addition, he also 
conducted more intensive communication with his staff. 
For example, Lis would meet with most of the city’s departments several 
times a month. Some of the occasions include a biweekly Thursday morning exercise 
and a monthly flag-raising ceremony with all departments. During these times, Lis 
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would deliver speeches about the need to work creatively. Heads of departments 
are also rotated to deliver speeches at different departments on the weekly flag-
raising ceremony held at each department. The intention was to facilitate an 
exchange of knowledge, and so all city government staffs were aware of the 
programs and policies being implemented in other departments.167  
Incentives and disincentives 
Tanjungpinang has been using rewards and punishments to encourage 
better performance. Suryatati institutionalized the recognition of ‘model employees’ 
as well as ‘best and worst’ health clinics, kecamatan, and kelurahan on an annual 
basis. Those that were deemed ‘best’ received prizes in the form of tools and 
sometimes vehicles, while those deemed ‘worst’ had to raise a black flag in front of 
their office. She was quite persistent in obligating the kecamatan and kelurahan to 
put up those flags. However, the black flags were eventually scraped off because 
some neighborhoods were consistently rated as ‘worst’ and this created a sense of 
hopelessness among the local officials. Model employees were given the 
opportunity to pursue further studies and conduct comparative visits to other cities. 
No monetary reward was given to individuals. 
Similar incentive-based policies were continued by the Lis administration, in 
which each department would announce an ‘employee of the week’ and ‘employee 
of the month’ according to their level. The decision was based on a number of 
indicators, such as attendance, on-time arrival and departure from office, rate of 
work completion, and approval rating from their peers. Monetary reward to 
individuals in the form of ‘development fund’ has also been introduced. The amount 
                                                          
167 Interview with Riono, 2015 
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was not very substantial (about 50% of the basic salary), but was meant as 
acknowledgement and incentive to work harder. 
Punishments were not announced, but followed-up individually through 
informal and formal warnings as well as pay cuts. The disincentive for late arrival of 
up to 10 times was a 25% pay cut. If that occurred more than half of the time, the 
result was non-payment of their basic salary. 
Summary  
The following table summarizes the presence or absence of factors related 
to leadership, society, and transaction costs of conducting public innovations in 
Tanjungpinang. The table largely refers to the period under Suryatati’s leadership, as 
Lis tenure only started in 2013 (too recent to make an impact). 
Table 24: Case Summary:  







A2. Leader’s charisma  A3. Leader’s experience 
NO: Suryatati had many 
supporters but was 
reluctant to be 
unpopular, or push her 
staff to higher 
performance 
standards.  
NOT ALWAYS: Suryatati 
was popular & attracted 
political support. 
However, people did not 
always follow her & 




background was solely 
in the local civil service 
of Tanjungpinang.  




B1. Favorable history  B2. Progressive local 
organizations 
B3. Good local norms 
NOT ALWAYS: The city 
was a vibrant trading 
hub, but has been a 
periphery since the 
1700s. Recent upgrade 
as provincial capital 
created much local 
political bickering. 
NO: Many art and ethnic-
based groups exist but 
there was little activity in 
building political 
awareness or strong 
demands for better 
public services.  
NO: People were 
generally content with 
the easy life. 
Meritocracy was not 
pursued and there was 
lenient attitude towards 
politics and corruption. 
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C1.3. Access to ICT  
NO: For the most part, 
Tanjungpinang (under 
Suryatati) did not refer 
much to programs from 
other cities.  
NO: Involvement in city 
associations, as well as 
networking with 




NO: Suryatati saw e-
government strategies 






C2.1. Supportive city 
council 
C2.2. Supportive citizens 
groups 
C2.3. Healthy leadership 
rivalry  
YES: Relationship 
between mayor and 
city council was largely 
harmonious. The party 
that supported the 
mayor held the 
majority of seats. 
NOT ALWAYS: Suryatati 
built relationships mostly 
with formal RT and RW 
leaders only. Business 
interests were rarely 
involved in decision-
making. 
YES: Mayors have won 
elections by large 
margin. There were no 
major political 
challenges during a 




C3.1. Capable civil 
servants 
C3.2. Capacity building 
activities 
C3.3. Incentives & 
disincentives 
NO: Tanjungpinang 
suffered from lack of 
quality and quantity of 
civil servants. Existing 
ones held largely 
parochial views and 
tend to be reserved.  
YES: Capacity building 
was conducted through 
formal trainings, 
continuing education, 
and communication with 
staff.  
YES: ‘Best’ and ‘worst’ 
kelurahans were chosen 
based on their 
performance. ‘Employee 
of the month’ type 
awards were given.  







Chapter 6: Comparisons and Analysis  
 
 
This chapter provides a cross-case analysis following a description of how 
leadership, society, and transaction costs took shape in the innovative and typical 
cases (Chapters 4 and 5). There are three ways in which the cases are compared and 
contrasted: (1) between innovative and typical cases, (2) between different time 
periods of the city, ranging from the start of decentralization to 2014, and (3) 
between Philippine and Indonesian cities. Each comparison ends with assessments 
of the explanatory factors. 
1. Comparing Innovative and Typical Cases 
The comparison between innovative and typical cases aims to identify 
possible patterns which distinguish one from the other. It does so by identifying 
ways in which the explanatory factors (leadership, society, and transaction costs) 
have been present or absent in each city over time. The findings are as follows: (1) 
seven out of eight cases (all but Dagupan, PH) confirmed the expected association 
between leadership, society and innovativeness. Meanwhile, (2) a slightly different 
seven out of eight cases (all but Samarinda, ID) confirmed the expected association 
between transaction cost and innovativeness.  
a. Leadership Factors 
The extent to which leadership sub-factors were present in each case is 
displayed in Table 25. Among ‘innovative’ city governments, all four cases showed 
presence of transformational leadership, which in this research was identified 
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through (1) charisma, (2) commitment, and (3) diversity of experience. In contrast, 
three of the four typical city governments (all but Dagupan) have had issues with 
lack of consistent presence of transformational leadership. Table 26 shows that 
seven out of eight cases confirmed the proposed theoretical link between leadership 
and innovativeness, while one case (Dagupan, PH) did not.  
Table 25: Leadership in ‘Innovative’ and ‘Typical’ Cases 
Leadership 
sub-factors 























Charisma Yes Yes Yes Yes 4/4 No No No No 0/4 
Commitment Yes Yes Yes Yes 4/4 Yes No No No 1/4 
Diversity of 
Experience 




YES YES YES YES 12/12 YES NO NO NO 4/12 
 








































Among the innovative cases, all four have had leaders with strong ability to 
motivate people and make them follow instructions based on their charisma. For 
example, in Marikina, PH, this was manifested initially in BF’s strong character, and 
subsequently through MCF’s and De Guzman’s persuasion skills. In Naga, PH, 
Robredo and Bongat led by example and were able to mobilize people by combining 
strong presence as well as motivational and persuasion skills. In Pekalongan and 
Balikpapan, ID, mayors motivated staff through their energy and intensive 
communication. Much of what they have shown was in line with the elements of 
‘transformational leadership’, which include charisma, inspiration, intellectual 
stimulation, and individualized attention (Bass 1990, Bass and Riggio 2006), and 
















Among the typical cases, however, none has shown consistent presence of 
transformative leaders. For example, in Malabon, PH, Samarinda, and 
Tanjungpinang, ID, mayors from time to time have had issues in fully implementing 
their visions. For example, in Samarinda, signature projects such as the airport and 
second bridge over Mahakam River have been stalled for multiple years. Public 
disgruntlements over the performance of mayors were also easily found throughout 
the media. Dagupan, PH, had shown stronger presence of charismatic leaders 
compared to the other three typical cities, but their effectiveness in mobilizing 
citizens and staff fluctuated over the years, across different leaders. For example, 
Benjie Lim managed to implement programs successfully in his first set of terms, but 
not quite so in his second.  
Commitment 
All four of the innovative cities have had leaders with strong political will 
and moral standards. For example, leaders of Naga, PH, were known to live frugally 
in personal and public life, and have not been reported to take direct benefits from 
their tenure. Such are in line with arguments for prioritizing collective success over 
personal gains (Sinek 2014), promoting organizational values (Selznik 1984), and 
having high moral legitimacy (Barnard 1982, Steinbauer et al. 2014). In Marikina, PH, 
and Balikpapan, ID, leaders were not hesitant to take politically unpopular decisions 
(similar to the argument set by Heifetz 1994), as shown by programs that induce 
self-discipline in the former, and policies that ban mining activities in the latter. In 
Balikpapan, ID, earlier mayors displayed military-level discipline and commitment to 
their jobs. In Pekalongan, ID, the mayor worked long hours and made sure that he 
was accessible to the public, intentionally signaling determination and hard-work 
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(Collins 2001, Molinaro 2013). Leaders of such cities also showed higher credibility 
with their promises (Gabris, Golembiewski, and Ihrke 2001). 
Among the typical cities, only one out of four (Dagupan, PH) showed the 
presence of committed leaders over multiple periods. Dagupan has had leaders who 
were known to work hard, ambitious, and were willing to take unpopular 
decisions.168 In the three other cases, however, committed leaders were not 
consistently present over time. For example, in Malabon, PH, leniency and short-
term orientation was seen as the predominant norm in managing the city. In 
Samarinda, ID, the city’s leaders had personal interests in the mining industry, and 
some had been tried in court for corruption cases. In Tanjungpinang, ID, the past 
mayor showed reluctance to take unpopular decisions, or to push her staff towards 
higher accountability standards. All the typical cases, in recent history, have 
experienced the investigation of their mayor or high-ranking officers in cases related 
to corruption or ‘abuse of authority’.169 These are closely related to the arguments 
for leaders to have moral and ethical legitimacy (Steinbauer et al. 2014, Ciulla 1998) 
Diversity of experience 
Among the innovative cases, all four cities have had leaders with experience 
in large private sector organizations, either in international or national settings. For 
example, before becoming mayor of Naga, PH, Robredo and Bongat worked in 
Manila for large companies such as San Miguel Corporation and Megaworld 
Corporation, respectively. Similarly in Marikina, PH, the Fernandos were managing 
                                                          
168For example, Benjie Lim raised taxes despite the risk of not being popular politically. 
However, there were criticisms later that Benjie Lim of Dagupan did not deal with city hall 
finances in entirely transparent manner 
169 Leadership in Tanjungpinang, ID, and Malabon, PH, however, seems to be changing with 
the recent election of a younger, more dynamic and forward-looking mayor in 2013. It 
remains to be seen whether they will make substantial impact on the way the city 
government is run.  
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their own AAA-rated construction company before they went into politics. Basyir of 
Pekalongan, ID, was born into a family of entrepreneurs and was known to be a 
successful medical doctor. In Balikpapan, ID, mayors such as Yoes and Tjutjup had 
military backgrounds, while Rizal was a senior editor in the region’s largest 
newspaper. These highlight concepts such as ‘lateral entry’ (Treverton 2005) and the 
association of curiosity and resourcefulness with creativity (Judge and Bono 2000, 
Lee 2013, Zopiatis and Constanti 2012). 
Among the typical cases, three out of four cities also have had leaders with 
diverse professional experience. In Dagupan, PH, Belen Fernandez and Benjie Lim 
were successful mall owners and developers. The Oretas in Malabon, PH, led an 
AAA-rated construction company, and some such as Tito Oreta and Len-len Oreta 
have had the experience of working abroad. The earlier Vicencio of Malabon, 
however, was more a traditional local politician with local experience. In Samarinda, 
ID, the earlier Amins had a local political background, but the later Jaang had a 
career with private, natural resource-based companies in East Kalimantan. 
Tanjungpinang, ID, was the only case where the mayor’s experience was largely 
based in local public service.170  
Assessing leadership as explanation 
All four ‘innovative’ cases (4/4) have had consistent presence of 
transformational leadership. Meanwhile, only one out of four ‘typical’ cases (1/4) 
have had this condition (Dagupan, PH).  
There seem to be notable differences between innovative and typical cases 
in terms of leader’s charisma and commitment. All innovative cases (4/4) had 
                                                          
170 Tanjungpinang’s current mayor (Lis Darmansyah, elected in 2013), however, has a more 
diverse background in the private sector, with some experience working abroad.  
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charismatic and entrepreneurial leaders who were effective, while such characters 
barely or inconsistently appeared among the typical ones (0/4). Similarly, all four 
innovative cases (4/4) had committed and credible leaders, while only one out of the 
four typical cases (1/4) showed this to a substantial level. These seem to suggest 
that charisma and commitment were important factors in explaining innovativeness. 
Arguments for strong leadership such as these may also be related to a tendency to 
believe in strong states (Wiarda and Boilard 1999) and self-perception as a 
paternalistic society (KEMENPANRB 2013). However, there seems to be not much 
difference between the innovative and typical cases in terms of the leader’s diversity 
of experience.  
All four innovative cases (4/4) have had leaders with varied experience 
outside of the public sector; a condition shared by three of four typical cases (3/4). 
There seems to be weak association between diversity of experience and 
innovation; which may be understandable as the literature only showed association 
between the former and creativity (Zopiatis and Constanti 2012, Judge and Bono 
2000, Lee 2013), not innovativeness. 
One of the conclusions from this section, that Dagupan had largely 
transformational leadership but remains a ‘typical’ city (rather than an ‘innovative’ 
one) is an unexpected observation that counters the claim that leadership is 
associated with innovativeness. It seems that leadership alone was not a sufficient 
explanation. Also, two particular aspects of leadership (charisma and commitment) 
may be relevant for further exploration, while diversity of experience seem to have 
limited explanatory power. 
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b. Society Factors 
Next, this section dissects the sub-factors related to a progressive society, 
which include: (1) meritocratic norms, (2) organized civil society, and (3) favorable 
history. The extent to which society-related sub-factors were present in each case is 
displayed in Table 27. Among ‘innovative’ city governments, all four cases showed 
presence of a progressive society (Marikina was the only one that did not have a 
favorable history). In contrast, three out of four typical city governments (all except 
Dagupan) did not have such qualities in their society. Table 28 shows that seven out 
of eight cases confirmed the proposed theoretical link between society and 
innovativeness, while one case (Dagupan, PH) was not.  
Table 27: Society in ‘Innovative’ and ‘Typical’ Cases 
Society Sub-
factors 

























Yes Yes  Yes Yes 4/4 No No No No 0/4 
Organized civil 
society 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes 4/4 Yes No No No 1/4 
Favorable 
history 
Yes No Yes Yes 3/4  Yes No No No 1/4 
‘Progressive 
society’? 
YES YES YES YES 11/12 YES NO NO NO 2/12 
 


































Meritocratic norms  
Among the innovative cases, all four cities have had a society that tends to 
value hard work over rent-seeking. For example, Balikpapan’s society is known for 
its industrious work-ethic related to the demands of oil and gas manufacturing, as 
well as discipline related to the presence of the regional headquarters of the police 
and armed forces. Pekalongan’s society is largely noted for its entrepreneurial 
character and strong presence of batik industries that tends to allow them to be 
more meritocratic and ‘independent’ of public sector money (Hidayat 2003). In 
Naga, PH, there is a strong sense of community and a calling from religious 
institutions such as Ateneo de Naga that motivate youth to become ‘men for others’ 
and uphold the public to higher moral standards. For example, there have been 
multiple occasions where a person who returned another person’s lost belongings 
was given personal appreciation from the mayor and covered by the media. Such 
characters highlight the importance of values such as meritocracy (Mahbubani 2008, 


















presents an interesting case where the city used to have issues of low discipline and 
indifferent attitude among citizens. But such have changed and over the years the 
people have adopted a more disciplined habit based on an internalized 
understanding of the public consequences of one’s actions.  
All four of the typical cities, by contrast, tend to lack the consistent 
upholding of meritocratic norms. The people of Dagupan, PH, have quite strong 
demands for business and economic development issues, but such demand is 
admittedly not as strong for public service and governance issues. Malabon, PH, had 
difficulty implementing a performance incentive system due to a commonly held 
norm that expects everyone to be rewarded equally, regardless of their 
contribution. Such norm, which could be labeled as a form of ‘collectivism’, may or 
may not be beneficial for progress (Müller, Mekgwe, and Mhloyi 2013). In 
Samarinda, ID, rent-seeking activities and political lobbying for personal gains 
increasingly became socially accepted. In many instances, lax attitude towards work 
prevailed because ‘reward’ was not seen as result of hard work, but of personal 
connections. In Tanjungpinang, ID, there was a tendency to be content with easy life 
and leniency towards corruption. There were disgruntlements among the population 
in typical cities toward the public sector, but such voices largely have not 
materialized in the form of organized advocacy. 
Organized civil society  
All four of the innovative cases have had a society that is organized into 
various associations that voice out their interests, almost along the line with 
arguments presented by Tocqueville, Mayer, and Lawrence (2006) and Putnam 
(1993). Pekalongan has deep-rooted presence of religious organizations that set 
standards in community development and public service, and did not hesitate to 
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march against repressive government policies in the Suharto era (Hidayat 2003). The 
city also has many micro and small entrepreneurs who are well-organized into 
cooperatives.171 Similarly, Naga, PH, has been the place where church groups, 
universities, and the media converged to create an atmosphere of critical 
intellectualism that made the region one of the nation’s hubs of ‘people power’ 
movements. Naga is also home to many regional civil society organizations, where 
Manila-based NGOs established their field offices. Balikpapan, ID, has numerous 
media outlets, people’s organizations, and business chambers which are well-
organized. These organizations have close relationship with the city government, but 
do not hesitate to demand the latter to uphold high performance. They also have 
good relationship with one another, signifying higher inclusiveness or ‘wide radius’ 
of such social networks (Fukuyama 1995). Marikina, PH is an interesting case as it 
had relatively weak civil society organizations in the past, but city leaders have put in 
much effort to organize local interest groups into associations and federations.  
Among the typical cases, three out of four (all but Dagupan) have not had a 
society with distinctly organized civil society. In Samarinda, NGOs, community 
organizations, and business associations remained relatively scattered and prone to 
elite capture.172 In Tanjungpinang, ID, community groups such as art and ethnic-
based organizations are aplenty, but there was little activity in terms of building 
political awareness and demanding the government for better services. In Malabon, 
PH, civil society organizations were weak in the face of predatory slum syndicates 
that were not hesitant to engage in criminal activities. In contrast, Dagupan, PH, was 
more similar to Naga and Pekalongan: the city is a meeting place where churches, 
                                                          
171 Pekalongan is home for Indonesia’s largest savings and loans cooperative, not only 
signifying strong organizing skills, but also more egalitarian norms. 
172 The relative success of a recent class action law suit against the government may signal 
that the civil society is becoming more organized. 
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universities, and the local media converge and facilitate the people to form local 
associations and articulate their interests.  
Favorable history 
Among the innovative cases, three out of four cities (all but Marikina) have 
had a long history of organized society and meritocratic norms. Pekalongan, ID, for 
hundreds of years has been a multi-ethnic trading post that emphasized egalitarian 
and entrepreneurial values above Javanese-style top-down feudalism. Balikpapan, 
ID, since 1900, has long been a place that attracted processing industries along with 
relatively more skilled workers who were looking for a better life and adopt a new 
home. Naga, PH, has been a place where NGOs established bases and opposition 
groups and activists were trained. Catholic institutions also flourished and built 
many schools and conducted community service. The innovative cases seem to 
confirm the argument that history matters, and that they influence the trajectory of 
a society through slow, evolving paths as well as stochastic changes (North 1990, 
Mahoney 2000). The exception was Marikina, PH, which did not have a favorable 
distant history. The city was a vibrant cluster of shoe manufacturing for many 
decades, but it was poorly managed, with high crime and unruly behavior among the 
population. Substantial changes to Marikina only started in the early 1990s, 
coinciding with the arrival of Fernando. 
Among the typical cities, three (all but Dagupan) have not had historical 
paths favorable for meritocratic norms. Rather, their paths tend to be supportive of 
rent-seeking. Tanjungpinang, ID, used to be a vibrant port town, but became an 
extractive colonial and administrative post of the surrounding Riau Islands. 
Samarinda, ID, was similarly an important city near the Mahakam delta, but its 
history is characterized by feudalistic rent-seeking which has persisted since the 
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times of the sultanate, maintained by the Dutch colonial government, and has 
endured until the current era (Magenda 1991). These explanations seem to be in 
line with arguments that distant history matter, including how colonialism took 
shape (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001), and how royal families and 
feudalistic traditions from hundreds of years ago have endured (Day 2003, Nordholt 
2004). Malabon, PH, arguably had a favorable distant history as the NCR’s trade and 
processing center of grains. However, subsequent flight of original residents and rise 
of extractive crime syndicates have made the city teeming with recent immigrants 
who were not smoothly integrated into the community. The exception is, again, 
Dagupan, PH, which has been the most prominent hub of the Ilocos region for many 
centuries, allowing the city to attract religious, educational, financial, and media 
institutions for many decades. 
Assessing society as explanation 
All four ‘innovative’ cases (4/4) have had the conditions of a progressive 
society, while only one out of four ‘typical’ ones (1/4) have this character (again, 
Dagupan, PH).  
There were notable differences between innovative and typical cases in the 
three sub-factors. All four innovative cases (4/4) had meritocratic norms and 
organized civil society groups. Meanwhile, none (0/4) of the typical cases had a 
distinctly meritocratic norm that pervades the private and public sectors, and only 
one (Dagupan) had vibrant and organized civil society groups. Also, three of the 
innovative cases (all but Marikina, PH) had a favorable history, while only one of the 
typical cases (Dagupan) shared this characteristic. Marikina showed that while 
history cannot be changed, one could in fact change the trajectory of a society, and 
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the city did so through consistent transformation of norms, values, and beliefs. How 
beliefs change, however, remains an ill-understood process (North 1981, 2005). 
Again Dagupan stood out as an exception: it largely showed the 
characteristics of a progressive society, but remains a ‘typical’ city (rather than an 
‘innovative’ one). This suggests that society may not a sufficient explanation for 
innovativeness. This section also suggests that all three sub-factors of progressive 
society (meritocratic norms, organized civil society, and favorable history) are 
potentially relevant to be explored in future studies of innovativeness. 
It should be noted that three of the innovative cases (all but Pekalongan), 
have had a single line of political leadership that dates back to the late 1980s, where 
subsequent mayors were supported by the preceding mayor. This is connected to 
the notion of ‘recent history’ and leadership continuity which has likely allowed the 
process of accumulated learning. The latter is argued to be conducive to continuous, 
incremental innovation (Tidd, Bessant, and Pavitt 2005). 
c. Transaction Cost Factors 
The extent to which each case fulfils the explanatory factors related to 
transaction costs is explained next. Here, transaction cost is described as an 
aggregate of information cost, negotiation cost, and enforcement cost sub-factors. 
Therefore, before synthesizing how each case is associated with the presence of 
efficient transaction costs, the various sub-factors of transaction costs will be 
dissected first.  
Information cost 
First the presence or absence of low information costs across the cases is 
examined across the eight cases (see Table 29). All four of the innovative cases had 
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the presence of low information cost, which include: (1) access to ICT and media, (2) 
networking opportunities, and (3) opportunities to travel and be familiar with other 
cities. Showing a similar trend, three out of four typical city governments (all but 
Tanjungpinang, ID) also faced favorable information cost. This seems to imply that 
information costs, when considered on its own, may not be very much related to 
innovativeness. 



























Access to ICT Yes Yes Yes Yes 4/4 Yes Yes Yes No 3/4 
Networking 
opportunities  








YES YES YES YES 12/12 YES YES YES NO 7/12 
 
Access to ICT and media 
Among the innovative cases, all four have had relatively good access to ICT 
and the media that allowed the mayor and city leaders to find references from other 
cities which could be emulated. For example, Balikpapan, ID, hosts PT. Telkom’s 
regional headquarters and is a place where national and local media outlets thrived. 
Telkom is currently installing 1,000 WiFi.id hotspots throughout the city. In many 
cases, mayors were strong proponents of expanding ICT use and access in their city. 
Naga, PH, was among the first cities in the country to embark on large-scale 
government computerization and e-government programs. They were also among 
the first to utilize ICT as a tool to improve governance, which has continued to this 
day through creative social media strategies. Department heads in Marikina, PH, 
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actively used the Internet to search for best practices, references, and 
benchmarking. Pekalongan, ID, developed a Local Area Network connecting city 
government offices, and similarly provided community halls with internet 
connectivity. These seem to highlight arguments on the importance of ICT on public 
innovation (Bekkers, Duivenboden, and Thaens 2006, Hale and Project 2011) 
Three of the four typical cases (all but Tanjungpinang, ID) had similarly 
favorable access to ICT and the media. Samarinda, ID, hosts many higher learning 
institutions and thrived on private sector support to develop ICT infrastructure. For 
example, WiFi points are were installed throughout the city and political leaders 
have a social media presence, though outdated. Dagupan, PH, is the regional hub for 
media outlets, and has laid out relevant infrastructure to support the media, 
universities, and business process outsourcing companies. City leaders and officials 
in Malabon, PH, also had good access to the Internet and media, though largely after 
the development of a new city hall. Still, internet use among Malabon’s leaders is 
mostly limited to finding technical references. The only exception in the group was 
Tanjungpinang, ID, where city leaders were not very keen on expanding ICT 
infrastructure and applications (at least until 2013), and considered them less 
relevant to the society’s skill level.  
Networking Opportunities 
All four innovative cases have had extensive networking opportunities with 
other city governments, the national government, or local stakeholders. These 
networks pointed them to new ideas and resources, and were part of their learning 
processes (Campbell 2012, Considine, Lewis, and Alexander 2009). For example, 
leaders of Pekalongan and Balikpapan, ID, as well as Naga and Marikina, PH, were 
actively involved in horizontal inter-city networks at the national level (such as 
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APEKSI and the LCP) and the international level (such as CityNet and UCLG Asia 
Pacific). Such networks helped cities’ leaders get curated and relevant information 
from other mayors (Marsden et al. 2011). Mayors were also involved in vertical 
networks and were well connected with provincial and national officials. Marikina’s 
mayors have had access to key national government leaders, which helped the city 
clarify some issues with line ministries in the context of conducting ‘top-down 
innovations’ (Windrum and Koch 2008). In Naga, PH, other than the opportunities to 
engage in vertical and horizontal networks, city leaders also have had close access to 
a network of local activists and NGO figures in the form of ‘epistemic communities’ 
(Haas 1992, Simmie 1997). 
Among the typical cases, two out of four cities, namely Dagupan and 
Malabon (both in the Philippines), also had plenty of networking opportunities. 
Mayors Fernandez and Lim of Dagupan, PH, as well as Mayors Oreta of Malabon, PH, 
were well connected with national-level officials, politicians, and private companies 
who could help the city implement new ideas. By contrast, city governments in 
Indonesia networked to a more limited extent. Samarinda, ID, was also involved in 
networks, but limited to those at the sub-national level. Meanwhile, Tanjungpinang, 
ID, for the most part, had minimal involvement in intercity networks. Both cities’ 
relationship with the national and province governments were also limited, and city 
leaders have had difficulty in securing help from their networks to deal with issues 
such as stalled development projects. 
Travels and familiarity with other cities 
In all four innovative cases, city leaders had conducted numerous travels to 
other cities (nationally and internationally), and were well-informed about 
innovative programs in other cities that could be referenced or replicated. For 
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example, mayor of Pekalongan, ID, coined the term ‘ATM’ (Indonesian acronym for 
Observe, Replicate, Modify) and encouraged his key staffs to visit other cities, and 
set a target that their city has to be better in implementing such program after two 
years of learning. This has some similarity with the ‘fast-follower’ strategy typically 
used in the private sector (Jaruzelski and Dehoff 2007), as well as the notion of 
‘learned’ or ‘imitative’ innovation (Lee and Rodríguez-Pose 2013), and ‘urban inter-
referencing’ (Phelps et al. 2014), 
In general, mayors of innovative cities were well-traveled: they were 
regularly invited to national or international conferences, or have conducted 
substantial travels prior to becoming mayor. For example, BF of Marikina, PH, would 
take notes and measurements from his travels and conduct brainstorming sessions 
with his staff once back at the office. He also conducted direct learning from other 
cities, such as Subic Bay, where he took almost all his staff, including street cleaners, 
to experience how clean the former U.S. military base was. This harks back to the 
argument that policy transfer is more likely to happen among places that are 
geographically near (Kern, Koll, and Schophaus 2007) as direct visits provide 
inspiration and reduce uncertainties (Rose 1993). Robredo and Bongat of Naga, PH, 
were similarly well-traveled and often invited to events in other cities, nationally or 
abroad. 
Among the four typical cases, two leaders, namely those of Dagupan, PH, 
and Samarinda, ID, have been consistently familiar with good programs in other 
cities. Lim and Fernandez of Dagupan were successful retail business owners and 
have traveled extensively, including to cities with successful public services or 
programs. Samarinda’s leaders have also traveled to many places, though mostly in 
closer domestic and regional destinations. The latter has looked to Singapore as 
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inspiration, but only for referencing physical appearances of parks and open spaces. 
The two other typical cases, however, did not show consistent familiarity with or 
referencing of other cities’ innovative programs. For example, leaders of Malabon 
and Tanjungpinang considered many successful programs from other cities as 
irrelevant due to perceived unique condition of their city, as well as lack of funding.  
Negotiation cost 
Next, we examine whether innovative and typical city governments had 
faced low negotiation costs. Table 30 shows that all four innovative city 
governments showed presence of low negotiation costs, namely: (1) good 
relationship with city council, (2) good relationship with citizens groups, and (3) 
healthy rivalry with their political opponents. Among the typical cases, two out of 
four (Samarinda and Tanjungpinang, ID) faced favorably low negotiation costs, while 
the other two (Dagupan and Malabon, PH) did not. 
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Relationship with city council 
Three out of four innovative cases (all but Balikpapan) have had largely 
supportive relationship with their city councils. This was not always the case, 
though. At the beginning, Robredo of Naga and Fernando of Marikina started with a 
non-cooperative city council that blocked most of their proposals, which harks back 
to the importance or relevance of the ‘veto players’ argument (Tsebelis 2002). 
However, they managed to turn the council in their favor from their second political 
term onwards by having their political slate winning most (if not all) city councilor 
positions for multiple periods. Currently Naga and Pekalongan conducted weekly 
breakfast meetings between the mayor and city councilors. The city council typically 
trusted the mayor to conduct innovations, but by starting with small-scale 
experiments to see if it would work, which is related to the notion of risk 
management (Bhatta 2003). In Indonesia, Basyir of Pekalongan, ID, did not belong to 
a majority political party, but after being elected he quickly built a coalition for his 
party such that he had overwhelming political support in the council. These 
advantages, however, did not result in these mayors always getting what they 
wanted. Healthy debates, disagreements, and even vetoes still took place, but the 
extent to which politics played a part has been minimized. Balikpapan, ID, was the 
odd one among the innovative cases as their mayors typically encountered critical 
responses from city councilors who would approach the debate based on political 
considerations. This seems to show that the ‘veto players’ argument applied to a 
larger extent in Balikpapan, or highlight another argument that veto players’ role 
tend to be associated with cohesion of their political parties and strength of the 
current regime (West and Lee 2014). 
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Among typical cases, similarly three out of four city governments (all but 
Dagupan) have had good relationship with the city council. In Samarinda and 
Tanjungpinang, ID, various political parties built large coalitions around the 
incumbent mayor (or vice mayor), hoping to capitalize on his or her popularity 
among the voters, as well as his/her ability to mobilize public resources. This seems 
to confirm the argument for weak political parties vis a vis strong leadership 
personalities (Kasuya 2009). Such political affiliation typically stopped once election 
was over and a ‘quid-pro-quo’ relationship between the executive and legislative 
follows. In Samarinda and Tanjungpinang, ID, as long as this relationship is 
maintained, typically mayors did not face objections from the city council. In 
Malabon, PH, the city council has been tipped in favor of the ruling Oreta family for 
multiple periods, providing them with low political transaction cost to make most 
policy decisions. Some opposition councilors had been consistently present, but 
similar agreements could typically be achieved. The exception was Dagupan, PH, in 
which the city council had been largely unstable, prone to tipping sideways in favor 
of opposing political leaders. 
Relationship with citizens groups 
Among the innovative cases, all four have managed to build good working 
relationship with local stakeholder groups. Naga city government has been working 
closely with civil society organizations since Robredo came into power in 1989, and 
since then city officials have consulted intensively with NGOs and POs. Leaders of 
Pekalongan, ID, involved ‘ABCG’ stakeholders (academics, businesses, community 
groups, government) in sector-based councils in similar notion to ‘issue networks’ 
(Heclo 1978). Meanwhile, Balikpapan mayors held weekly consultation sessions over 
coffee (and monthly over dinner) to solicit input and feedback from the city’s 
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interest groups and people’s organizations. Interaction with various stakeholders in 
‘common zones’ such as these (Hambleton and Howard 2013) is relevant to the 
notion of ‘bisociation’ (recombining indirectly-related knowledge) often associated 
with creativity and innovativeness (Koestler 1964). In Marikina, PH, however, 
relationship with citizens group did not start smoothly. BF’s disciplinarian programs 
initially faced opposition from local interests, but ultimately his administration was 
able to convince constituents of the value of such programs. After BF’s era, Marikina 
embarked on a more consultative approach which was closely related to notion of 
co-creation (Alves 2013, Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004), typically associated with 
‘need-seeker’ and ‘first-mover’ companies in the private sector (Jaruzelski and 
Dehoff 2007).  
None of the typical cases has built a continuously harmonious working 
relationship between the mayor’s office and citizens groups. In Malabon, PH, the city 
government has good relationship with the Urban Poor Alliance, but was not able to 
deal with powerful local syndicates that extract illegal rent from squatters. In 
Dagupan, PH, politics often influenced citizens groups either to support or oppose a 
mayor’s program, resulting in polarization among the citizens. In Tanjungpinang and 
Samarinda, ID, mayors admittedly involved citizens groups in policy making, but such 
involvement was largely limited to formal processes. Effective citizens’ involvement 
was minimal and some policy decisions such as the granting of coal mining permits 
were made in what DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993) would call exclusive ‘urban 
regimes’. In this case, such regime involved local government elites, local land 
owners, and Jakarta-based investors. Harsh critiques from civil society groups 
towards the city government can be easily found in the media, signaling issues in the 
relationship between citizens and their leaders. 
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Healthy political rivalry 
Among the four innovative cases, all mayors have faced situations where 
political rivalry did not disrupt the day-to-day functions of the executive in 
meaningful ways. In Pekalongan and Balikpapan, ID, opposition leaders and their 
supporters typically left the ruling mayor to do his or her job as they consolidate 
their powers for the subsequent election. Basyir of Pekalongan made effort to reach 
out to his political opponents after winning the election and offered several avenues 
in which they could work together in non-political contexts, i.e., ‘reconciliation’ 
(Schaap 2005). In Naga and Marikina, PH, mayors were able to keep political rivals at 
bay by consistently winning the election by large margins, thus managing rivalry by 
domination. For example, in Marikina, one of BF’s campaign slogans was ‘Let’s 
achieve landslide victory to avoid being cheated!’ Meanwhile, in Naga, Robredo’s 
slogan was ‘All or nothing!’ calling for those who supported him to also vote for his 
affiliated city councilors, thus preventing the opposition from winning any political 
positions.  
Among the typical cases, leaders in two cities had a healthy rivalry with their 
opponents, while those in the other two did not. Intense rivalry was present in 
Dagupan and to a lesser extent, in Malabon (both in the Philippines). This proved to 
be detrimental in Dagupan, with accusations of cheating and corruption being raised 
by one mayor against the former, and the canceling of previous programs when a 
new mayor takes seat.173 In Malabon, there were on-street clashes between 
supporters of different mayors in the past, as well as sidelining of city hall officials 
and employees in favor of those related to certain clans or political affiliations. None 
                                                          
173 This, however, seems to have been reduced substantially in Dagupan since 2013, where 
the newly elected vice mayor (Brian Lim) had announced that he was going to let then 




of the two Indonesian cases, however, suffered from disruptive rivalry at the 
leadership level. For the most part, political rivalry took place only during elections, 
where the losing candidate tend to not challenge the results and did not spend 
much effort to operationally challenge the current leader’s policies and programs.  
The negotiation costs analysis seems to provide conflicting arguments on 
the role of democracy for innovation. Veto players, citizens groups, and political 
rivals are inherent parts of a well-functioning democracy, but here it appears that 
they might pose some challenges to innovativeness. The key seems to lie on the 
quality of democracy. In lower quality democracy, legislative members and citizens 
groups could be passive out of perverse political interests or apathy. In a functioning 
democracy, they could constantly scrutinize the executive in distrust and hold things 
in status quo. However, in a more mature society, the executive-legislative 
relationship seems to have found a balance between trust and scrutiny, where the 
executive is given ‘elbow room’ to ‘innovate’ through small scale experiments, and 
scrutiny is conducted naturally through frequent interactions.  
Enforcement cost 
Third, we examine whether innovative and typical city governments had 
faced low enforcement costs. As per Table 31, all four innovative city governments 
managed to face low enforcement costs, which include: (1) capable civil servants 
and bureaucracy, (2) opportunity to conduct capacity building, and (3) a consistent 
system of incentives and disincentives. Among the typical cases, two out four 
(Samarinda and Tanjungpinang, ID), faced low enforcement costs, while the other 




Capable Civil Servants 
Among the innovative cases, all four have had relatively capable civil 
servants for many years. Mayors and heads of departments in of Naga and Marikina, 
PH, overwhelmingly believed in the capability and work ethic of their staff. However, 
this condition was not the case at the beginning of decentralization. In the early 
1990s, only a few staff had this favorable condition, but many of those who do have 
remained in the government until today. Moreover, others have improved their 
capability over the years. Pekalongan and Balikpapan, ID, similarly have had capable 
civil servants. In Pekalongan, bureaucratic capacity started low in the early 2000s, 
but improved quickly with the identification of the right people for the appropriate 
jobs, and adoption of ‘clean’ and meritocratic recruitment (similar to that argued by 
Rauch and Evans 2000). Balikpapan has had a situation of good government for 
several decades that it was difficult to pinpoint the start of the transformation. 
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Among the typical cases, only one has had relatively capable civil servants, 
namely Samarinda, ID. Here, educational qualification of civil servants is arguably 
better than that of the private sector, with most department heads holding a 
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master’s degree, and some a Ph.D. However, in the other three cities, conditions 
were different. In Tanjungpinang, ID, there was a resounding theme regarding lack 
of civil servants’ quantity and quality, with existing ones claimed to hold a largely 
parochial outlook. In Dagupan and Malabon, PH, city leaders tended to give less than 
favorable assessments of their staffs’ technical capacity and commitment to serve. 
Capacity Building Activities 
All four of the innovative cases have had the opportunity to spend 
considerable effort in building the capacity of their staff. In Naga, PH, such capacity 
building was initially institutionalized in large scale through the Productivity 
Improvement Program in the 1990s, where insights and techniques from the private 
sector were utilized to increase employee productivity and motivation. In a similar 
adoption of New Public Management principles that ‘borrows’ private sector 
methods into the public sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011), city leaders in 
Pekalongan, ID, conducted leadership and entrepreneurship trainings that also built 
an attitude of ‘service excellence’ among civil servants. In Marikina, PH, staffs were 
often sent to attend trainings, and BF himself would conduct lectures and instill a 
sense of urgency and motivation through direct interactions. In Balikpapan, ID, 
mayors and senior department heads similarly modeled ‘good behavior’ and ‘high 
motivation’ among the staff, and interacted with them closely.  
Three out of the four typical cases (all but Malabon) similarly conducted 
numerous capacity building activities for their staff. In Samarinda and 
Tanjungpinang, ID, the city government has conducted various leadership classes, 
sent staff to formal trainings with the central government, and facilitated staffs to 
pursue higher education. In Dagupan, PH, one mayor sent staffs to various city 
branding and computer trainings, while another personally conducted orientations 
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and coaching to key staffs of various city departments. However, in Malabon, PH, 
the city seemed to be facilitating less training than the others due to perceived 
difficulty in securing the required financial resources. The extents of which these 
trainings achieved objectives or improved performance, however, remain under-
studied. 
Incentives and Disincentives 
Among the innovative cases, three out of four (all but Pekalongan, ID) have 
implemented a comprehensive performance incentive system, covering monetary or 
career-based rewards. The governments of Naga and Marikina, PH, have conducted 
regular staff performance ratings and handed bonuses to high-performing 
employees (where the same were not given to those with low performance). In 
Naga, this was started also as part of the previously mentioned Productivity 
Improvement Program. In Balikpapan, ID, disciplinary issues could lead to pay cut 
while good performance is rewarded by travels and promotions. Pekalongan, ID, on 
the other hand, did not use monetary or career-based incentives; it rewarded 
performance, rather, with personal trust from the mayor and opportunity to take on 
more responsibilities. 
Among the typical cases, two out of four cities (Samarinda and 
Tanjungpinang, ID) have implemented an employee performance incentive system. 
These cities utilized monetary incentives and disincentives for their staff. 
Tanjungpinang also announced ‘best’ and ‘worst’ sub-districts as well as ‘employee 
of the month’ type of acknowledgements. The city also provided personal monetary 
rewards in the form of ‘development fund’, just as Samarinda provided ‘income 
improvement benefits’ for those who fulfilled their key performance indicators. 
Meanwhile, such incentive schemes were not present, or not consistently applied, in 
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Dagupan and Malabon, PH. In Dagupan, selective performance bonuses were 
conducted on and off, according to the mayor’s policy at the time. Meanwhile, 
Malabon’s leaders faced constraints in handing out rewards to selected staff only. 
Part of the constraint is due to lack of resources, but also social norms that 
discourage giving rewards only to selective persons. However, the extents of which 
such incentives work to improve performance and encourage more innovations (i.e., 
as argued by Gertler and Vermeersch 2012, Newman, Raine, and Skelcher 2001) 
have not been openly studied. 
Synthesizing and Assessing Transaction Costs 
After describing how the sub-factors of information cost, negotiation cost, 
and enforcement cost were present (or absent) in the eight cases, the analysis is 
now aggregated to achieve a consolidated notion of transaction cost. Table 32 
shows the number of ‘Yes’ occurrences out of the possible number of sub-factors.  
Table 32: Transaction Costs in ‘Innovative’ and ‘Typical’ Cases 
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All four innovative cases showed notable presence of efficient transaction 
costs. Naga and Marikina, PH, obtained nine ‘Yes’ out of nine sub-factors, while 
Pekalongan and Balikpapan, ID, almost similarly collected eight ‘Yes’. In contrast, 
three of the typical ones (all but Samarinda, ID) obtained relatively low occurrence 
of ‘Yes’. Tanjungpinang, ID, Dagupan, and Malabon, PH, obtained – respectively – 


















out of nine possible sub-factors. This seems to imply that Samarinda, contrary to the 
initial theoretical expectation, largely faced efficient transaction costs of governing, 
despite not being identified as an ‘innovative’ case.  
In terms of information costs, the innovative cases collected 12 ‘Yes’ out of a 
possible 12, while the typical cases collected only seven (see Table 32). A difference 
of five occurrences out of a possible 12 is quite notable. However, when we break 
the analysis into information cost, negotiation cost, and enforcement cost, however, 
there seems to be slightly weaker difference between the innovative and typical 
cases (see Table 34). Between the innovative and typical cases, there was a 
difference of two ‘Yes’ for each of networking activities and travels and familiarity 
with other cities. However, for Access to ICT, the difference is only one - which 
seems to suggest that its explanatory power is limited.  
Table 34: Comparing transaction cost factors between Innovative and Typical cases 




A Low Information Cost 12/12 7/12 
 1. Access to ICT 4/4 3/4 
 2. Networking activities* 4/4 2/4 
 3. Travels & familiarity with other cities* 4/4 2/4 
B Low Negotiation Cost 11/12 5/12 
 1. Relationship with city council 3/4  3/4  
 2. Relationship with citizens* 4/4 0/4 
 3. Healthy political rivalry * 4/4 2/4 
C Low Enforcement Cost 11/12 6/12 
 1. Capable civil servants* 4/4 1/4 
 2. Capacity building activities 4/4 3/4 
 3. Incentives & disincentives 3/4  2/4 
*: Possibly a notable difference between innovative and typical cases 
 
In terms of negotiation costs, innovative cases collectively obtained 11 ‘Yes’ 
out of a possible 12, while typical cases only secured five. The difference of six 
occurrences out of 12 is quite notable. However, not all sub-factors of negotiation 
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costs may be similarly important. There was no substantial difference between the 
innovative and typical groups in terms of having a good relationship with city council 
(three out of four cases in each group had this characteristic). This seem counter-
intuitive to the ‘veto players’ argument. However, in this research, such favorable 
relationship between leaders and veto players could be achieved through multiple 
means, including short-term quid-pro-quo relations (which applied in three of the 
four typical cities), and benign agreement between city councilors and the mayor to 
put aside political interests for the sake of the city (which applied in three of the four 
innovative ones).  
There were, however, stronger differences between the innovative and 
typical cases in terms of relationship with citizens groups. All four of the innovative 
cases (4/4) fulfilled this condition consistently, while all four of the typical cases did 
not (0/4). This seems to imply that this sub-factor is an important one in explaining 
innovativeness. In terms of having healthy rivalry with political opponents, all four 
innovative cases (4/4) fulfilled this condition, either by winning landslide elections 
(Naga and Marikina, PH), or through efforts to minimize or manage the rivalry 
(Pekalongan, ID). It is quite interesting to note that two typical cases (2/4) that 
fulfilled this condition were Indonesian cases, and for them having healthy political 
rivalry was a ‘given’ factor. Meanwhile, the two Philippine typical cases (2/4) faced 
disruptive political rivalries. Some aspects of negotiation costs cannot be not cleanly 
separated from leadership and society factors. For example, the relationship 
between leaders and citizen groups, is closely related to personal characters of the 
leaders and to the institutions of the society. This possible contamination of 
constructs was highlighted earlier in Chapter 3 under validity issues. 
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In terms of enforcement costs, innovative cases collected 11 ‘Yes” out of a 
possible 12, while typical cases secured six. The difference of five occurrences out of 
12 is also notable. The strongest sub-factor is most likely the presence of a capable 
civil servant or bureaucracy. All four innovative cases (4/4) fulfilled this condition, 
while only one of the typical cases did (1/4): Samarinda, ID. This seems to imply that 
personal and institutional capability could be a factor in explaining innovativeness. 
However, there was only a difference of one case between the innovative and 
typical groups in terms of conducting capacity building activities (4/4 as opposed to 
3/4), as well as in terms of having an effective performance incentive system (3/4 as 
opposed to 2/4).   
This section concludes that all four innovative cases have had low 
transaction costs, but so does one of the typical cases: Samarinda. This argues that 
the proposed transaction costs argument may matter, but not to a full extent. There 
are possibly other reasons why Samarinda remained a ‘typical’ city (rather than an 
‘innovative’ one), despite its low transaction costs of governing.  
d. Assessment  
Cross-case comparison has allowed us to identify patterns of how the 
explanatory factors of leadership, society, and transaction costs were present or 
absent in ‘innovative’ and ‘typical’ city governments. In general, we could argue that 
there are some evidences to suggest that efficient transaction costs, 
transformational leadership, and progressive society may be associated with 
innovativeness. All four ‘innovative’ cases showed stronger presence of the 
explanatory factors compared to ‘typical’ cases (see Figure 18).  
More specifically, Figure 18 seems to show some differences in the 
‘explanatory power’ of each factor. Innovative cases seem to have stronger presence 
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of transformational leadership (12/12) and progressive society (11/12) compared to 
the typical cases (4/12 and 2/12, respectively). There is also a difference in the 
presence of favorable transaction costs among innovative cases (34/36) compared 
to the typical cases (18/36), but arguably not as strong when compared to 
leadership and society factors. These are initial observations based on limited 
number of cases.  
Figure 18: Comparing Explanatory Factors between Innovative and Typical Cases 
 
However, there were two unexpected observations. First, Dagupan, PH, 
arguably had favorable society and leadership, but was not considered as 
‘innovative’. Complementing the conventional leadership and society explanations 
with the proposed transaction cost framework, it was found that Dagupan lacked 
having favorable transaction costs. Second, Samarinda, ID, arguably faced efficient 
transaction costs, but was similarly not an ‘innovative’ case. Again, by examining 
transaction costs together with leadership and society, it was found that Samarinda 
lacked clear presence of favorable leadership and society.  
By addressing several possible (‘rival’) explanations, the cross-case analysis 




































innovativeness on its own. The Dagupan case even seems to suggest that having two 
explanatory factors (leadership and society) was not enough. Samarinda, similarly, 
show that having favorable transaction costs were not sufficient. Instead, the eight 
cases in this research tend to argue that innovativeness was more attainable when 
all three conditions were fulfilled.  
Such arguments, however, was made based on a consolidated time-frame 
that possibly show associations, but definitely not causal relationship. To better 
explain the trends, the sequence in which explanatory factors present themselves in 
innovative and typical cases need to be viewed through a historical analysis. This is 
offered in the following section by comparing the different time periods that each 
case went through.  
2. Comparing Innovativeness over Time 
The second comparison aims to analyze the extent to which efficient 
transaction costs, transformational leadership, and progressive society have been 
present (or absent) across the eight cases in different time periods.  
Table 35 presents a truth table based on Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
that lays out 16 possible configurations of how innovativeness may relate to each of 
the explanatory factors. However, not all possible configurations may be justified by 
the presence of an actual case (‘observation’). The configurations were concluded by 
analyzing the historical narratives as told by interviewees and from casual 
conversations, coupled with media articles and formal documents from the 
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a. Configurations of Cases 
Table 35 identified seven configurations in which actual observations were 
present, namely: Configuration A (four observations), B (1), C (3), D (3), E (1), F (1), 
and G (3). Two of such configurations (A and B) show the presence of ‘innovative’ 
cases, while the remaining five configurations (C, D, E, F, and G) show the presence 
of ‘typical’ cases.  
Configuration A refers to the condition where the city was recognized as 
‘innovative’, and had favorable presence of all three explanatory factors: 
transformational leadership, progressive society, and efficient transaction costs. All 
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four cases of present-day innovative city governments fall under this configuration. 
Balikpapan, ID, has had these conditions for multiple decades, even since before 
Indonesia’s decentralization started. However, the three other cities (Naga, 
Pekalongan, and Marikina) reached this stage through a process of local governance 
transformations that will be further explained in the following section (Types of 
Change). 
Configuration B is the condition where the city government was recognized 
as ‘innovative’, had favorable leadership and transaction costs, but did not have the 
characteristics of a progressive society. The only city that fit into this configuration 
was Marikina3, starting from BF’s second term in 1995 until approximately 10 
afterwards. This was the period when the city’s mayors (BF and MCF) were leading 
innovative programs with support from the city’s stakeholders (including the city 
council) while simultaneously building a more progressive society (i.e., 
institutionalizing meritocratic norms and community organizing). However, at this 
point it could be argued that such norms and organizations have yet to become a 
strong feature of Marikina’s society. 
The following five configurations are associated with ‘typical’ cities. 
Descriptions start from the bottom row of Table 35, going up.  
Configuration G is the condition where the cases were not considered as 
‘innovative’ cities, and neither did they have strong presence of progressive society, 
transformational leadership, or efficient transaction costs. Three cities in different 
time periods were identified as having this configuration. They include: (1) 
Tanjungpinang, ID and (2) Malabon, PH (since decentralization started in their 
respective countries until 2014), as well as (3) Marikina1 (at the period before the 
election of BF in 1992).  
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Configuration F is the condition where the city was not considered as 
‘innovative’, and neither did it have favorable society and leadership. However, 
despite not having these characteristics, the city did face largely favorable 
transaction costs. Only one observation is found in this configuration, namely 
Samarinda, ID. The configuration of characters has remained descriptive of 
Samarinda, from the start of decentralization until 2014.  
Configuration E is the condition where the city was not considered as 
‘innovative’, and neither did it have favorable society and transaction costs. 
However, it did have transformational leadership. This is exemplified only by the 
observation of Marikina (during BF’s first term in 1992-1995), when the city council 
largely opposed his reforms, and the society has not fully embraced or understood 
the objective of such reforms.  
Configuration D is the condition where the city was not considered as 
‘innovative’ and neither did it have favorable leadership and transaction costs. 
However, it did have a progressive society. Three observations fall under this 
configuration: Dagupan (before election of Benjie Lim in 2001), Naga (before 
election of Robredo in 1989), and Pekalongan (before election of Basyir in 2005). 
Before the arrival of transformational leaders, these three cities started by already 
having a progressive society.  
Configuration C is the condition where the city was not identified as 
‘innovative’, and neither did it face efficient transaction costs. However, it did have 
(1) a progressive society and (2) transformational leadership. This configuration is 
exemplified by Naga (during Robredo’s first term in 1989-1992, when he faced major 
obstacles from the city council), Pekalongan (during Basyir’s first year as mayor in 
2005, when he was still trying to build a coalition for his party), and Dagupan2 (from 
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2001 onwards until 2014, the city’s leadership has faced various governing 
challenges related to lack of healthy political rivalry and supportive city council).  
b. Types of Change 
Out of the seven configurations, there are three types of change (and one 
‘non-change’) that were experienced by the cases. Four cities largely experienced no 
change in terms of their configuration of leadership, society, and transaction costs. 
Since the start of their respective decentralization, Tanjungpinang, ID and Malabon, 
PH has remained in Configuration G, Samarinda, ID in Configuration F, and 
Balikpapan, ID in Configuration A. Meanwhile, the other four cities have experienced 
three types of change (see Table 36). 
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Change Type 1 was experienced by Dagupan, PH. The city already started by 
having a progressive society but not much else (Configuration D), and then it also 
had effective leaders (Configuration C), approximately since 2001. However, from 
then on, high transaction costs have loomed over the functioning of the city 
government, with difficulties in reconciling acute political rivalry that had wide-
ranging effect on the city council and various citizens groups. Dagupan has largely 
remained in Configuration C until 2014. 
Change Type 2 was experienced by Naga, PH, and Pekalongan, ID. Similar to 
Dagupan’s early trajectory, these two cities already started with having a 
progressive society (Configuration D), and then they had effective leaders added 
into the mix (Configuration C). These leaders experienced some political difficulties 
(high transaction costs of governing) in their first periods as mayor (in Naga it lasted 
for most of Robredo’s first term, while in Pekalongan it lasted only for several 
months). However, such issues were ironed out after Robredo’s slate won all local 
political positions in the subsequent election, and after Basyir built a broad-based 
political coalition and won the trust of key social figures (Configuration A). From 
then on, effective and committed leaders were able to spring on progressive society 
and capitalize on low transaction costs to conduct many innovations. 
Change Type 3 was experienced by Marikina, PH. The city started without 
favorable society, leadership, and transaction costs (Configuration G, or similar to 
the condition faced by Malabon, PH, and Tanjungpinang, ID). At one point, 
transformational leadership was a part of the city’s characteristics with the election 
of a charismatic, committed, and particularly strong leader in 1992 (Configuration E). 
The leader faced some political challenges, but was able to create a condition of 
favorable transaction costs that allowed him to introduce many changes and made 
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the city government an ‘innovative’ one (Configuration B). Over time, the 
institutionalization of such reforms resulted in the development of a progressive 
society (Configuration A), where leadership and transaction costs remained 
favorable, and the city government remained innovative.  
c. Assessment 
Comparing innovativeness both across cases and across time has allowed us 
to see more nuances. Previously when comparing ‘innovative’ and ‘typical cases’, 
the different time periods for each case were amalgamated into one. Now, by 
analyzing the cases through different key periods of the city (historical analysis), we 
find that the conclusion achieved by only comparing ‘innovative’ and ‘typical’ cities 
could be further enhanced. 
The conclusion from this section (comparing innovativeness across time) 
remains consistent with that from the previous one (comparing innovative and 
typical cities). In general, we could still argue that transaction costs, leadership, and 
society may be associated with innovativeness, and that the latter tends to be 
present when all three conditions were fulfilled.  
However, by comparing innovativeness across time, an additional ‘special 
case’ was identified in the form of Marikina, PH. Marikina is an interesting case that 
shows that unfavorable history could be changed, where the society shifted over 
time from being unruly, rent-seeking, and unorganized to disciplined, meritocratic, 
and eager to associate. The city did this by having an exceptional leader who built 
favorable transaction costs that allowed him (and her) to introduce reforms and turn 
the city into an ‘innovative’ one, even without the presence of a distinctly 
progressive society (Refer to Configuration B in the previous section). Over time, the 
leader institutionalized those reforms, and supported civil society groups to better 
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organize themselves. This is in line with the ‘strong state’ argument (Wiarda and 
Boilard 1999). In the long-run, these possibly helped to change the trajectory of 
Marikina as a society such that it is now often exemplified as an organized, 
meritocratic, and progressive one.  
However, the odds of relying on such leaders are small. Out of five cases 
where good leaders were present, three surfaced from a context of an initially 
progressive society (Pekalongan, Naga, and Dagupan), one had been present for 
multiple decades together with a favorable society such that it was difficult to 
identify which came first (Balikpapan), and one came from a not-so-favorable 
society (Marikina). This seems to highlight arguments for the importance of deep-
rooted institutions in the society (Williamson 2000, Granovetter 1985). These 
findings, however, remain speculative as they were based on a limited number of 
observations. One of the ways to improve the validity of such arguments is to reduce 
biases, including ones which may have been caused by country-specific conditions 
(i.e., inherent differences among the Philippines and Indonesia). 
3. Comparing Philippine and Indonesian Cases 
Third, similar to the way innovative and typical cases have been compared 
and contrasted, possible differences between Philippine and Indonesian cases were 
identified in terms of leadership, society, and transaction costs. The objective of this 
comparison is to check whether there was any strong pattern that distinguished the 
Philippine and Indonesian cases which may have biased the way innovative and 
typical city governments were distinguished. The comparison is not meant to find 
meaningful differences among Philippine and Indonesian cases in explanatory ways, 
but more descriptive. While it is acknowledged that the Philippines have had longer 
experience of decentralization than Indonesia (by about 10 years), any difference 
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that appear between the two countries in terms of leadership, society, or 
transaction costs may have been related to other factors than decentralization 
experience.  
a. Leadership and Society Factors 
First, the extents of which leadership-related sub-factors were present or 
absent in Philippine and Indonesian cases are presented in Table 37. The difference 
in the presence of leadership aspects ranged from zero to one case for each sub-
factor (charisma, commitment, and diversity of experience). In aggregate, Philippine 
cases obtained nine ‘Yes’ out of a possible 12, while Indonesian cities obtained 
seven. The difference of two out of 12 possible ‘Yes’ is argued to be relatively small. 
Second, the extents of which society-related sub-factors were present or 
absent in Philippine and Indonesian cases are presented in Table 38. The difference 
in the presence of society aspects ranged from zero to one case for each sub-factor 
(meritocratic norms, organized civil society, and favorable history). In aggregate, 
Philippine cases obtained seven ‘Yes’ out of a possible 12, while Indonesian cities 
obtained six. Similar to the situation with leadership factors, the difference of one 
out of 12 possible ‘Yes’ for society factors is argued to be relatively small. 
Table 37: Leadership in Philippine and Indonesian Cases 
Leadership 
sub-factors 























Charisma Yes Yes No No 2/4 Yes Yes No No 2/4 
Commitment Yes Yes Yes No 3/4 Yes Yes No No 2/4 
Diversity of 
Experience 








Table 38: Society in Philippine and Indonesian Cases 
Society sub-
factors 

























Yes Yes  No No 2/4 Yes Yes No No 2/4 
Organized 
civil society 
Yes Yes  Yes No 3/4 Yes Yes No No 2/4 
Favorable 
History 
Yes No Yes No 2/4  Yes Yes No No 2/4 
‘Progressive 
society’? 
YES YES YES NO 7/12 YES YES NO NO 6/12 
 
b. Transaction Cost Factors 
Third, the extent to which transaction cost-related sub-factors were present 
or absent in Philippine and Indonesian cases are presented in Table 39. The 
difference in the presence of transaction cost aspects ranged from two to three ‘Yes’ 
for each sub-factor out of a possible number of 12 ‘Yes’. Here we start to see more 
substantial differences for each of the sub-factors, which will be explored below.  






























Cost (of 3) 
3 3 3 2 11 3 3 2 0 8 
Low 
Negotiation 
Cost (of 3) 
3 3 0 1 7 3 2 2 2 9 
Low 
Enforcement 
Cost (of 3) 
3 3 1 0 7 2 3 3 2 10 
Sub-factor 
Count 








In terms of information cost, Philippine cases obtained 11 out of 12 possible 
‘Yes’, while Indonesian cases only obtained eight. Upon inspection of the more 
specific sub-factors related to information costs, this may be related to a difference 
in networking activities (Table 40, item A2). It is noted that all four Philippine cases, 
regardless of ‘innovative’ or ‘typical’, have conducted or were involved in extensive 
networking activities, be in vertical, horizontal, or local networks. Meanwhile, 
Indonesia’s ‘typical’ cases were more limited in their networking. Samarinda 
sporadically participated in national-level city associations, while Tanjungpinang had 
largely minimal involvement in intercity networks. While the number of cases are 
not enough to draw any conclusion, but the maturity of each country’s city 
government associations may deserve to be further explored (the League of Cities of 
the Philippines was established as per 1991 Local Government Code, while 
Indonesia’s City Government Association or APEKSI was established in 2000, 
similarly in-line with decentralization laws). Another possible area of exploration is 
the extent to which English as the international language of networking is spoken in 
each country. 
Table 40: Comparing transaction cost factors between Philippine and Indonesian cases 




A Low Information Cost 11/12 8/12 
 1. Access to ICT 4/4 3/4 
 2. Networking activities* 4/4 2/4 
 3. Travels & familiarity with other cities 3/4 3/4 
B Low Negotiation Cost 7/12 9/12 
 1. Relationship with city council 3/4  3/4  
 2. Relationship with citizens  2/4 2/4 
 3. Healthy political rivalry*  2/4 4/4 
C Low Enforcement Cost 7/12 10/12 
 1. Capable civil servants 2/4 3/4 
 2. Capacity building activities 3/4 4/4 
 3. Incentives & disincentives 2/4  3/4 




In terms of negotiation cost, Indonesian cases obtained nine out of 12 
possible ‘Yes’, while Philippine cases obtained seven. Upon inspection of more 
specific sub-factors, this may be possibly related to a difference in presence of 
healthy political rivalry (Table 40, item B3). All four Indonesian cases, whether 
‘innovative’ or ‘typical’, did not face conditions where the mayor faced substantial 
‘obstructionist’ moves by their political rivals while in office.  Meanwhile, both of the 
Philippine’s ‘typical’ cases faced bitter rivalry that resulted in a mayor sidelining the 
rival’s family members from strategic public positions, discontinuing the rival’s 
signature programs once the latter is no longer in power, and battling each other in 
court cases and media war. Speculatively, these may be related to the longer history 
of direct democracy in the Philippines, as well as the extent to which strong local 
families, ‘clans’, or ‘dynasties’ have been present. It may also be related to the fact 
that Philippine LGUs do not have a ‘permanent secretary’ (the ‘city administrator’ 
post is coterminous with that of the mayor). An ‘informal understanding’ between 
political leaders and senior career executives was argued to contribute to higher 
‘perceived innovation’ (Berman et al. 2013) 
In terms of enforcement cost, Indonesian cases obtained 10 out of 12 
possible ‘Yes’, while Philippine cases only obtained seven. However, upon inspection 
of the specific sub-factors related to enforcement cost (Table 40, items C1-3), there 
was only a difference of one case count among Indonesian and Philippine cases.  
In the aggregated notion of transaction costs, Philippine cases obtained 25 
‘Yes’ out of a possible 36, while Indonesian cities obtained 27. Similar to the earlier 
situations, the difference of two out of 36 possible ‘Yes’ is argued to be relatively 
small. Philippine cases lead in terms of information costs (11/12 ‘Yes’, as opposed to 
8/12 among Indonesian cases), but Indonesian cases lead in terms of negotiation 
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costs (9/12 compared to 7/12) and enforcement costs (10/12 compared to 7/12). In 
the end, such differences were evened out and a preliminary argument is proposed 
that there was no meaningful difference among Philippine and Indonesian cases in 
terms of transaction costs.174 
c. Assessment 
There were no strong indications to suggest that Philippine and Indonesian 
cases were so different that they may have biased the comparison of innovative and 
typical city governments. In general, such findings were as expected and seem to 
highlight various similarities between the two countries (see Figure 19). This, 
however, further exposes the high level of similarity in local governance issues 
between the Philippine and Indonesian cities that many people (including politicians 
and policy makers in the two countries) seem to have not realized.  
Some relatively minor differences, however, exist between cases from the 
two countries. The Philippine cases showed slightly stronger presence of leadership 
and society factors (commitment, diversity of experience, and organized civil 
society), while the Indonesian cases fared marginally better in terms of transaction 
costs. However, no substantial difference was identified between the cases of the 





                                                          
174 Two sub-factors, however, perhaps deserved to be further studied: engagement in 
networking activities, and presence of extreme political rivalry. 
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Figure 19: Comparing Explanatory Factors between Philippine and Indonesian Cases 
 
In the transaction cost sub-factors, Philippine cases tend to fare better in 
information costs especially by engaging in wider networking activities; even the 
‘typical’ cases were more involved in various international, national, and local 
networks. However, the Indonesian cases tend to fare better in negotiation costs by 
facing healthier political rivalry; even in the ‘typical’ cases, city mayors did not face 
disruptive political and administrative challenges from his or her political rivals. The 
Indonesian cases also fared slightly better in the three aspects of enforcement costs. 
Again, only a limited extent of conclusion can be drawn from the small number of 










































Chapter 7: Conclusion  
 
 
Public innovations are increasingly capturing the imagination of politicians, 
government officials, and academics. With growing interest in cities and 
urbanization, more attention is being focused upon local governments and their role 
in offering innovative public solutions that could inspire fellow cities and 
municipalities. While more research has been conducted on the topic, a review of 
the literature showed a lack of theoretical framework that attempts to explain why 
certain cities have been introducing more innovation than others. The small number 
of research done specifically on mid-sized city governments, and the ‘big-bang’ 
adoption of decentralization in newly democratized Indonesia and the Philippines 
(which have provided unprecedented degree of autonomy to city governments 
therein) provided the motivation to identify more specific cases to study.  
This thesis aims to understand the factors which may have contributed to 
some city governments being consistently more innovative than others. It attempts 
to fill the gap in theoretical explanations by offering a ‘Leadership-Society-
Transactions’ framework that integrates conventional explanations (agents and 
structure) with an arguably less-conventional one drawn from theories of 
transaction costs. The framework is applied to eight mid-sized cities in Indonesia and 
the Philippines to better understand how factors related to transformational 
leadership, progressive society, and efficient transaction costs have been present (or 
absent) in both ‘innovative’ and ‘typical’ city governments over a 10-20 years period.  
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This final chapter of the thesis provides a summary of the research findings, 
offers policy recommendations, identifies intended contributions to the academic 
literature, reflects on the methodological shortcomings, and ends by proposing 
some suggestions for future research.  
1. Summary of Findings  
The findings of this research could be simplified as a Venn diagram in Figure 
20. The figure shows that innovative city governments, in this case, Naga and 
Marikina in the Philippines, and Balikpapan and Pekalongan in Indonesia, showed 
notable presence of the three explanatory factors: transformational leadership, 
progressive society, and efficient transaction costs. Meanwhile, typical city 
governments such as Dagupan and Malabon in the Philippines, and Samarinda and 
Tanjungpinang in Indonesia, tend to lack one, two, or all three of such factors.175  












                                                          
175 This seems to be in line with the ‘Anna Karenina principle’ from Tolstoy’s 1877 novel 

















The four typical cases showed variation in the presence (or absence) of 
these factors. Malabon and Tanjungpinang did not show strong notable presence of 
leadership, society, and transaction cost factors. Dagupan, however, showed relative 
presence of transformational leadership and progressive society, but generally 
lacked having favorable transaction costs over time. Samarinda, interestingly, tend 
to show the presence of efficient transaction costs, but generally struggled for the 
consistent presence of transformational leadership and progressive society.  
The experience of Naga, Pekalongan, and Balikpapan highlights how 
transformational leaders (3/3 sub-factors) emerged from a progressive society (3/3) 
and faced low transaction costs (9/9, 8/9, and 8/9 respectively), or were able to alter 
the transaction costs in their favor, such that they could implement new, innovative 
programs. Thus Naga, Pekalongan, and Balikpapan were cities where leadership, 
society, and transaction cost factors worked together to make the city an innovative 
one.  
Marikina highlights how transformational leaders (3/3) were able to emerge 
even from an initially not-so-progressive society (initially 0/3, but then 3/3). These 
leaders had especially strong political will and charisma, such that they could alter 
transaction costs which were initially against their favor (negotiation costs were 
initially 1/3, but then 3/3), and implement the needed transformative programs. 
Over time (23 years of consistent implementation), Marikina was able to change the 
values, norms, and habits of their population such that it has now more meritocratic 
and organized. 
In Malabon and Tanjungpinang, a less-than-progressive society (0/3) 
coupled with inconsistency in the presence of transformational leaders (0/3) have 
prevented the city from introducing innovative programs. Even if sometimes 
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promising leaders with commitment and favorable experience were given the 
chance to lead, they were largely prevented from being effective. Malabon’s and 
Tanjungpinang’s transaction costs were relatively low, though not very obstructive 
(3/9 and 4/9, respectively). However, inward-looking orientation and lenient 
attitude towards accountability in Tanjungpinang, predatory interest groups and 
disruptive political rivalry in Malabon, as well as permissive attitude and low 
capacity of civil servants in both cities consistently presented challenges to mayors 
who may be keen on implementing innovative programs. 
While the six cases showed that leadership and society factors tend to be 
present in the innovative cases and absent in the typical cases, two remaining cases 
(Dagupan and Samarinda) showed otherwise. Dagupan showed that leadership and 
society, alone or together, were not enough to explain innovation. Dagupan is a case 
where even relatively transformational leaders (2/3) and relatively progressive 
society (2/3) were not able to join forces to implement innovative programs 
consistently over time. A large part of the explanation may be that Dagupan’s 
leaders faced relatively unfavorable transaction costs (4/9), especially in terms of 
bitter political rivalry, where opposing characters take the leadership position one 
after another, and resulted in the nullification of existing programs, not to mention 
lack of consistent support from city council and citizens groups. 
Similar to Dagupan, Samarinda showed that transaction costs alone were 
similarly not enough to explain public innovation. Samarinda’s leaders had faced 
relatively efficient transaction costs (7/9), which signify that the leaders have been 
able to generate a consistently favorable political and administrative environment 
for whatever program they would propose. However, the relative lack of 
transformational leadership (1/3) and absence of progressive norms in the society at 
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large (0/3) seem to prevent the city from coming up with innovations that generate 
meaningful public value. 
The research findings pose questions on traditional claims of the primacy of 
leadership (agency) alone or deep-rooted societal institutions (structure) alone.  A 
meso-structure that links leaders and their social setting is argued to be present in 
the form of transaction costs, and it seems to matter in providing or completing a 
framework to explain a city government’s innovativeness. The notion of transaction 
costs covers an overlapping area between leaders and society, but also reveals some 
aspects of local governance that were not visible by looking at agents and structures 
alone, especially in terms of how new policies and programs were adopted and 
implemented.  
2. Policy Recommendations 
Based on the findings of how leadership, society, and transaction cost 
factors played out in innovative and typical city governments, the thesis provides 
policy recommendations to national and local government policy makers, as well as 
donor agencies, to facilitate city governments in further developing innovations. 
Learning from Leadership and Society 
Leadership 
As identified in the theoretical framework, leadership is related to a host of 
qualities related to deep and personal characters. As such identifying policy 
recommendations to improve local leadership quality, especially that related to 
commitment and charisma, is not a straightforward task. Diversity of experience is a 
factual condition based on one’s past, but it could be enhanced even after someone 
has become a leader, i.e., by exposing him or her to ‘common zones’ of interaction, 
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were political leaders meet other leaders from the bureaucracy, business sector, and 
community groups (Hambleton and Howard 2013).  
The notion of leadership also should be extended beyond top-level political 
positions. Bason (2010), for example, identified four levels of leadership which are 
relevant for innovation: (1) the political chief executive, (2) the top-ranked career 
civil servant (permanent secretary and heads of city departments), (3) the mid-level 
manager (head of sub-departments), and (4) the institution head or team-leaders. 
Each of these has a role to play in enabling innovation. This falls in line with the 
argument for good ‘executive initiative understanding’ between political leaders and 
career executives, which tend to be associated with increased perception of 
innovative activities (Berman et al. 2013).  
The gap in governance capacity among political leaders is notable. Political 
leaders typically can interact very well with citizens on the relatively short-term and 
political context of vote-getting. However, once elected, the leader is expected to 
interact with citizens in more the long-term context of local governance. How they 
interact with administrative leaders and staff, city council members, civil society 
groups, etc. are also key. The research found many newly-elected political leaders in 
the Indonesian and Philippine cities struggled on this front and so there is untapped 
demand for improving the governing capacity of political leaders (including their 
interaction with administrative leaders) in the context of local democracy. 
Society 
Factors related to deep-rooted societal institutions were found to be 
strongly present in the innovative cases but not so in the typical ones. While history 
cannot be changed, norms and the organization of citizens groups could be 
transformed over time. First, much could be learned from how Naga, Marikina, and 
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Pekalongan empowered civil society groups. These cities benefited from local and 
national government programs, as well as those of NGOs and religious institutions, 
which conduct civic education and community organizing. Naga has a ‘people’s 
council’ where various civil society groups converge at the city level, and one 
representative from the people’s council is formally involved as an additional voting 
member of the city council. In Pekalongan, the national community empowerment 
program (PNPM) is used to a great extent to train community groups to organize 
themselves, participate in public affairs, and ultimately become more politically 
empowered. Along the argument for building social capital with ‘wide radius’ 
(Fukuyama 1995), cities could also provide resources for civil society groups (which 
tend to have narrow interests based on religion, ethnicity, hobby, etc.) to work 
together, for example, on a common city-wide project.  
Second, one could still learn from these cities in how to institutionalize 
values of meritocracy, trust, and trustworthiness through formal and informal ways. 
Formally, Marikina implemented a strict rule of law where unruly sidewalks were 
ravaged and those who violated recycling rules were fined. However, such rules 
equally applied to city government officers, so a sense of ‘credibility’ was 
established. After 15-18 years of consistent implementation, norms and values 
slowly changed and now Marikina is widely regarded as one of the country’s most 
orderly cities.176 Informally, good norms are also appreciated, as shown by an 
example from Naga, where citizens who return other people’s lost belongings would 
always get personal appreciation from the mayor, and are profiled in the city’s 
media. Furthermore, In Pekalongan the mayor gave annual awards to citizen 
                                                          
176 Interview respondents, however, warned that Marikina is still prone to backslides, so such 
rule of law needs to be continued. When the researcher visited the city several times in 
2014 and 2015, he found people conducting community service for violating city rules like 
not separating the garbage. 
300 
 
entrepreneurs and innovators, in line with the argument for cities to support social 
entrepreneurs (Korosec and Berman 2006).  
Learning from Transaction Costs 
Information Costs 
Based on understanding of information costs, we are alerted to the 
importance of ‘policy learning’ across cities and the need to develop a case bank of 
good practices. For this to work better, cities need to expand ICT access to both civil 
servants and the population (Hale and Project 2011). Collaboration between city 
governments and telecommunication companies could be explored, as in the case of 
Balikpapan City with PT. Telkom. To ensure that the database of innovative 
programs are well used, a government organization could be tasked as ‘knowledge 
facilitator’ that helps local governments identify appropriate solutions from other 
cities, including the resources (reports, trainers, funding, etc.) to do so.  
However, I should clarify that beyond ICT access, how the technology is used 
and the types and forms of information available is just as important. Currently 
award committees tend to showcase their winning programs only in a one-page 
description, if at all. Instead, these should be packaged in more popular language, 
perhaps in the form of feature articles, videos, etc. with collaboration with the 
media. The database on award-winning programs should be open and easily 
accessible to the society. Relevant and useful content should be further developed 
in more popular language or format that is more accessible to the society. 
Second, for innovative ideas to flourish, city officials need to expand their 
network beyond their immediate locality and interact with officials from other cities 
and regions (Considine, Lewis, and Alexander 2009, Newman, Raine, and Skelcher 
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2001). City governments should try to secure resources to engage in inter-city 
networks, which may include membership dues, budget for travels, and time for 
public leaders to participate in network events. Despite some tendency to be 
misused for personal interests, traveling, if done strategically, is an effective way to 
keep city leaders (not only mayors) inspired and have a range of good models to pull 
from. However, they need to report back to the citizens on what they learned from 
these networking and traveling opportunities, perhaps through the media. Naga 
gives a good model on how leaders regularly provide a Facebook update of what 
they are doing when traveling, and the lessons that could be highlighted for the city. 
Negotiation Costs  
Based on understanding of negotiation costs, we found that not all city 
leaders have the ability to build good relationship with local stakeholders; trainings 
on negotiation, public engagement/participation, and community empowerment 
may be relevant. The proportion of ‘veto players’ in the city council may be given, 
but the relationship and understanding between the executive and legislative 
institutions could be improved.  From Naga and Marikina, one could learn how 
frequent informal meetings between the mayor, senior career executives, and city 
council members were conducted on a weekly basis. This was easier to do in 
Philippine cities as they tend to have substantially fewer councilors than Indonesian 
cities.177  
The relationship between city government and society could be also 
improved by similarly facilitating more frequent meetings between the two. For 
example, Imdaad of Balikpapan held weekly open house ‘coffee morning’ sessions, 
                                                          
177 For example, despite similar population size, Tanjungpinang in Indonesia has 30 city 
councilors while Naga has 10.  
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and rides the bike around town with citizens every Sunday. Meanwhile, Basyir of 
Pekalongan answers questions on the radio every week. Such relationship, however, 
could be further improved by incorporating citizens’ voice and role in the design and 
implementation of public programs, similar to the ‘co-creation’ argument (Alves 
2013). For example, the Naga city government has conducted numerous 
collaborative projects with NGOs and POs, as Malabon were also doing with the 
AIMM on the Community Mortgage Program. More advanced forms of citizen 
participation such as ‘citizen’s juries’ and ‘citizen’s panels’ also help the public better 
express their expectations, and the city government could get more ideas for 
innovative programs  (Newman, Raine, and Skelcher 2001).  However, to engage 
meaningfully in such opportunities, the society’s capacity needs to be strengthened, 
for example through ‘citizen’s academies’ (Morse 2012).  
Enforcement Costs 
Based on understanding of enforcement costs, we found the need to ensure 
good capable civil servants. This is a given factor, but could be achieved by ensuring 
clean, meritocratic recruitment in the first place (Rauch and Evans 2000). Regardless 
of civil servants’ given capability, capacity building needs to be conducted on an 
ongoing basis. Naga and Pekalongan have shown that trainings and awareness-
raising on productivity and service orientation could be effective in improving both 
the skills and mindset of the bureaucracy, especially when coupled with more 
comprehensive programs such as a ‘citizen’s charter’ and the Productivity 
Improvement Program. Although conducting trainings and sending highly 
performing staff to public policy schools is beneficial, many government staff 
appreciated the hands-on trainings and modeling of ‘good behavior’ conducted 
directly by the mayor, as in the case of Marikina and Balikpapan.  
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Finally, the city government could apply an appropriate incentive system for 
both civil servants and public leaders to conduct innovations that provide public 
value. As argued by Bason (2010), innovativeness should also be encouraged 
‘consciously’ and ‘systematically’. This could be done by incorporating ‘innovation’ 
as a value in the city’s vision and mission. The Seoul metropolitan government in 
South Korea provides an example of wholesale adoption of ‘creativity management’ 
which resulted in more than 60,000 new ideas proposed by employees and 
managers within a period of two years, where ultimately 13% of such ideas were 
implemented (Berman and Kim 2010). The incentive argument for ensuring good 
performance is arguably more ‘transactional’, but people in general respond to 
incentives. Such incentives could be monetary (as in the case of Balikpapan and 
Marikina’s performance bonuses), reputational (as in the case of Tanjungpinang’s 
‘best’ and ‘worst’ sub-districts, and Marikina’s quarterly rating of employees), or 
career-based (as in Balikpapan’s educational and promotion opportunities).  
Role of National Government 
An aspect of ‘negotiation cost’ not covered in this research was the possible 
compromises that a city government may need to conduct with higher level 
governments, namely the provincial and national government. This aspect was not 
covered due to the argument that Indonesia’s ‘autonomous’ cities and the 
Philippines’ ‘highly urbanized’ and ‘independent component’ cities178 have a high 
level of autonomy that most local innovations could be decided internally and 
conducted using the city’s own budget. However, in effect, the ways in which 
national and local governments view innovation could present a challenge. Until the 
                                                          
178 All eight cases in this thesis fall into these categories. 
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recent (2014) update of Indonesia’s local government law179, the country’s 
regulatory framework did not recognize the concept of local public innovation, and 
thus ‘innovation’ and ‘innovativeness’ was often seen in a suspicious light (as 
something that did not have legal justification).180  
While the law should indeed be welcomed, more recommendations on how 
the central government could facilitate regional and local innovations would be 
beneficial. A ‘rational choice’ approach is to incentivize innovative local leaders with 
political visibility and reputational capital (Potts and Kastelle 2010). National 
government leaders could do their part by placing a premium on local innovations, 
and reward innovative mayors with more political prominence and/or promotion to 
high-profile national positions. For example, in the Philippines, the GP Awards is 
already a prestigious event hosted directly by the President, and Robredo (whom on 
behalf of Naga City had received multiple GP awards), was eventually appointed as 
Secretary of the DILG. For the city in general (not just for leaders), innovations could 
be incentivized with more tangible rewards, such as letting the city government 
keep cost savings enabled by the innovation as ‘strategic funds’ that can be used to 
achieve the city’s goals, or to enable more innovations in the future (Albury 2011). 
How a city government uses such savings, however, should be transparent and 
regulated.  
The central government could also ‘buy’ or ‘procure’ successful local 
innovations for scaling up as a national program (Rolfstam 2013, Lember, Kalvet, and 
Kattel 2011). However, more care should be applied to prevent premature or 
                                                          
179 Indonesia’s Law No. 23 of 2014 on Regional Governance (Pemerintahan Daerah) dedicates 
Chapter XXI (Articles 386-390) to support and regulate local innovations. 
180 Law No. 23 of 2014 further states that an objective of the articles on local innovation was 
to ‘develop objective criteria’ such that ‘innovations will be developed without fear of 
breaching the law’. 
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inappropriate replication. Instead, the central government could allocate more 
attention to support ‘bottom-up innovation’ (Lowndes 1996) by facilitating local 
governments that have shown initiative to replicate an ‘innovation’ from elsewhere 
based on their own interest. The DELGOSEA project (Partnership for Democratic 
Local Governance in Southeast Asia) provides an example for an organization that 
facilitates city governments to learn from ‘best practices’ conducted by other city 
governments.  
With growing interest in public innovations, it is time that Indonesia and the 
Philippines start to have regularly published data on the subject down to the local 
level. The biases of innovation-specific surveys are well documented. However 
without the availability of such data, we are left to proxy innovation from similarly 
biased sources, such as award winners.  Large scale surveys of over 500 local 
governments in Indonesia and over 1,000 in the Philippines are expensive and 
bureaucratic, and needs to be adopted by the national government. To reduce 
possible reporting biases, the national government may not need to do a dedicated 
survey on the topic of ‘innovation’, but require local government to conduct regular 
reporting of their key policies, programs, and projects, wherein one of the 
fields/questions to be answered is: ‘Is it a new policy/program/project that did not 
exist last year?’ This question could help identify possible innovations and 
innovativeness across local governments, and set the stage for a targeted follow-up 
survey that include more specific questions for the innovative programs. 
3. Academic Contributions 
This thesis is expected to contribute to the literature on a number of 
academic fields, namely public management and public policy, new institutional 
economics, urban studies, and Southeast Asian studies.  
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Public Management and Public Policy 
First, the thesis attempts to expand the field of public management by 
introducing the ‘Leadership-Society-Transactions’ (LST) framework with the 
consideration that there are still a limited number of frameworks that try to explain 
public innovativeness. This expands public management’s depository of ‘tools’ with 
which to analyze this topic of growing interest. Currently the literature on public 
innovation tends to be dominated by descriptive attempts to clarify and distinguish 
the topic (for example, see Osborne and Brown 2013, Stewart‐Weeks and Kastelle 
2015, De Vries, Bekkers, and Tummers 2015). With the exception of a few who has 
provided a comprehensive framework linking innovation with awareness, capacity, 
courage, and co-creation (Bason 2010) or provided a strong argument for the role of 
power, networks, and norms in enabling/hindering innovation (Considine, Lewis, 
and Alexander 2009), the phenomenon still tends to be explained through ‘lists’. 
The LST framework offered here is unique not only because it incorporates 
the predominant arguments offered to explain ‘innovation’, ‘progress’, and ‘change’ 
(namely: leadership and society), but also because it draws insight from the theories 
of institutional analysis, especially those of transaction costs. Many of the factors 
that have been used to explain innovativeness could be seen as ‘transaction costs’. 
For example, ‘awareness’, ‘co-creation’, and ‘capacity’ (Bason 2010), could be 
identified as part of ‘information cost’, ‘negotiation cost’, and ‘enforcement cost’, 
respectively. The insight from institutional approaches is relevant in light of 
arguments about the limited extent of institutional and political analysis in public 
management and policy studies literature. 
This thesis has also explored some topics typically analyzed in the public 
policy literature. Among these is the notion of ‘policy transfer’ (Evans 2004, 2009) 
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and ‘policy learning’ (Rose 1991, Bennett and Howlett 1992), which are closely 
related to the notion of ‘learned innovation’. Within the LST framework, these are 
primarily explored through the ‘information cost’ sub-factors. Parts of the case 
reports pertaining to information cost could be viewed as empirical observations of 
policy learning. Other themes related to the public policy literature explored in this 
thesis, though to a lesser extent, are ‘policy networks’, ‘policy implementation’, 
‘policy entrepreneurs’, and ‘policy beliefs’.   
New Institutional Economics 
This thesis also extends the application of transaction cost analysis into the 
topic of public management, and more specifically public innovation. Transaction 
cost analysis is often used in the private sector context to analyze various 
‘mechanisms of governance’ to produce a good or service (Williamson 1996), from 
in-house production (direct provision) to outsourcing (privatization). The transaction 
cost analysis has also been used to analyze how public services could be delivered 
with higher efficacy (for example, Brown and Potoski 2003, Huet and Saussier 2003, 
Kwon, Lee, and Feiock 2010, Obermann 2007). In relation to innovation, much has 
been explored on the relationship between an organization’s mechanisms of 
governance (i.e., size, structure, and procedures) and its likelihood to adopt 
innovations (Damanpour 1987, 1992, Wolter and Veloso 2008). However, the TC 
framework has been rarely applied on the topic of public innovation. 
TC theories are mostly developed based on the private sector context, 
where it is assumed that economic activities will take place in any case, because 
economic actors need to generate profit. However, the way TCs work in the public 
sector may be slightly different from the way they work in the private sector. Firms 
need to generate profit, so they would choose different organizational forms to 
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minimize TCs. In the public sector context, however, where innovation is not a 
requirement, high TCs of a new program of policy may deter public organizations 
from introducing said innovation altogether.  
By applying the lens of transaction costs on public innovation, this thesis 
found some evidence on the theoretical proposition that connects innovativeness 
with presence of low transaction costs. All the four innovative cities have faced 
favorable transaction costs of governing, while three of the four typical cities have 
not. One of the typical cities which did face efficient transaction costs (Samarinda of 
Indonesia), however, argued that transaction costs may not be a sufficient 
explanation, and that other factors (i.e., leadership and society) may similarly play 
an important role in explaining public innovativeness. The case reports describe the 
ways in which transaction costs were present (or absent) in eight mid-sized cities of 
Indonesia and the Philippines. Academically, these contribute to the expansion of 
empirical studies of transaction costs in less-explored topics (public innovation, mid-
sized cities, Indonesia, and the Philippines).  
Urban Studies 
Furthermore, the research expands the field of urban studies by (1) 
exploring the topic of urban governance in less-explored cities, and (2) expanding 
the literature on innovations in the city from a largely private-sector focus to include 
the public sector. Plenty of analyses have been conducted on cities of the developed 
world, as well as capital and large cities of the developing world. However, with the 
exception of some, there is a dearth of knowledge about what is specifically 
happening in the developing world’s secondary and mid-sized cities. Although a mid-
sized city does not accommodate many residents compared to large or metropolitan 
ones, but a great number of cities fall under the medium-size category. Therefore 
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better understanding of how these cities are governed potentially sheds light on 
how a large portion of the population is governed.  
Also, this thesis explores aspects related to leadership, society, and how the 
two are related through politics and policy in the context of public innovations. 
There is already an established literature on why some cities better support firms in 
conducting innovative activities. Many of these also utilized the transaction cost 
perspective to argue that cities which offer lesser transaction costs provide more 
positive externalities and opportunities for firms to innovate (Piore and Sabel 1984, 
Storper 1993, Saxenian 1996). Unlike the existing literature, however, this thesis has 
not offered a specifically ‘urban’ or ‘regional’ viewpoint (i.e., by looking at distance 
and density). Instead, it has explored cities and urban settings in particular, and 
offered empirical cases of public innovations in the city. 
The literature on urban politics and urban regimes, such as those developed 
by Stone (1993), Molotch (1976), and DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993), have 
informed the development of the framework used in this thesis. However, 
considering the breadth of the transaction cost framework, the urban politics 
literature has been incorporated in a limited manner within the “negotiation cost” 
component (more especially under “relationship with society”). My research have 
gauged the extent of presence of urban regimes in the cities, and found that pro-
development “growth machines” did not feature prominently. From my cases I 
found that government officials were typically not interested in linking with big 
private businesses in urban development projects as the former was more 
interested in seeking gains from the public purse. The fact that I am focusing on mid-
sized cities in Indonesia and the Philippines may have contributed to such findings. 
Albeit still at an early stage, these would make an interesting point to highlight as 
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empirical response (from mid-sized cities of developing Asia) to the more 
established theories (typically drawn from larger cities in Western cases). 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Southeast Asian Studies 
Finally, the research expands knowledge in the fields of Indonesian studies, 
Philippine studies, and to some extent Southeast Asian studies. With similar 
argument to the above, most of the current understanding on Indonesia and the 
Philippines (as well as Southeast Asia) has been based on the context of major cities 
and some rural areas therein, but not the mid-sized and smaller cities. Also, there is 
little research on public management issues that compares and contrasts sub-
national entities across multiple Southeast Asian countries. This research thus sheds 
more light on a relatively less explored region of archipelagic Southeast Asia that 
possibly offers interesting lessons, particularly in the field of public management and 
urban governance in the context of recent democratization and decentralization. 
Through this cross-country comparison, with careful selection of two 
countries that are similar in many ways (especially related to decentralization, but 
also politics and culture), I highlighted a high level of similarity between the 
Philippines and Indonesia that many people – including in both countries - did not 
realize. Many could be achieved by highlighting this phenomenon, including more 
opportunity for policy learning between Indonesian and Philippine cities.  
4. Limitations  
In general, there was no major hurdle in obtaining primary data in the form 
of interviews, except perhaps in the city of Malabon, where some intended 
respondents were reluctant to provide their insights. Secondary data and statistics 
was also relatively accessible, but only once the researcher was already on site. Thus 
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for small-n approach, where fieldwork was part of the agenda, data collection did 
not pose a major challenge.  
The methodology chapter has identified several validity issues that limit the 
extent to which research findings could be interpreted with assurance. First, the 
notion of ‘innovativeness’ as identified by awards may be biased in terms of (1) 
construct contamination, where ‘innovation’ was mixed with other notions such as 
‘positive impact’ and ‘community participation’, and (2) self-selection, where those 
who applied for awards tend to be those who may already be innovative or have the 
capacity to write compelling applications. To deal with this challenge, 
‘innovativeness’ was not used in continuous or ordinal notions, but binary 
(‘innovative’ and ‘typical’). 
Second, interview respondents may be biased in their answers due to 
‘design contamination’. For example, knowing the topic of the research, 
respondents may have exaggerated the city’s innovations, or deliberately offered 
their favorite explanations as to why innovations were adopted. To deal with this, a 
variety of data sources over extended periods of time were used to triangulate the 
information given. 
Third, there were some ‘contaminations’ and possible endogeneity among 
the explanatory factors. The notion of transaction costs as explored in this thesis 
(the interactions between the leader and the people around her) straddles some 
‘gray area’ with leadership and society (which were envisioned to be more intrinsic, 
deep-rooted, and given). A number of sub-factors under transaction costs, such as 
‘relationship between city leaders and society groups’ may have been shaped by 
characteristics of the leader (i.e., commitment) and the society (i.e., norms of trust 
and trustworthiness). This thesis nevertheless proposes transaction costs as 
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explanation alongside leadership and society with the argument that it remains a 
valuable perspective to understand public innovation. 
Fourth, there may be some endogeneity issues between the outcome 
phenomenon (public innovativeness) and transaction costs as explanatory factor. 
The thesis argued that favorable transaction costs explain public innovations. But 
the argument could be flipped on its head: that winning awards for innovation may 
lead the mayor to gain support and trust from the city council and people, thus 
leading to more favorable transactions. Use of historical analysis seems to suggest 
that innovativeness tend to manifest after the presence of favorable transaction 
costs, but it does not rule out the possibility of positive feedback loops, where 
transaction costs may became more favorable as the city won more awards.  
Fifth, research along this topic would have benefited from the presence of 
quantitative data at the city level that covers not just standard statistical topics 
(economics, social welfare, infrastructure, etc.), but also those related to local 
politics, local social capital, and local public management. However, lack of formal 
secondary data contributed to the difficulties of conducting large-n studies with 
cities as unit of analysis. For Indonesia, standard statistical data was available for the 
city level, but may not be readily available at the national statistics office or website 
(and thus many cities may need to be contacted individually). In the Philippines, 
election data down to the local level was available online from the Commission on 
Elections website back to 2007. However, for standard statistical data, there was no 
common format and types of information available across cities. With such 
limitations, large-n analyses for local governments remain difficult to conduct. 
Ultimately, there is much potential to explore the open-ended ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions of each case (processes, sequence, reasons) which are under-
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explored. The data to develop each case into a more in-depth case study is indeed 
available, but I am bound to word limits of this thesis. The comparative case-study 
method which I adopt has driven me to focus on the common factors to be 
compared and contrasted among all cases, instead of explaining the process of how 
the explanatory factors helped lead to innovativeness. There are a variety of 
contexts, reasons, motivations, and processes under which the cities became 
‘innovative’. For example, Marikina and Naga started their transformation with very 
small public budget (a legacy of the inefficient ways the city was previously run). 
Balikpapan, on the other hand, has for a long time had a large public budget due to 
the presence of oil & gas revenue. As for political coalitions, a variety of situations 
also emerged. Pekalongan (innovative) was able to build coalition mainly through 
the charisma and commitment of the mayor, but Samarinda (typical) was able to 
build coalition through a common interest among the mayor and the cities’ other 
politicians. Indeed, more in-depth explanations on each case would do justice to the 
lessons that could be learned on how different city governments came to be (or not 
to be) innovative.  
5. Future Research Opportunities 
A number of future research opportunities are present to improve this 
thesis and further develop theories and empirical observations related to public 
innovation and transaction costs. The thesis has explored an array of overlapping 
theories, themes, and contexts. Each of these could be analyzed and developed on 
its own account (instead of combined through the LST framework).  
First, there is opportunity to learn further from each of the individual cases. 
The data and analysis for each city (especially the innovative cases), as well as some 
notable local innovations (or innovative programs), could be redeveloped and 
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packaged as ‘cases’ of local public management transformation and innovation. Such 
case studies would be beneficial as part of a ‘training curriculum’ for local leaders, as 
has been written by the researcher for the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, 
NUS, and the Center for Public Policy Transformation, Jakarta. Some cases such as 
Naga offers a particularly interesting lesson in how certain characteristics of 
leadership, society, and transaction costs lead to ‘innovativeness’. In Naga, civil 
society activism, which has been built over many years, contributes to the plethora 
of public forums and civic engagement activities. And when such activism finds the 
right combination in the form of a transformational leader, they strengthen the 
governance processes of the city, trigger various interactions, and come up with 
innovative ideas well implemented. Such narratives (which may be unique from each 
city) deserve to be explored more deeply. More detailed comparison between the 
selected pairs of ‘innovative’ and ‘typical’ cases may also shed more light to uncover 
the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. 
Second, further analysis could be done by expanding beyond the cases.  
More focused analysis could be done on the cities of one country (Philippines only or 
Indonesia only), where more cities would be added to be compared with the existing 
four already analyzed here. This would keep the analysis focused on the social and 
political context of each country and be of interest, perhaps, for each national 
government to develop specific policies. Also, descriptive research could be done on 
the award winners and applicants’ data, identifying types and themes of innovations 
that have been most applied and awarded in Indonesia and the Philippines. This 
would provide a more unique picture of the characteristics of public innovation from 
a developing country perspective to complement the picture already available from 
a U.S. context (Borins 2014), for example. 
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Third, some themes that have been explored in this research deserve to be 
explored on its own account. More specific analysis could be done on each of the 
explanatory factors (leadership only, society only, or transaction cost only), tailored 
to more specific audiences. For example, the leadership analysis may be relevant for 
management journals, while the society and transaction cost themes could be 
relevant for audiences from the fields of institutional, political, and social analyses.  
In terms of leadership, for example, while past trends have shown seemingly 
innate personal characters of leaders to be a dominant explanation for innovation 
and progress, the current trend seems to indicate increasing attention on ‘collective 
leadership’ that is embedded within networks (Contractor et al. 2012, Friedrich et al. 
2009).  In terms of societal aspects, the theme of social capital, norms, trust and 
trustworthiness has been gaining ground and examined through large-scale surveys 
by national institutions, such as the annual UK Citizenship Survey of 2000-2011 
(Department of Communities and Local Government and Ipsos MORI 2011), 
Australia’s ‘Mapping Social Cohesion’ surveys (Markus 2015), and Singapore’s 
surveys on inter-racial and inter-religious relations (Chin and Vasu 2012, 2008). 
Developing countries, however, have yet to explore such issues in a more systematic 
manner.  
In terms of transaction costs, more could be further studied. For business 
transactions, The World Bank’s sub-national ‘Doing Business’ survey for Indonesia 
only covered 20 cities in 2012 and 14 cities in 2010 (World Bank 2012, 2010). A 
wider research on regional economic governance covered 243 cities/regencies in 
2007 and 245 in 2011 (KPPOD and The Asia Foundation 2011, 2007). However, no 
updates have been conducted, and the data from such reports have rarely been 
examined through an academic lens.  
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For information costs in particular, much interest is placed on the local role 
of ICT and media, as well as the notion of ‘smart cities’, in contributing to possible 
innovations in both the private and public sector domains (Campbell 2012, 
Paskaleva 2011, Schuurman et al. 2012). Multinational companies are similarly 
developing relevant programs to support these, such as Microsoft’s ‘CityNext’, IBM’s 
‘Smarter Cities’, and Cisco’s ‘Smart + Connected Communities’.  
For negotiation and enforcement costs more specifically, the notion of ‘local 
governance’ has gained much interest in the past 20 years, with international 
organizations such as the World Bank and UNDP supporting various related 
programs. However, the increasing interest in cities and urban issues has also 
focused more attention to ‘urban governance’, which specifically explores the ways 
in which urban development is planned and managed. Some examples include 
MacArthur Foundation’s support for LSE Cities’ ‘New Urban Governance’ project, 
and Temasek Foundation’s support for the Centre for Liveable Cities ‘Leaders in 
Urban Governance Programme’. An area which was understudied in this thesis, and 
would have benefited from further research, is the extent to which a local 
government’s bureaucratic capability (including the quality of regulations, 
procedures, and ‘rule of law’) provides either positive or negative externalities that 
influence its performance and innovativeness. 
Finally, the proposed LST framework to understand public innovation is 
admittedly still in an early stage of development. In order to better understand how 
consistently it provides the explanatory arguments, it needs to be applied in other 
settings. As more quantitative data becomes available, the theory should be tested 
in large-n settings. Furthermore, considering that the framework is currently applied 
only to mid-sized cities of Indonesia and the Philippines, it would be beneficial to see 
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how the theory would hold when expanded to large and small cities, cities in 
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1. Appendix 1: Sample of Interview Request, Participant 
Information Sheet, Consent Form 
A. INTERVIEW REQUEST SAMPLE 
 
To:  
Mayor [full name] 
City of [city name], Province of [province name] 
[Country] 
 
Subject: Requesting Interview for academic research 
 
Dear Mayor [full name],  
I hope this email finds you well.  
My name is Mr. Mulya Amri, and I am a Ph.D candidate at the Lee Kuan Yew School 
of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. As part of my requirements to 
graduate with a Ph.D degree, I am writing a thesis based on research about 
“Innovative City Governments”. 
For the above purpose, I would like to request a semi-structured interview with your 
goodself, at the time and place of your choosing, between [date] to [date] of [month, 
year], when I will be present in the City of [city name]. The interview will take place 
between 30 to 60 minutes.  
This research explores innovative programs conducted by governments of eight 
secondary or mid-size cities in the Philippines and Indonesia. It aims to understand 
the factors that have allowed some city governments to be innovative. Interviews will 
be conducted with the city mayor, other elected, appointed, and career public officials 
at the city level, local non-government organizations and the media. The research 
hopes to contribute to the knowledge on practices and policies of urban governance 
in the growing cities of Southeast Asia, especially in the context of decentralization. 
Appended to this email are more information about the research: 
1. Participant Information Sheet (basic information about the research, your 
participation, and your rights as participant) 
2. Consent form (for you to sign as your acknowledgement to participate) 
3. List of interview questions 
Please don’t hesitate to contact me should you need any clarification.  
Thank you very much. 
With best regards, 
Mr. Mulya AMRI 
PhD Candidate 




B. PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
1. Project title  
Innovative City Governments 
 
2. Principal Investigator and co-investigator(s), if any, with the contact 
number and organization: 
Principle Investigator: Mr. Mulya AMRI (mulya.amri@nus.edu.sg) 
Ph.D candidate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, NUS 
Email: mulya.amri@nus.edu.sg 
Co-Investigator: Dr. Eduardo ARARAL, Jr. (sppaej@nus.edu.sg) 
Assistant Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, NUS 
 
3. What is the purpose of this research?  
This research explores public innovations conducted by governments of 
secondary or mid-size cities in the Philippines and Indonesia. It aims to 
understand the factors behind the innovativeness of some city governments. 
This research a partial requirement for the Principal Investigator to obtain a 
Ph.D degree from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, NUS. The co-
investigator is his thesis supervisor. 
 
4. Who can participate in the research? What is the expected duration of 
my participation? What is the duration of this research? 
I plan to conduct interviews with stakeholders from government, private, non-
profit sectors, as well as from academia who are of at least 21 years old, in 
Indonesia and the Philippines. The interview will be conducted between 
October 2014 (upon IRB approval) to March 2015 and will take about 30-60 
minutes to complete.  
 
5. What is the approximate number of participants involved? 
The number of targeted participants is 80 people. 
 
6. What will be done if I take part in this research? 
If you agree to take part in this research, you will be explained in more detail 
about the research, you will be asked to sign a Consent Form, you will be 
interviewed (either face-to-face, via phone, web conferencing, email, and 
other means), and you will be sent a draft transcript of your interview for your 
inspection and approval.  
Audio recording and hand-written note-taking will be carried out during the 
interview only with your permission. If you feel uncomfortable with having the 
interview recorded, written notes will be taken instead (you can choose this 
option in the Consent Form).  
You may be re-contacted for any clarifications after the interview. Should the 
need for clarification arises, your additional consent will be taken. 
 




In publications or presentations related to this research, your identifiable 
personal information (name, position, institution) will only be disclosed with 
your explicit consent through an option that you can choose in the Consent 
Form.  
In the event that consent is not given, only the generic type of institution (for 
example, private, public, NGO, etc.) and position (for example, staff, 
manager, etc.) will be disclosed; your actual name, position, and institution 
will remain confidential and will not be used in any publication or 
presentation. 
In the storage of research records (notes, recordings, etc.), any identifying 
information (such as name, e-mail address or contact number) will be coded 
(i.e. only identified with a code number).  
All data collected will be kept in accordance to the University’s Research 
Data Management Policy. Research data used in publication will be kept for a 
minimum of 10 years before being discarded.  
 
8. What are the possible discomforts and risks for participants? 
There is no foreseeable risk or discomfort. You are free to not answer any 
question, if you wish. You may also withdraw from the interview at any time 
without having to give any reason, and all the data collected from you up to 
that point will be discarded. You will be sent a draft transcript of the interview 
notes for your inspection and approval. The researcher may not use the 
interview content for research and publication purpose without my prior 
approval of the transcript. 
 
9. Will there be reimbursement for participation? 
There will not be any reimbursement for participating in this research.  
 
10. What are the possible benefits to me and to others?  
There is no direct benefit to you by participating in this research. The 
knowledge gained may benefit future generations of public administrators, 
more specifically in the Philippines and Indonesia.  
 
11. Can I refuse to participate in this research? 
Yes, you can. Your decision to participate in this research study is voluntary, 
and there is no monetary or in-kind compensation for participants. There is 
no foreseeable risk or discomfort. You are free to not answer any question, if 
you wish. You may also withdraw from the interview at any time without 
having to give any reason, and all the data collected from you up to that point 
will be discarded. 
 
12. Whom should I call if I have any questions or problems? 
Should you have any questions about the research study, please contact the 
Principal Investigator, Mr. Mulya AMRI, at mulya.amri@nus.edu.sg or by 
calling or messaging him directly at his mobile phone. 
For an independent opinion regarding the research and the rights of research 
participants, you may contact a staff member of the National University of 
Singapore Institutional Review Board (Attn: Mr Chan Tuck Wai, at telephone 
(+65) 6516 1234 or email at irb@nus.edu.sg). 
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C. CONSENT FORM 
 
Project title: Innovative City Governments 
 
Principal Investigator with the contact number and organization: 
Mr. Mulya AMRI  
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, NUS 
Email: mulya.amri@nus.edu.sg 
 
I hereby acknowledge that: 
1. My signature is my acknowledgement that I have agreed to take part in the 
above research.  
2. I have received a copy of Participant Information Sheet about this research 
project and I have understood its contents. 
3. My participation in this research is voluntary and involves responding to semi-
structured interview questions that will be asked either through face-to-face 
interaction or phone interview. The interview will take 30-60 minutes of my time. 
4. I understand that the interview will be recorded either through digital media, 
hand-written notes, or both. I may decline to have the interview recorded through 
digital media and ask the interviewer to record only on hand-written notes, and will do 
so in point 9 below.  
5. I may ask the interviewer to keep some parts of my response as “off the 
record” (confidential). In such case, I will identify the parts which are confidential, and 
the interviewer will pause or stop the recording process, not write anything about 
them on the notes, and not tell anyone else about them. I may decline to answer 
certain questions without having to provide any reason. 
6. I can withdraw from the research at any point of time by informing the 
Principal Investigator and any information and data that I have conveyed (or parts of 
it) will be discarded. 
7. I understand that the interviewer will send me a draft transcript of the 
interview notes for my inspection and approval. The researcher may not use the 
interview content for research and publication purpose if I decide so. 
8. I will not have any financial benefits that result from this research. 
9. I agree / do not agree* to audio-recording of my participation in the research. 
10. I agree / do not agree* to be re-contacted for future related studies. I 
understand that future studies will be subject to an Institutional Review Board’s 
approval. 
11. I agree/do not agree* for the following personal identifiers to be disclosed in 
any publication or presentation relating to this research, if any.  
 Surname       First name        Organisation Name        Position/Designation   
 Disagree (I wish to remain anonymous and only agree to be known as ________). 
*please delete as appropriate 
 
_______________________________ ___________ 
Name and Signature (Participant) Date 
_______________________________ ___________ 
Name and Signature (Consent Taker) Date 
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2. Appendix 2: Interview Questions 
 
Project title:  
Innovative City Governments: A Transaction Cost Approach to Explain Public 
Sector Innovation in Secondary Cities of Indonesia and the Philippines 
 
Semi-Structured Interview 
List of Questions for City Mayor 
 
Questions relating to Information Cost 
1. As Mayor, how often did you travel to other cities in your country?  
 What about other cities abroad?  
 Did you get any inspiration from these visits,  
 and if so, from which cities,  
 and in what ways? 
2. How extensively do you use the Internet to learn about innovative programs 
in other cities?  
 Did you get any inspiration by doing this,  
 and if so, from which cities,  
 and in what ways? 
3. Is your city involved in networks or associations with other cities (nationally 
and internationally)?  
 How many networks or associations is your city involved in?  
 Did you get any inspiration by participating in these networks or 
associations,  
 and if so, from which cities,  
 and in what ways? 
4. Were there any other ways through which you gained inspiration or 
motivation to start an innovative project or program that has never been 







Questions relating to Negotiation Cost 
5. Who (and from which organizations) did you have to convince in order to 
conduct an innovative project or program that has never been applied in your 
city? 
 How did you rally support for innovative projects or programs from 
the city council?  
 How many people (or what proportion of city council members) were 
from the same political party as yourself?  
 Did this matter in getting the support to conduct the project or 
program? 
6. How did you rally support for innovative projects or programs from the local 
business people?  
 Did this matter in getting the project or program rolling?  
 If so, in what ways do business interests matter? 
7. How did you rally support for innovative projects or programs from the local 
civil society groups?  
 Did this matter in getting the innovative project or program rolling?  
 If so, in what ways do civil society groups matter? 
8. How did you rally support for innovative projects or programs from the 
provincial and national-level actors?  
 Did this matter in getting the innovative project or program rolling?  
 If so, in what ways do provincial and national-level actors matter? 
9. Were there other actors that had to be convinced or their support had to be 
secured? Who were they? How did you rally their support? 
 
Questions relating to Monitoring and Enforcement Cost 
10. Once they were approved, how did you ensure that the innovative projects or 
programs were implemented well? 
11. How did you monitor the implementation? 
12. How did you make sure that your staff implemented the projects or programs 
well? 
13. Did capacity of your staff contribute to the success or failure of the projects or 
programs?  
14. How did you deal with issues related to staff capacity? 
346 
 
15. Did incentives and disincentives for city government staff contribute to the 
success or failure of the projects or programs?  










Indonesia National Government and Civil Society 
 
No Name Organization Rationale for interview 
1 Syarif Puradimadja Ministry of Home Affairs Jury of IMP Award 
2 Dadang Sumantri 
Mochtar 
Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Directorate General of Regional 
Development, Director of 
Urban Affairs 
Convener of IMP Award 
3 Djatmiko Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Directorate General of Regional 
Development 
Convener of IMP Award 
4 Rudiarto Sumarwono  Partnership for 
Governance Reform  
 University of Indonesia 
 Ministry of State 
Apparatus & Bureaucracy 
Reform  
Minister’s advisor on 
public innovation 
5 Imelda Maidir GIZ  & Ministry of State 
Apparatus– One Agency, One 
Innovation 
Convener of SINOVIK 
competition 
6 Muhammad Sundoro Head of Performance 
Evaluation Subdirectorate, 
Directorate General of Human 
Settlements, Ministry of Public 
Works 
Convener of PKPD Cipta 
Karya (regional 
government performance 
evaluation in the field of 
human settlements) 
 
Philippine National Government and Civil Society 
 
 No Name Organization Rationale for interview 
1 Dr. Eddie Dorotan Galing Pook Foundation Convener of Galing Pook 
Award 
2 Adrian Adove Galing Pook Foundation Convener of Galing Pook 
Award 
3 Prof. Alex B. Brillantes  Center for Local and 
Regional Governance, UP 
Diliman 
 Commission on Higher 
Education 
Expert on public 
administration  
4 Prof. Federico 
Macaranas 
Asia Institute of Management, 
AIM Policy Center 
Expert on local 
competitiveness; Convener 
of Philippine Cities 
Competitiveness Ranking 
5 Sherwin Gatchalian  Representative of 1st 
district of Valenzuela City, 
House of Representatives 
 Former mayor of 
Valenzuela 





LOCAL RESPONDENTS - INDONESIA 
 
City of PEKALONGAN, Indonesia 
 
No Name Organization 
Type of 
Organization 
1 Fathurrahman Batik production company Business Interest 
2 Rofiqur Rusdi Restaurant owner Business Interest 
3 Balqis Diab City Council (DPRD) City Council 
4 Slamet Budianto Agency for Resarch, Technology 
and Innovation (RISTEKIN) 
City Government 
5 Agus Jati Waluyo Agency for Community and 
Women's Empowerment, Child 
Protection, and Family Planning 
(BPMP2AKB) 
City Government 
6 Bambang Suharyono Department of Industry 
(DISPERINDAGKOP) 
City Government 
7 Dr. Sri Budi Santoso Department of Communication 
and Informatics (KOMINFO) 
City Government 
8 Cayekti Widigdo,  
Anita Kusumorini,  
Betty Dahfiani 
Agency for Development & 
Planning (BAPPEDA) 
City Government 
9 Mohamad Basyir Ahmad  City Mayor City Leaders 
10 Dwi Arie Putranto City Administrator (SEKDA) City Leaders 
11 Muh. Hasan Bisyri,  
Kartono Muhamad,  
Andi Eswoyo 
Muhammadiyah Civil Society 
12 Ahmad Rofiq,  
Muhtarom,  
Ramdan 
Nahdhatul Ulama (NU)  Civil Society 
13 Setiawan Hariyanto PATTIRO (Center for Regional 
Research and Information) 
Civil Society 
14 Dr. Suryani  Rector of University of 
Pekalongan 
Higher Education 
15 Dicky, Satri STMIK Widya Pratama Higher Education 
16 Yohani STIE Muhammadiyah Higher Education 
    City of BALIKPAPAN, Indonesia 
 
 
No Name Organization 
Type of 
Organization 
1 Slamet Brotosiswoyo 
Indonesian Employer's 
Association (APINDO) Business Interest 
2 Herry Johanes Alamindo Sejahtera Persada Business Interest 
3 Wahyu Hartono  Past city councilor City Council 
4 Arbain Side 
Department of Traditional 
Markets (previously head of 
Margasari Village) City Government 
5 Muhaimin Department of City Planning City Government 
6 Mulyanto Village of Margasari, Staff City Government 
7 Imdaad Hamid Past mayor City Leaders 
8 Rizal Effendi  Mayor City Leaders 
9 Jufriansyah STABIL, Head Civil Society 




City of SAMARINDA, Indonesia 
 
 
No Name Organization 
Type of 
Organization 
1 Novel Caniago 
Indonesian Employer's 
Association (APINDO) Business Interest 
2 Majedi Effendi 
ASMINDO (Furniture industry 
association) Business Interest 
3 Sahib Heri Sutomo City Council (DPRD) City Council 
4 Heri Nurdi City Council (DPRD), Staff City Council 
5 Shiska Meliana City budget office City Government 
6 Syaharie Ja'ang  City Mayor City Leaders 
7 Zulfakar City Administrator (SEKDA) City Leaders 
8 Kahar Albahri 
Mining Advocacy Network 
(JATAM), Head Civil Society 
9 Carolus Tuah Pokja 30, Head Civil Society 
    City of TANJUNGPINANG Indonesia 
 
 
No Name Organization 
Type of 
Organization 
1 Selamat Budiman Shipyard Owner Business Interest 
2 Husnizar Hood Past city councilor City Council 
3 Abdul Kadir Ibrahim 
Secretary of City Council (past 
head of tourism department) City Government 
4 Dwi Saptarini Tourism Office City Government 
5 Suryatati Manan Past City Mayor City Leaders 
6 Riono City Secretary City Leaders 
7 Chaidar Rahmat Lekas Kepri Civil Society 
8 Alex Kolaai Putra Lekas Kepri Civil Society 
9 Zamzami Karim Rector of STISIPOL Higher Education 
10 Endri Sanopaka Lecturer at STISIPOL Higher Education 
 
 
LOCAL RESPONDENTS – THE PHILIPPINES 
 
City of DAGUPAN, Philippines 
 
 
No Name Organization 
Type of 
Organization 
1 Reagan Lim Jollibee Dagupan Business Interest 
2  Joey Tamayo City Councilor City Council 
3 Ryan Ravanzo City Council Secretary City Council 
4 Vladimir Mata 
Past City Administrator (worked 
closely with past mayor Benjamin 
Lim) City Government 
5 Atty Jo City Legal Officer City Government 
6 Farah Decano City Administrator City Government 
7 Emmanual Palaganas City Planning Office City Government 
8 Belen Fernandez City Mayor City Leaders 
9 Brian Lim Vice Mayor City Leaders 
10 Robert Dance Ensemble Civil Society 




City of MALABON, Philippines 
 
 
No Name Organization 
Type of 
Organization 
1 Antolin Oreta III  City Mayor City Leaders 
2 Alan Gatpolintan Department of Engineering City Government 
3 Cleah Nava Department of Social Work City Government 
4 Carlos Dias 
Malabon Alliance of Urban Poor 
(AIMM) Civil Society 
5 Anonymous Anonymous Civil Society 
 
 
City of MARIKINA, Philippines 
 
 
No Name Organization 
Type of 
Organization 
1 Roger S. Py 
Philippine Footwear Federation, 
Inc. Business Interest 
2 Joseph Banzon City Councilor City Council 
3 Reginald Tamayo City Council Secretary City Council 
4 Vic Jayson Cruz Head of Marikina City Library City Government 
5 Robert Baluyot Marikina City Library City Government 
6 Lourdes de la Paz Trade & Industry Office, Head City Government 
7 Gloria Buenaventura 
City Environmental Management 
Office City Government 
8 Del de Guzman City Mayor City Leaders 
9 Melvin Cruz 
City Administrator (worked 
closely with past mayors) City Leaders 
10 Val Barcinal Rotary Club Civil Society 
11 Jaime Cabalquinto Rotary Club Civil Society 
    City of NAGA, Philippines 
 
 
No Name Organization 
Type of 
Organization 
1 Nicholas Beda A. Priela Naga City Chamber of Commerce Business Interest 
2 Gabriel H. Bordado Jr.  
City Councilor (past vice mayor, 
worked closely with Jesse 
Robredo) City Council 
3 Alec Santos Arts, Culture & Tourism Office City Government 
4 Reuel Oliver Information Technology Office City Government 




Metro Naga Development 
Council (previously led the 
Productivity Improvement 
Program) City Government 
7 Nelson Legacion Vice Mayor City Leaders 
8 Florencio Mongoso Jr. City Administrator City Leaders 
9 John Bongat City Mayor City Leaders 
10 Johann Dela Rosa Naga City People's Council Civil Society 
11 Danilo Ludovice Naga Urban Poor Federation Civil Society 
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